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Improving on the allocation of 10 percent of the
national GNP is enough to keep more than a few
economists busy assisting the military services
and the Secretary of Defense.
Government Decision- Making
Decision-making in government in general and in the military
in particular is not subject to the same influences as it is in private
industry. Consequently, in any discussion of management problems
in the military too close a correspondence with industry problems
should not be assumed. Certain very substantial differences exist.
For example:
1. There is no clear cut profit motive in the military. When
business management has to decide how to allocate scarce
funds the expected revenues, costs and profits of potential
Stephen Enke, "Using Costs to Select Weapons, " American
Economic Review
,
May, 1965, p. 426.
David Novick and G. H. Fisher discuss this problem at more
length in "The Role of Management Tools in Making Military Deci-
sions, " Armed Forces Management , September, 1956, p. 44.

alternatives can be compared. All oi these variables can
be expressed in terms of a common denominator -- dollars.
The military decision-maker is in a somewhat different
situation. He must somehow value the "military worth"
of various alternatives. This can be a difficult task.
2. There is a problem involved in defining precisely the
"product" involved in many military operations. In order
to use purely quantitative techniques this, of course,
would be essential.
3. The motivations of a military decision-maker are dif-
ferent from those of his counterpart in business and bar-
gaining to achieve desired goals assumes a role of much
greater importance. A measure of "efficient" operation
is thus more difficult to establish.
4. There is the lack of a free market mechanism which is
designed to reveal preferences to the military manager
of the citizen in his role as a consumer of governmental
services. It is, in general, harder to determine con-
sumer wants in the public than in the private sector of
the economy.
Inasmuch as these differences exist, it is understandably
more difficult to formulate concepts of management control for
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government executives than for those in industry. The budgetary pro-
cess in government cannot operate to insure efficient activity in the
same manner that the price mechanism and competition enforce effi-
ciency in industry. Yet choices do have to be made and resources
are limited in the public sector, including the defense establishment.
Despite the differences referred to, there is some common ground and
the basic economic problem in both sectors remains that of making the
best use of scarce resources. One certainly should not claim too much
for public budgeting in helping to achieve this end. However, "the
budgetary process can make for better-informed judgment concerning
the allocation of government resources and can encourage the more
effective use of resources devoted to particular purposes. "^
Economic theory has always been concerned with the problem
of resource use, but only in the last few years has any real attempt
been made to apply existing theory to the problems involved in making
military expenditures through this budgetary process. Since the
See the discussion concerning operation of the market
mechanism in Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (7th ed. ; New York:
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967), pp. 42, 57-64.
4Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 1956), p. 37.
-'Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, I960), p. 105~

early 1960's, systematic quantitative analysis has been more rigor-
ously employed in the allocation process to aid military decision-
making where, due to the complexities of the problems involved, its
role might be considered potentially more important even than in the
private sector of the economy.
Development of Integrated Logistic Support Planning
The formal concept of Integrated Logistics Support Planning
(ILSP) in the Department of Defense was instituted during 1964. Since
that time a great deal has been written on how the system is designed
to work from a theoretical standpoint. Much less has been done to
provide a definite organization across functional lines within which
the system can operate. Moreover, relatively little specific guidance
has been provided to those with decision-making responsibilities as
to how procedures are to be implemented particularly as regards the
the use of the techniques of economic analysis, statistical decision
theory and the more recent concepts of business logistics management.
The organizational problem involved in implementing ILSP
procedures is a formidable one, but one which is largely outside the
"U. S.
,
Department of Defense, Directive 4 100. 35, Develop-
ment of Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and Equipment
(Washington, D. C. : Department of Defense, June 19, 1964) officially
established policies and objectives and assigned responsibility for
carrying out the program. The scope and meaning of ILSP and re-
lated logistics concepts are discussed in more detail in Chapter II,
infra.

scope of this paper. The focus here is rather on adding to the "bag
of tools" of those who must make resource allocation decisions in a
military setting so that they may be more competent to consider the
economic implications of logistic decisions. The Chief of Naval Ma-
terial, United States Navy, in fact, indicated the desirability of this
when he said:
The introduction of the logistical view into the research and
development process at an early stage is one aspect of
logistics which is rapidly becoming more prominent and one
which will have an important role in the years ahead. It
requires that we develop large numbers of individuals who
can "think logistics" across the whole life span of each
weapon system. '
Accordingly, the study of the Integrated Logistic Support concept
which follows investigates procedures aimed at using military sup-
Q
port in the most effective and efficient manner. ° Before proceeding,
however, it would be well to distinguish between the terms economy
and efficiency. These two terms may actually be considered to be
mirror images of each other. ' Economy thus means to achieve a
"7
I.J. Galantin, keynote address presented at the Navy Supply
Conference, Washington, D. C. , May 4, 1965.
Q
See Logistics Systems Management, Inc. , Maintenance
Engineering Analysis Procedures (MEAPS) Guide (Washington, D. C. :
Logistics Systems Management, Inc., 1966), p. 1-1 for a discussion
of the meaning of these concepts in a military setting.
"Donald Stevenson Watson, Price Theory and Its Uses (2nd
ed. ; Boston, Mass. : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), pp. 10-11.
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given objective with expenditure of the fewest resources (least costs)
whereas efficiency means to achieve the maximum possible benefits
from a given input of resources. Such will be the meanings intended
when these terms are subsequently used.
General considerations . -- A few additional considerations
should also be noted as regards this study of ILSP. One is that the
motivation of military decision-makers should not be too lightly dis-
missed despite the differences previously referred to with respect to
the private sector of the economy. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
has recently stated in this regard that "Managers in the Department
of Defense have one motivation going for them that managers else-
where do not. They are directly committed to a cause that supports
the very foundations of government -- the preservation of government
itself. Given this motivation, then, it is important that defense
managers be provided tools which, in the absence of a true market
mechanism, can be used to improve resource allocation decisions.
In terms of its over-all place in the scheme of national
economic activity, defense has been called ". . .the archetype of a
public good, a good that is most suitable for outright production by
10 David R. Packard, "The Qualities of Good Management, "
Defense Management Journal , Spring, 196 ( >, p. 1.
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the national government. ... The theory of public goods and their
production is of interest in a general consideration of military re-
source allocation, but is not in its entirety an immediate concern of
1 ->
this study. The main point of interest here is that a public good
such as national defense cannot be effectively supplied through the
market mechanism and, therefore, it is necessary to devise other
means of supply and other tests of efficiency. These are subjects
with which this research deals.
Information on specific systems and equipment involved in
ILSP is presented below in an unclassified manner and with due regard
for proprietary information. Whenever possible, specific systems,
equipment, and contractors are identified and actual cost and per-
formance data used. Where appropriate, examples are used to fur-
ther clarify points being made.
Need for the Study
One observer has written that [in the military] "Logistics
support historically has had little glamour. It has been relegated to
Martin J. Bailey, "The Market Mechanism in the Defense
Department, " in Issues in Defense Economics , ed. by Roland N.
McKean (New York: Columbia University Press for the National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1967), p. 175.
A brief summary of the theory of public goods as it applies
to national defense is included in Appendix A for reference purposes.
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a secondary status and called upon only when a specific need or emer-
gency arose. " 13 During the period of World War II and for several
years thereafter, defense planning in general was geared to a concept
of harnessing the vast productive power of the United States to over-
whelm the military potential of any aggressor. ^ This planning was
based on the assumption that adequate time would always be available
to bring the Nation's productive power to full force and that the coun-
try would be able to maintain at least an adequate defense until such
time as this was accomplished. In this atmosphere, attention was
focused primarily on production and delivery of weapon systems.
Responsibility for the post-delivery logistics support of these systems
was often overlooked or given only cursory consideration. Likewise
the total cost of this support received little attention.
In part due to the achievements of Soviet science, a wide
range of new weapons began appearing on the drawing boards during
this period. A successful launching of the Soviet sputnik in 1957
ushered in the space age and a whole new era of technology. Faced
1
"\
-"Edward J. Shaughnessy, A Preliminary Review of POD
Directive 4100. 35 of June 19, 19&4 "Development of Integrated
Logistic Support for Systems and Equipment" (Washington, D. C. ;
Planning Research Corporation, November, 1964), p. 5.
Murray A. Geisler, The Impact of Changing Defense on
Logistics Requirements (Santa Monica, Calif. : The RAND Corpor-
ation, December, 19&3), p. 1.
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with the threat of possible overhaul by the Soviets, speed of produc-
tion of these ever more complex and expensive weapons appeared to
assume primary importance. 15 If an optimal mix of the three dimen-
sions of development effort -- time, quality, and cost -- could not be
quickly achieved, then emphasis clearly was to be placed on speed of
development.
A turning point in military strategy considerations also
evolved during the 1950's. With the development of more sophisti-
cated, versatile weapons and equipment, emphasis began to change
from reliance on the relatively slow build-up of a massive response
to more dependence on forces in being. Conviction began to grow
that military readiness and therefore national security would depend
in the future on weapon systems in current operation. Should another
major conflict occur the issue might well be decided almost imme-
diately with weapons then available. A flexible capability was also
felt desirable to deal with a whole spectrum of conflicts ranging from
counter-insurgency to those of a "brush fire" nature. This desire to
increase the fire power and mobility of the armed forces through the
development of a large inventory of modern sophisticated weapon
systems and equipment is understandable and probably necessary.
^A. A. Giordano, "Logistical Implications of Weapon Sys-
tem Design Decisions: Integrated Logistic Support for Navy Weapon
Systems, " Naval Engineers Journal , April, 1966, p. 194.
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The process does, however, create new and more difficult problems
for the logistics management function. *" Two major problems, in
particular, arise if the weapon systems and equipment are new and
complex: (1) they are then likely also to be expensive, and (2) sup-
port requirements will not have been demonstrated in actual use.
With the introduction of increasingly more complex weapon
systems into the arsenal, it soon became apparent that maintainability
and reliability considerations had vastly increased in importance.
For example, Giordano notes that ". . . the operational success of
even routine naval missions is now almost totally hostage to the suc-
cessful performance of sophisticated weapon systems. "*' In addi-
tion, it has become increasingly apparent theit maintainability and
reliability requirements have to be in effect "built in" to the equip-
ment in the design stage to insure adequate supportability.
Logistic support of the operating forces has, of necessity,
always been carried out. A chart showing the organizations currently
engaged in this function for the Navy is included for reference as
Appendix B. This support planning has in the past, however, been
devoid to a large extent of quantitative methodologies and measured
Charles J. Zwick, Logistics Modernization (Santa Monica,
Calif. : The RAND Corporation, August, 1964), p. 2.
1 7 Giordano, "Logistical Implications of Weapon System
Design Decisions, " p. 194.
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consideration of available alternatives over the equipment's life
cycle. A new weapon system is born in an environment of complex
interactions among several influences. These influences include:
"The Threat" as defined by government intelligence; present capa-
bility to respond as calculated by military planners; state of available
technology as determined by scientists; and funds made available by
1 oCongress and the Administration. °
A basic acknowledgement contained in the Integrated Logistic
Support Planning (ILSP) concept is that any given weapon system or
equipment design automatically generates certain logistical support
considerations and that these considerations are affected by inter-
action among the influences referred to above. There is thus a con-
tinuing need for the development of new analytical tools and applica-
tions of economic analysis to obtain the maximum advantage from
logistics support dollars spent. This study is concerned with that
need and suggests areas where the planning and decision-making
process might be improved. Attention is confined primarily to
logistics support planning in the United States Navy, through evalu-
ation of certain aspects of the concept of ILSP.
1
8
Logistics Management Institute, Methods for Evaluating
the Cost/Effectiveness of Alternate Support Plans for Major Weapon
Systems (Washington, D. C. : Logistics Management Institute,
September, 19&5), p. 30.
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The problem of sharply increasing costs . -- Rising costs of
modern sophisticated weapon systems have also been instrumental in
forcing the use of analytical tools in military allocation decisions.
Discussing this point Enthoven points out that:
Whether we like it or not, we have only a limited amount
of goods and services available at any one time. Our
gross national product, though large, is limited. We
have only a finite number of manhours available for all
forms of defense activity. Moreover, there are other
needs besides defense: feeding, clothing, and housing
our population, educating our children, cultivating our
minds, fighting disease, and so on. Therefore, in peace
or in war, only a limited amount of resources is available
for defense. And if we wish to assure our freedom, it
is important that we use those resources well. * •
Because of the high cost of these systems, it is necessary to exer-
cise tighter control over the weapon itself and also the support
structure which backs it up. In Fiscal Year 1965, for example, over
25 percent of the budget for national defense was designated for
maintenance and support of systems and equipment. An appreci-
ation for the magnitude of these support operations in the United
States Navy can be obtained from the following:
The Navy is a composite warfare system, an intricate
mix of some 900 submarines and surface ships of many
1
9
Alain Enthoven, "Systems Analysis and the Navy,
Naval Review 1965 (Annapolis, Md. : United States Naval Institute,
1964), p. 102.
C. B. Moore, An Integrated Approach to Logistics
Analysis (Fort Worth, Texas: General Dynamics, May, 1966), p. 1

13
types, 8000 aircraft of every kind and configuration,
missiles, and 260 supporting shore activities, all
manned by over 700, 000 military personnel and more
than 360, 000 civilian personnel all contributing their
special skills and qualities to a balanced force capable
of highly mobile worldwide combat operations. Keeping
this composite warfare system operating is a $15 bil-
lion-a-year operation. Keeping it supplied takes any-
where from half to two-thirds of that amount, depending
on how the computation is made; in any event, it exceeds
the annual income of the nation's railroad industry and
2 1approximates that of the entire telephone system.
That the need for applying economic analysis to the planning
of military activities is not likely to decrease in the near future is
indicated by Clark when he states: "The events of the decade since
World War II mark a qualitative change in the group structure of
American democracy -- namely the acceptance on a 'permanent'
22basis of a large professional military establishment. " The Depart-
ment of Defense, owning property valued in excess of $160 billion,
is the wealthiest economic organization in the nation or the world,
and 25 to 30 percent of the country's economic activity is tied in
some manner to military spending.
As a practical consideration for military planners, more-
over, the Department of Defense budget is coming under increasingly
2 1 U. S.
,
Department of Defense, Supplying the Navy
,
NAVPERS 10487 (Washington, D. C. : Bureau of Naval Personnel,
1967), p. 3.
22John J. Clark, The New Economics of National Defense




close scrutiny in the Congress. As the cost of weapon systems
and their logistic support continues to rise, it may be expected that
this trend will intensify. If in the future a major system is to be
approved, it will have to present a sound economic as well as mili-
tary effectiveness argument not only as regards initial procurement
cost, but also as regards support costs as well.
A serious problem is that the expenditure of large sums for
military procurement and support has not always resulted in the
delivery of reliable and supportable equipment. Speaking of this
problem, the former Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Material
once complained that bomb navigation systems had been designed to
do so much that they were not only too expensive, but also sometimes
? A.
almost impossible to maintain. As another example, a study pre-
sented to Congress showed that of a sample of thirteen major Air
Force and Navy aircraft and missile programs initiated since 1955
at a total cost of $40 billion, less than 40 percent had produced sys-
23 For example, U. S. , Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
The Economics of Military Procurement
,
Joint Committee Print
(Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 18-28,
contains a critical evaluation of cost overruns on the C-5A Air Force
long-range, heavy logistic aircraft.
4Mark F. Bradley, speech before the Los Angeles Chamber
of Commerce, September 25, 1959.
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2 5terns with acceptable electronic performance.
Since these weapon systems are extremely costly, it is essen-
tial in the interest of efficient allocation and use of military resources
that design and development of new weapon systems and equipment
proceed on a basis which balances a level of military readiness with
its attendant cost. Former President Eisenhower has been quoted in
this connection as stating in 1952 that: ". . . the foundation of military
strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the
Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of battle. ' °
Objective of the Study
Department of the Navy Directives and Instructions imple-
menting Integrated Logistic Support Planning make it clear that:
1. The scope of ILSP applies to the acquisition of all systems
and equipment by the Navy. '
25 U.S. , Congress, Richard A. Stubbing, "Improving the
Acquisition Process for High Risk Military Electronics Systems, "
91st Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 7, 1969, Congressional Record , 115,
S1450.
Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glen H.
Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962), p. 390.
27
U. S., Department of the Navy, SECNAV Instruction 4000.29,
Development of Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and Equip-
ments (Washington, D. C. : Headquarters Naval Material Command,
August 19, 1966), p. 1.
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2. An "Acquisition Manager" will be designated for every major
system and will be charged not only with the responsibility for
development and production of Navy equipment, but also with
responsibility for "design and development of the related
logistic support package. " °
3. An assistant, or "logistician" will be assigned to the Acquisition
Manager. He is to be responsible for "planning, development,
acquisition, integration and execution of the Integrated Logistic
Support Plan. "29
4. Each system command, bureau and other organizational compo-
nent participating in the acquisition and logistic support process
shall be responsible to work with the designated system or
equipment logistician. ™
In view of the potentially large number of organizational
entities and personnel that can become involved in logistic support
planning for a weapon system or equipment, it should be helpful to
indicate areas in which decision-making procedures can be aided
28U. S., Department of the Navy, NAVMAT Instruction
4000. 20, Integrated Logistic Support Planning Procedures (Washington,







through increasing the understanding of those involved of certain con-
cepts of economic analysis, statistical decision theory and business
logistics management where these have application to the ILS process.
Accordingly, the objective of this research is to investigate several
areas where these concepts can be applied to help make the support
planning decision clearer or more defensible, or at least to help the
decision-maker to be more aware of these important considerations.
One Naval officer writing on the subject considers that the
basic function of management is decision-making, a process he feels
can be reduced to five basic steps: (1) awareness of the facts,
(2) recognition of the problem, (3) analysis of available alternatives,
(4) choice of an alternative, and (5) resulting action. Ji The general
objective of this research is to assist the ILS planner in the first
four steps, so that the fifth step, resulting action, might be rendered
more sound from an economic standpoint. In a program involving the
expenditure of large sums of money each year, any improvement in
the decision-making process could have a substantial pay-off.
Specific objectives of this research, relating to the areas
of investigation referred to above are:
1. To foster in ILS program managers a clear understanding of
31 J.S. Vishneski, Jr., "Management, " Navy Supply Corps
Newsletter
,
April, 1969, p. 17.
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the economic principles involved in achieving an efficient allo-
cation of resources devoted to weapon system support operations.
2. To investigate the potential use of Bayesian statistical decision
theory in the ILS environment so that all available sources of
information might be utilized in a systematic manner prior to
the making of decisions involving the commitment of human,
financial, and physical resources to support operations.
3. To investigate certain of the elements officially designated as
comprising Integrated Logistics Support and to indicate areas
in which the application of current concepts of business logis-
tics management could result in new considerations being
brought forward, particularly in the areas of inventory manage-
ment and customer service levels (CSL).
4. To investigate the role of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness
analyses in the ILS decision-making process.
An important point which might be raised is that Integrated
Logistic Support Planning does involve significant program control of
the total weapon system and equipment acquisition and deployment
process. Such control can in itself be expensive and require the
employment of scarce resources. It has been estimated, for example,
that management control of an approved defense program may amount




engineering or operational systems development program. It is
essential, therefore, that this planning be well considered. From the
discussion above it is clear that in addition to the plan for operational
performance of a new system, a companion plan for its logistic sup-
port is also required by the Department of Defense. As development
and acquisition proceeds, these plans must be "meshed" if the total
33system is to achieve optimum effectiveness. The objective of this
research is to indicate tools and other relevant considerations for the
benefit of those who are to be involved in the achievement of this
meshing. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and
Logistics), indicating a need for such information, recently stated
that in the Navy logistics system, a "statistical, economic approach
34
to decision-making will continue and become more expansive. "
Hypotheses
The hypotheses of this study relate to specific areas of Inte-
grated Logistic Support Planning. They are:
32
J. Lynn Helms, "The Impact of Government Program
Control, " speech given to the Armed Forces Management Association,
Washington, D. C. , September 1, 1965.
3 3Thomas D. Morris, keynote address presented at The
Electronic Industries Symposium, Washington, D. C. , March 7, 1968.
34 Barry J. Shillito, "Assistant SECNAV Shillito Speaks on
the Corps, " Navy Supply Corps Newsletter , January 1, 19&9, P* 15.
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1. Certain micro -economic concepts applied to ILS problems
can improve the allocation of resources by logistic decision-
makers. These concepts include marginal and indifference
curve analysis.
2. Bayesian statistical decision theory can be used in ILS situ-
ations and can be of valuable assistance by providing a means
through which additional information can be brought to bear
systematically on the problem with due regard being given to
the cost of acquiring such information.
3. Some elements that now comprise ILS should be reevaluated
and broadened in scope, particularly those that concern the
costing of inventory and the use of the concept of customer
service levels in establishing desired inventory quantities.
Modern business logistics concepts can be brought to bear in
these areas. The narrow approach at times now being used
can result in cost estimates that are incomplete at best and
that may result in misallocation of resources.
4. Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies are important to
ILS decision-making primarily because they help to focus atten-
tion on relevant areas that might otherwise be overlooked
rather than because of their mathematical precision. In the
allocation of support resources, the practical applicability of
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cost-benefit analysis is somewhat limited due to immeasurable
factors involved and the possibility of their being interpreted in
a different manner by different analysts.
Research Methodology
The following procedure was followed during the investigative
phase of this research:
1. A general review was conducted of management decision theory
as used in the government and business logistics fields for
application to military weapon system and equipment support
planning. This literature is quite extensive and much of the
theory involved has not been brought to bear on ILS problems.
2. Attendance was arranged at a formal three day Navy Integrated
Logistics Support Concepts Course in Washington, D. C.
,
sponsored by the Chief of Naval Material and conducted under
Navy contract by Sterling Institute personnel. Material used
in the course was prepared by the Sterling Institute, Defense
and Aerospace Center, in association with Peat, Marwick,
Livingston & Co. The general purpose and objectives of this
course are important to the research carried out, and are
therefore listed for information in Appendix C. This course
provided a strong conceptual base for the study detailed herein.
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3. The Naval Supply Systems Command in Washington D. C. , is an
"element manager" within the definition of Integrated Logistic
Support directives. As such, an extensive ILS library is main-
tained and an ILS group has been established within the Develop-
ment Branch of the Research and Development Division. On-
the-site review and study of the material in this library and
discussion with ILS group members was carried out. This
formed the basis for understanding as to:
a. The theoretical role of ILS within the support organization
of the Navy, as shown in Appendix B.
b. The way ILS actually is working in practice, and
c. The potential for application of the concepts developed in
this study to the ILS process.
4. Current Department of Defense and Navy guidelines and direc-
tives concerning criteria for use in evaluating investment deci-
sions and the establishment of inventory levels were investi-
gated to form the basis for the discussion in Chapter V of inven-
tory policy and the importance of the concept of customer ser-
vice levels in Navy business management.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
Integrated Logistic Support Procedures apply to all activities
and all acquisitions within the Department of Defense. This study
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of the ILS process, however, has been primarily limited to operations
within the Department of the Navy and more specifically to the Naval
Supply Systems Command, which is responsible for ILS supply support
including spares and repair parts and also for transportation and
handling that is used for logistics purposes. Concentration thus is
on support aspects of weapon system and equipment ownership although,
as demonstrated in Chapter VII, acquisition costs must also be taken
into account.
It has been stated by writers on the subject of defense manage-
ment that a weapon system, such as a ballistic missile, has the fol-
lowing important characteristics:
1. Availability: The probability that the missile will be available
for launch when required.
2. Survivability: The probability that the missile will survive,
given that it is fired upon by the enemy.
3. Reliability: The probability that the payload will attain the
proper ballistic trajectory.
35 H.J. Lieberman, Research and Development in Integrated
Logistics Support (Washington, D. C. : Naval Supply Systems Command,
February 24, 1969), pp. 4-5.
36R.H. McMahan, Jr. and D. H. Taylor, "Central War Alter-
natives, " in Defense Management , ed. by Stephen Enke (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 117.
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4. Penetration Probability: The probability that the warhead will
penetrate the defenses, given that it arrives at the target and
that the target is defended.
5. Kill Probability: The probability that the warhead will kill the
target, given that it penetrates. This in turn is a function of
(a) other weapon system characteristics such as yield and
accuracy; (b) target characteristics such as hardness, accur-
acy of attacker's knowledge of its location, and so on; and (c)
the kill criterion established by the offense.
6. Cost: The research and development, investment, operating,
and basic support costs of each system as a function of the
number purchased (author's italics).
Accepting this list, then, the scope of this study is limited primarily
to characteristic number six, especially the support aspects, and to
characteristics one and three, as they influence six.
The use of economic analysis in defense planning does have
certain limitations, some of which have already been mentioned.
Others which are important, but whose investigation is beyond the
scope of this study, are:
1. The use of analytical economic analysis can lead to the elimi-
nation of some alternatives that involve the investment of re-
sources in capabilities of low effectiveness, however, it cannot

- 25 -
aid in setting national priorities as, for example, helping to
choose between expenditures for urban development and expen-
ditures for national defense. Within any one homogeneous cate-
gory, however, measurements and selections are possible. '
For purposes of this study, it has been assumed that decisions
as to desired military capabilities are being made through the
political process and that the task which presents itself is to
provide that capability in the most economic or "cost-effective"
manner. Specifically, the analysis is primarily limited to a
discussion of the cost of logistics support (as defined in Chapter
II) of that capability once it is translated into hardware. Total
life cycle costs, however, must always be given due attention.
2. Information deficiencies stemming from what Piekarz terms
"inappropriate accounting conventions" at present seriously
limit the potentialities for certain types of analyses in the De-
38partment of Defense. This problem is recognized, however,
and steps toward improvement are being made. 7
37 Burkhead, Government Budgeting
, p. 251.
3 8
°Rolf Piekarz, "Discussion of Defense Economics: Applying
Economic Criteria, " American Economic Review , May, 1965, p. 436.
See also Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age
, p. 233 on the need for better accounting techniques.
"For example, see Robert N. Grosse and Arnold Proschan,
"The Annual Cycle: Planning- Programming-Budgeting, " in Defense
Management
,
ed. by Enke, pp. 37-39.
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3. The whole spectrum of Department of Defense-defense con-
tractor relationships affects the distribution of goods and ser-
vices in the military establishment. This management area
requires a great deal of additional attention. u It has been
assumed in this study that contractual methods have been adopted
which, at least, will not interfere with attempts to employ
analytical techniques to maximize output.
4. With the introduction of ever more sophisticated systems and
equipment, the problems of military choice in the future may
well increase in those areas in which systematic quantitative
analysis is unable to provide "the" solution. Such problem
areas include the establishment of objectives, uncertainties,
and strategic choice. Here again, this study assumes that
the capability decision has already been made and that it is the
task of economic analysis to assist in the evaluation of alterna-
tive methods for providing that capability.
40For a discussion of some of these contractual problem
areas, see the testimony of VADM H. G. Rickover in U. S. , Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, Economics of Military Procurement,
Part 2
,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government,
Joint Committee Print (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Of-
fice, 1968). Also Oliver E. Williamson, "The Economics of Defense
Contracting: Incentives and Performance, " in Issues in Defense
Economics
, ed. by McKean, pp. 217-240.
James R. Schlesinger, "Discussion of Defense Economics:




Despite these limitations, however, there is certainly room
for the application of improved economic and statistical analysis in
a defense budget now affecting more than 50 percent of the federal
government's total budget disbursements and 8 to 10 percent of the
country's gross national product. It has been pointed out that
there are four distinct stages in the input-output sequence related to
national defense: (1) the cost to the economy of raising, equipping
and supporting the forces involved; (2) the deployment of these
forces; (3) the success of the forces in achieving military objectives;
4 ^
and (4) the social utility of these military successes to the nation.
Economic analysis has in the past been primarily focused on (2) and
(3), leaving (1) and (4) to the political process. This study, however,
investigates economics involved in support aspects at the first stage.
Such analyses, which assume capability decisions "given" at higher
levels, may be called "sub-optimizations" and correspond to the
42
See U. S. , Bureau of the Budget, The Budget of the United
States Government for Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D. C. : Govern-
ment Printing Office, 19&9), P* 6 f° r information on total federal
budget disbursements. See William A. Niskanen, "The Defense
Resource Allocation Process, " in Defense Management , ed. by
Enke, p. 4 for a statement on defense budgets as a percent of gross
national product.
Richard N. Cooper, "Comments on Applying Economic Con-




partial equilibrium analyses of conventional economic theory. Such
sub-optimizations are often both necessary and inevitable. Chap-
ter III deals in greater detail with the application of economic prin-
ciples to ILSP including a discussion of problems which can arise as
a result of sub -optimization.
Sequence of Presentation
Chapter I has contained introductory material including infor-
mation on need for the study, its objectives, hypotheses investigated,
research methodology followed, and scope and limitations of the study.
Chapter II deals primarily with background material relating
to the study including the Department of Defense organizational
framework for analytical decision-making; the concept of "logistics;"
the scope, development and current status of Integrated Logistic
Support Planning, particularly in the Navy; and a discussion of the
challenge for the future which ILSP presents.
Chapter III discusses the efficient allocation of resources in
Integrated Logistic Support trade-off situations, making use of
theoretical indifference curve analysis and considering the techniques
of elementary differential calculus in situations involving several
44
Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age, pp. 129-130.
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valuable inputs and one valuable output.
Chapter IV investigates the potential for use of Bayesian sta-
tistical decision theory in the ILS setting. The theory of Bayesian
analysis is discussed together with its hypothetical application in
actual equipment procurements.
Chapter V is concerned again with the meaning of the term
"logistics" and considers in particular the material aspects of the
elements which, by definition, make up ILS. Attention is given to
such matters as calculation of the costs of holding inventory and the
influence of customer service level (CSL) in determining the range
and quantity of inventory carried.
Chapter VI discusses the meaning and use of cost-benefit and
cost-effectiveness analyses in the ILS planning process. Contrasts
are made with the use of these techniques in other branches of govern-
ment and conclusions are reached pertaining to the usefulness of these
methods.
Chapter VII is an integrative chapter, and indicates how the
various tools and procedures that have been discussed could be brought
together in one particular case.
Chapter VIII is entitled "Summary and Conclusions" and re-
views the major findings of the study and conclusions reached. Cer-
tain recommendations for modifications in current logistic procedures
are also made as a result of these findings and conclusions.

II
INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND DECISION-MAKING
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
"Sound logistic planning is the prime requisite of good
weapon system support. "*
Planning -Prog ramming -Budgeting System
In 1961, having made defense operations a major issue in the
preceding election campaign, President Kennedy appointed Robert
McNamara as Secretary of Defense and Charles J. Hitch as Defense
Controller. Shortly thereafter a new method of military program
control was adopted which had previously been suggested by a group
of RAND economists. -* This control involved a change from manage-
ment concentration on individual military service activities to alloca-
R. A. Rodriquez, Qualitative Support Requirements (QSR): A
Concept for Improved Logistics Support Planning During Weapon-
System Development (Santa Monica, Calif. : The RAND Corporation,
September, 1962), p. v.
7 Niskanen, "The Defense Resource Allocation Process, " p. 7
discusses in some detail the background surrounding these appoint-
ments.
o
For example, see Hitch and McKean, The Economics of De-
fense in the Nuclear Age . Also David Novick, Efficiency and Economy
in Government Through New Budgeting and Accounting Procedures
and A New Approach to the Military Budget . (Santa Monica, Calif. :




tion of resources among major missions, with the services competing
for these missions. A five year planning period was also established
with the intention of making long-range implications of budget year
decisions more visible. This technique of concentrating on mission,
or program-oriented activities in resource allocation became known
as the Planning- Programming- Budgeting System (PPBS). So suc-
cessful did the PPBS system appear that its extension to all federal
agencies was ordered by President Johnson in 1965. The PPBS
system is important for ILS because logistics support requirements
appear in the DOD five year plan together with acquisition of the
weapon system which is to be supported. It is therefore the respon-
sibility of logisticians to determine these requirements as accurately
as possible.
The fundamentals of the Department of Defense PPBS System
are as follows:
1. The program is a formal one. It is written, organized into
specific categories and prepared at least five years ahead.
2. The program is comprehensive in that it is designed to show
John F. Due, Government Finance: Economics of the Public
Sector (4th ed. ; Homewood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, Inc. , 1968), p. 60,
These points are based on information contained in U. S.
,
Department of Defense, A Primer on Project Prime (Washington,




the full cost of the total enterprise for each of five years.
3. Inputs to the program in terms of men, money and material
are stated as well as outputs and the two are related. Thus,
the resources necessary to complete the stated objective are
clearly shown.
4. The approved program represents management decisions
among alternatives available.
5. The program is the primary tool to be used in Defense Depart-
ment management planning and decision-making. It is the nu-
cleus for the whole defense management and control process.
6. A procedure is provided within the structure of the system for
making changes. Hence the program is theoretically always
kept current and up-to-date.
Accompanying implementation of the PPBS concept was the
adoption of various quantitative techniques designed to aid the de-
cision-maker in the process of selecting from among a number of
competing alternatives. Among these techniques are such procedures
as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and systems
analysis. ° Better utilization of government resources is stressed
through defense management consideration of possible trade-offs
"These analytical techniques are defined and discussed in some
detail as they relate to ILS in Chapter VI, infra .
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among alternatives. In the first full-fledged use of these techniques
in 1962, however, it is perhaps significant that Department of De-
fense analysts rejected nearly all program change requests to the
recently established five year plan. Since that time, ". . . unfortu-
nately, the analytic process has often been associated with the
refutation of service arguments rather than with the initiation and
channeling of continued change. "' Indeed, a criticism often made of
the PPBS system is that it tends to centralize decision-making in
the Secretary of Defense and his staff to the detriment of innovation. '
Implications of centralized decision-making for ILS. - -
Whether this centralization, requiring top-level approval of many de-
fense resource allocation decisions, has proved beneficial seems
largely a matter of opinion. One observer has discussed both sides
of the controversy as follows:
The centralization of political decisions regarding the
total defense budget and its allocation among missions
is the key element of the present decision process and
is probably necessary for effective civilian control of
the U.S. military establishment. But the centralization
of the management decisions regarding the allocation of
resources within each mission area is a matter of style.
. . . increased centralization of defense management may
n
Niskanen, "The Defense Resource Allocation Process,
p. 10.





already be having a detrimental effect upon national
security interests. "
Another writer on the subject points out that centralization of military
decision-making is to a large degree necessary and that steps in the
direction of more decentralization must be taken with care. Specific-
ally, he states that:
In its most important characteristics.
. . the defense es-
tablishment must be a centralized organization, and de-
centralization must proceed cautiously if it is to produce
beneficial rather than harmful results. . . a certain amount
of direct supervision of the choice between weapons sys-
tems and of the provision for their development, support
and reserve supplies is necessary for the pursuit of a
rational set of national objectives. ^
In any event, the centralized PPBS System, including proce-
dural changes made to date, forms the structure within which the
Integrated Logistics Support (IL.S) program must function. Major
program-oriented missions are ultimately centrally approved or dis-
approved on the basis of a systematic comparison of the respective
cost and effectiveness of alternative feasible methods of accomplishing
the mission. Costs are aggregated by missions so that political
choices can be made concerning the allocation of resources among
these missions, leaving management choices for within-mission
'Niskanen, "The Defense Allocation Process, " p. 18
°Martin J. Bailey, "Defense Centralization Through
Prices, " in Defense Management , ed. by Enke, p. 342.
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allocation. These are the choices with which this study is concerned.
The aim of ILS is to establish a procedure whereby the support costs
of weapon systems and equipment can be made more visible, related
to total system costs and a support plan developed which can be
"sold" to decision-makers on economic grounds. With this general
background the concept and meaning of the term "logistics" can now
be examined more closely, with special attention being given to its
relevance for ILS planning.
The Concept of "Logistics"
Logistics in the military sense is officially defined as "The
science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance
of forces. In its more comprehensive sense, [logistics includes]
those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and
development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, main-
tenance, evacuation, and disposition of material; (2) movement,
evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or con-
struction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and
(4) acquisition or furnishing of services. Logistics, tactics and
strategics are generally considered the three main divisions of
U.S.
,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States
Military Terms for Joint Usage (Washington, D. C. ; Government
Printing Office, 1908), p. 126.
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military responsibility. One writer has succinctly referred to the
role of the logistician within this division of effort in stating: ". . . the
military services have the logisticians who support both strategy and
tactics, being responsible for getting the military hardware and sup-
1 2plies to the right places at the right time to do the job. " Finally,
Eccles has summed up well the meaning of military logistics in his
statement that it is ". . . the process of planning for and providing
1 -j
goods and services for the support of the military forces.
Business and economics usage. -- This study primarily
limits itself to those management aspects of items (1), (3) and (4)
above which deal with military functions somewhat analogous to those
found in business, and especially to the area of material support.
In this context, the American Marketing Association has defined
logistics as all activities involved in "The movement and handling of
goods from the point of production to the point of consumption or
1
4
vise. ' In more general economic terms, it may be said that
1 Richard S. Denenholz, "Physical Distribution as a New Staff
Function in Marketing, " in The Frontier of Marketing Thought &
Science
,
ed. by Frank M. Bass (Chicago: American Marketing Asso-
ciation, 1957), pp. 96-97.
1 3Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense
(Harrisburg, Penna. : The Stackpole Company, 1959), p. 45.
^Definitions Committee of the American Marketing Associ-
ation, "1948 Report, " The Journal of Marketing
,
Oct., 1948, p. 202.

logistics concerns "the translation of consumer demand for time and
place utility into a supply of these same kinds of utility. Time
utility is created primarily by transportation and distribution. Place
utility is created by acquiring and holding inventory and by insuring
ready availability of goods and services. This material support as-
pect, the ability to adequately satisfy consumer demand through pro-
viding time and place utility, is a primary focus of this study.
Logistics in the Navy. --In relating this general concept of
logistics to the naval establishment, Dyer distinguishes between the
categories of "Consumer Logistics" and "Producer Logistics" in the
following manner:
Consumer logistics is concerned with the determination
and distribution of the requirements of the Operating
Forces for material, services, and personnel. This
aspect of logistics is carried on at the national and de-
partmental levels. An example of this is in the determi-
nation by the Chief of Naval Operations of the type and




J. S. Heskett, Robert M. Ivie, and Nickolas A. Glaskowsky,
Jr.
,
Business Logistics: Management of Physical Supply and Distri-
bution (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 19&4), p. 8.
Ibid .
, pp. 20-21, points out that while there are important
differences between logistics as viewed by the military and by busi-
ness, there are also similarities, particularly in the area of move-
ment and storage of products and supplies. "Business logistics" is
defined by these authors as "the management of all activities which
facilitate movement and the coordination of supply and demand in the
creation of time and place utility in goods. "
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Producer logistics is concerned, in very general terms,
with the procurement of those requirements of the Oper-
ating Forces as determined by the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations. As in the case of consumer logistics, this aspect
is carried on at the national and departmental levels.
An example of producer logistics is the procurement at
the Bureau level of the naval aircraft the Chief of Naval
Operations determined were required by the Operating
Forces.
Having made this distinction, he then concludes that consumer logis-
tics in the naval establishment is primarily the responsibility of com-




Within the Navy, as may be noted from Appendix B, the Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) is responsible for management of the
logistics function. He is "responsible for over-all direction of the
Navy's material programs and the stating of material requirements
in general terms, taking into consideration the constraints of Navy
and DOD-approved force levels and budgeting limitations contained
in the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP). " 18 All Navy material
requirements therefore derive from guidance and policy handed down
by the CNO. Under the CNO, the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) and
his organization have responsibility for equipment support. The
Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, in turn, is responsible
17George C. Dyer, Naval Logistics (3rd ed. ; Annapolis, Md.
United States Naval Institute, 1962), pp. 11-12.
1 ft




for "business and supply judgments and techniques and lor the pro-
curement of about $13 billion worth of goods and services annually.
He is also designated the "Manager of Navy Material Transportation"
and as such is responsible for efficient management of the movement
2 1
of Navy freight. These are main links in the logistics support chain
with which this study deals.
Considerations in Naval Integrated Logistic Support Planning
In Chapter I it was pointed out that speed of design, production
and delivery characterized much of the military weapon system and
equipment acquisition process during the late 1950's and early 1960's
and that this requirement was often detrimental to related quality and
cost considerations. This sacrifice of cost and quality in favor of
speed, however, eventually caused concern to be evidenced for the
resultant readiness or "availability" of affected weapon systems and
equipment.
The inherent availability of a weapon system or equipment




Shillito, "Assistant SECNAV Shillito Speaks on the Corps, "
p. 14.
? 1 Department of Defense, Supplying the Navy
, p. 36. See
also the discussion in Chapter I, supra .
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maintainability. Reliability has been defined as the quantifiable
probability that specific equipment will continue to function correctly
for a specified period of time without failure under a prescribed con-
dition of use. Maintainability is similarly defined as the quantifiable
probability of equipment being restored to operating status within
allowable time limits using available test equipment, facilities, per-
22
sonnel, spare parts and procedures.
Concept of Availability. -- The most frequently used measure
of reliability is the statistical concept of mean-time-between-failure
2 3(MTBF) and that of maintainability, mean-time-to-repair (MTTR).
Using these measures, inherent availability of a weapon system may
be expressed by the equation:
a -i u-,- t MTBFAvailability = MTBF + MTTR
For a weapon system to be useful, it must be available , that is it
must not only be delivered expeditiously, but also must be able to
perform under expected operating conditions and in the intended
maintenance environment. Supportability as well as performance,
22
U. S. , Department of Defense, Publication 4100. 35-G, Inte-
grated Logistics Support Planning Guide for POD Systems and Equip-
ment (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 37.
23Giordano, "Logistical Implications of Weapon System De-
sign Decisions, " p. 195.
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therefore, is an important consideration. It has frequently been
noted, however, that "Unfortunately, we have far too many examples
of too much emphasis on performance and too little on support of. . . a
system. " It has also been pointed out, for example, that in the
specific area of naval ordnance development, as systems grow more
complex, interrelationship problems tend to become compounded
causing even greater problems of logistics support. -* One writer,
referring to the operational problems resulting from this increased
system complexity, states:
Reports from the Fleet have stressed that weapon systems
and equipments, because of their complexity are becoming
more difficult to operate and maintain. Also, it has be re-
ported that repairs have been delayed by lack of trained
personnel, the non-receipt of technical documentation, and
the non-availability of repair parts and spares.
The increasing importance of logistics support consider-
ations. -- In addition to speed of delivery, performance and sup-
portability factors, the increasing sophistication of modern weapon
systems has also acted to render it imperative that support factors
be more fully considered. In the first place, serious problems of
24Frank N. Worden, "Integrated Logistics Support, " Navy
Supply Corps Newsletter
,
June, 1965, p. Zl.
25
Miles H. Hubbard, "The Design of Naval Weapons, "
United States Naval Institute Proceedings , October, 1965, p. 41.
2 f>Shaughnessy, A Preliminary Review of POD Directive
4100. 35 of June 19, 1964, p. 8.
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cost estimation have developed. One study for instance, reported
that of twelve major defense programs studied, development cost
turned out to be as much as seven times original estimates with an
? 7
average variance of about 220 percent. Another problem is that
system costs often were not considered in total. A weapon system,
cost-wise, is actually composed of two primary elements -- acquisi-
28tion costs and ownership costs. These latter costs were often
overlooked, ignoring the significant point that "maintenance and oper-
ating costs, for the most part, far exceed development and investment
costs. " " From a cost-effectiveness standpoint, an optimum alloca-
tion of resources was frequently not being achieved.
27Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons
Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Re-
search, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1962), p. 429. Development Cost Factors (actual cost $ original
cost estimate) were calculated for each program, and an average De-
velopment Cost Factor obtained as the arithmetic mean. The variance
was then derived from this average, with 1.0 of the factor representing
the original estimate, and the remainder the variance.
28
A. D. Davies and E.J. Shaughnessy, The Logistician in Inte-
grated Logistics Support (Washington, D. C. : Planning Research Cor-
poration, June, 1965), p. 8.
'George E. Fouch, "Integrated Logistic Support - What the
Customer Expects, " speech before the National Security Industrial
Association Meeting, Washington, D. C. , October 7, 1968.
^See Chapter VI, infra , for a more detailed discussion of the
technique of cost-effectiveness analysis. For now it is sufficient to
state that the term involves a determination that the effectiveness to
be gained is worth the cost involved in attaining the gain. See also
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A major contributing factor to this situation was the fact that
basic military procurement practices had not been changed since prior
to World War II. Price of initial acquisition was still the prime con-
sideration despite a legal requirement that "award shall be made. . . to
the responsible bidder whose bid. . .will be most advantageous to the
United States, price and other factors considered (author's italics). "
These "other factors" are essentially logistics costs but were seldom
systematically evaluated. Concerned about this, the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) in 1963 directed that a
study be made of the economic consequences of taking only initial
3 ?price acquisition into active consideration in contract awards. D A
conclusion of this study was that logistics costs as well as purchase
price can vary significantly among different bidders, and that these
costs can be measured and should be taken into consideration in
awarding development contracts.
As a result of these developments, and intending to make use
of the techniques of quantitative analysis brought into wider use after
Giordano, "Logistical Implications of Weapon System Design Deci-
sions, " p. 196.
31 Section 2305(c), Title 10, U.S. C.
32
Logistics Management Institute, Life Cycle Costing in
Equipment Procurement (Washington, D. C. : Logistics Management
Institute, April, 19&5) contains the resultant report.
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1961, the Department of Defense, as mentioned in Chapter I, intro-
duced in 1964 the concept of Integrated Logistic Support Planning.
DOD Directive 4100. 5 formally defined ILS as "A composite of the
elements necessary to assure the effective and economical support of
a system or equipment at all levels of maintenance for its programmed
life cycle. ..." The elements initially listed as comprising ILS were:
1. Planned Maintenance
2. Support Personnel
3. Technical Data and Publications
4. Support Equipment
5. Spares and Repair Parts
6. Facilities
7. Contract Maintenance
Implementing directives establishing ILS were subsequently issued by
the Department of the Navy. The ILS concept as developed in these
directives has essentially three prime purposes as relates to re-
source allocation:
1. To insure that all the designated elements of support are
identified and provided for early in the hardware development
cycle so as to be ready when needed.
2. To insure that a piece of shipboard hardware is capable of
33Department of the Navy, SECNAV Instruction 4000. 29,
Development of Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and Equip-
ment implemented the application of the concept within the Navy; and
Department of the Navy, NAVMAT Instruction 4000. 20, Integrated




being maintained by the people on board and reliable enough
to meet operational requirements.
3. To consider possible cost and/or performance trade-offs
early in the development of a weapon system and its support
hardware.
The basic principles of this new concept of Integrated Logistics Sup-
port as formulated by the Secretary of the Navy are listed in detail
in Appendix D.
Concept of life cycle costing. -- Integrated Logistics Support
has been aptly called the "life-cycle" task of support management.
This implies that the process of logistics planning should begin with in-
itial design of the weapon system since this design will certainly signifi-
cantly influence the magnitude and type of logistics support thereafter re
35quired. Logistic planning which begins after design of the weapon sys-
tem has been completed can ultimately be highly expensive. Early inter-
face between the design engineer and the logistician is thus recognized
as being essential. In the implementing DOD directives, the Acquisition
34For an example of the use of this terminology, see Gerald
Holsclaw and Fred T. Carlson, "Integrated Logistic Support: The Life-
Cycle Task of Support Management, " Defense Industry Bulletin , June,
1968, p. 1.
3 5
Logistics Management Institute, Methods for Evaluating the





Manager is made responsible for establishing such relationships and
agreements within the Defense Establishment as will enable him to
properly carry out his tasks. These directives recognize that the
ILS concept requires that all decisions made in initial design and
development shall take into account accompanying logistic implications.
From a procurement and operation standpoint, the life cycle
of a major weapon system or equipment goes through several phases
important for ILS planning. These are: concept formulation, con-
tract definition, development, production and operation. Support
activities which are designed to take place during these phases are
summarized in Appendix G. Appendix H shows in a different perspec-
tive these life cycle phases in relationship to over-all equipment de-
sign considerations. This relationship indicates that it is important
for both operational design and support design factors to be taken into
account as early in the equipment life cycle as possible in order that
any desired changes can be made prior to entering into actual hard-
ware production, beyond which point changes become much more
costly. Continual review and improvement of logistic support aspects
is therefore essential, considering the over-all impact on system ob-
jectives involved including system performance and availability. In
carrying out this task, the Acquisition Manager and logisticians




From a logistics viewpoint, the concept of life cycle costing
essentially involves the development of a new method of military pro-
curement. By following this concept another alternative can be made
available in addition to the methods of sole source or price competi-
tion previously used, namely, competition on the basis of total cost
rather than bid price alone. This is particularly important since that
portion of the DOD budget devoted to logistics (including procurement
of spares and repair parts) exceeds in cost that devoted to the acqui-
sition of systems and equipment. ^" For many DOD procurements,
consideration of the economic aspects of acquisition costs alone
means that many potentially significant cost differences inherent in
competing bids are ignored. Table II- 1 demonstrates the importance
of this point showing a hypothetical example of how a contractor with
the low initial bid might not be the ultimate low bidder when all costs
involved in his approach are considered. In compiling figures such
as indicated in Table II- 1, the use of estimated logistics costs, des-
pite their uncertainty, is usually preferable to completely ignoring
them as has often been done in the past.
L. B. Early, S. M. Barro, and M. A. Margolis, Procedures
for Estimating Electronic Equipment Costs (Santa Monica, Calif. :





HYPOTHETICAL EVALUATION OF TOTAL COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT CONTRACTOR




Bid Price 41,000 60, 000 45,000
Maintenance contract 130,000 122, 000 86, 000
Test equipment 10, 000 20, 000 10, 000
Inventory support 47, 000 32, 000 43, 000
Transportation 8, 000 7,000 6,000
Handling 2, 500 2, 300 2, 100
Facilities 15,000 10,000 10, 000
Training 8, 000 8, 000 8, 000
Documentation 12, 000 16, 500 12, 000
Totals 273,000 277, 800 222, 100
Contractor "A" has the lowest bid price, but Contractor "C" is low
bidder when all resultant elements of cost are considered.
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Scope of Integrated Logistics Support. -- A problem has also
arisen in arriving at a final determination of the elements which
should comprise IL,S, and the specific ground each element should
cover. An Ad Hoc Committee with DOD, military service and indus-
try representation carried out a study pertaining to the possibilities
for implementation of ILS and reported that:
There is a need to scrutinize the elements of integrated
logistic support listed in DOD Directive 4100. 35 to de-
termine whether they truly constitute a well-defined
package. Three problem areas revealed in the task
reports dictate that such an examination be conducted.
These problems are:
1. Lack of definition of what elements truly constitute
an integrated logistic support package.
2. Lack of uniformity in element definition and
nomenclature
.
3. Lack of uniformity in element grouping for cost
purposes.
This problem is investigated further in Chapter V. For now it should
be noted that as one consequence of the Ad Hoc Committee Report,
the Department of Defense subsequently issued Publication 4100. 35-G
which revised the original definition of ILS so that it now includes
the following ten items:
1. Maintainability and Reliability
2. Maintenance Planning




Department of Defense, Report of DOD Directive
4100. 35 AD HOC Committee , Vol. I: Introduction (Washington, D. C.




5. Transportation and Handling
6. Technical Data
7. Facilities
8. Personnel and Training
9. Funding
10. Management Data
The scope included in the ineanings of these elements is summarized
in Appendix E. That these elements can by no means be considered
a final compilation, however, can be inferred from the statement of
one observer that "It is obvious that industry and other Military
Services have different peculiar elements that comprise a specific
routine. Nevertheless, ILS has identified 10 essential support ele-
ments which should be managed in relationship to a hardware pro-
,,38gram.
The role of support management. -- An important point in the
preceding discussion is that the life cycle cost of military systems
and equipment has now been recognized as involving "the total cost
incurred by the Government from the moment the investigation of its
generating idea elicits manpower usage within or without the Govern-
ment until every piece of the equipment is eliminated from the mili-
tary logistics system. The function of support management is thus
38George C. Axtell, "Designing an Integrated Logistics Sys-
tem, " Defense Industry Bulletin
,
July, 1 9 ^> 9 , p. 32.
39





now considered to be as important as those of production management,
system design, or administration and control. Appendix F depicts the
ten IL.S management functions in relation to other typical functions of
project management of a weapon system or major equipment program.
The interrelationships apparent in this chart demonstrate that a pro-
ject manager cannot concentrate on one group of these functions to
the exclusion of the others.
In view of this, it is obviously essential that persons charged
with logistic responsibilities be thoroughly grounded in such techni-
cal, administrative and theoretical skills as will enable them to
properly carry out their assignments. The Acquisition Manager must
be much more than simply a highly competent engineer. As for the
logistician assigned to the Acquisition Manager, he also must possess
particular skills that have not necessarily been previously required
in combination in a military situation. Concerning the logistic as-
pects of system acquisitions, it is now necessary for responsible per-
sons to be able to:
1. Define in precise terms the quantitative and qualitative
logistic support requirements of the system.
2. Predict logistic support costs in terms of resources and
funds.




The focus of this study deals with what might be called
"logistic support cost-effectiveness. " Logistics Management Insti-
tute (LMI) has defined this term as referring to ". . . the cost and the
capability or the effectiveness of the logistic support system in
bringing a weapon to a condition in which it is ready to operate
40
according to its assigned mission. " The term also necessarily
implies the ability of the logistics support system to insure contin-
uing availability of the equipment.
Element managers. -- Also of importance in the logistics
chain under discussion are the Navy "element managers, " i.e.
,
those
members of organizational entities officially responsible for manage-
ment of the ten designated ILS elements. Particularly important re-
sponsibilities in this regard rest on the Commander, Naval Supply
Systems Command (NAVSUP), Commander Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC), and the Chief, Bureau of Naval
41
Personnel (BUPERS). The element managers participate in all
logistic decisions made by an Acquisition Manager. NAVSUP,
Logistics Management Institute, The Cost/Effectiveness of
Alternate Support Plans for Major Weapon Systems
, p. 35.
41 Department of the Navy, NAVMAT Instruction 4000.20,
Integrated Logistic Support Planning Procedxires
, p. 5. See also
Appendix B infra which shows where these organizations fit into the
total Navy Support Structure.
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NAVFAC, and BUPERS provide the input and make decisions on ILS
matters relating to supply support and transporation, facilities, and
personnel respectively. The element managers are charged with
ensuring the availability of resources in their areas of responsibility
on a continuing basis throughout the entire ILS process. Logistic
support actions must, of course, be "tailored" in each specific case
to meet the particular needs of individual systems and equipment.
This study is especially concerned with the role of the Naval
Supply Systems Command as an element manager in the ILS process.
Having the right supplies when and where needed is extremely impor-
tant for weapon system and equipment readiness or availability con-
siderations. As previously noted, Supply Support is one of the ten
ILS component elements now recognized by the Navy. This element
in turn is composed of provisioning, distribution and inventory re-
plenishment, and maintenance of spares, repair parts, and special
supplies. Supply Support planning depends upon engineering esti-
mates of such factors as system /equipment utilization rates, oper-
ating hours, failure rates, required field repair rates, locations, and
selected maintenance items critical to safety and mission accomplish-




Holsclaw and Carlson, "Integrated Logistic Support: The
Life -Cycle Task of Support Management, " p. 9.
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constant attention throughout the equipment life cycle phases, as can
be noted from Appendix G.
Transportation and Handling is another of the ten identified
ILS elements which is the responsibility of NAVSUP. This element
includes all actions incident to transporation, packaging and preser-
AA
vation of material. Specific activities involve the determination of:
1. Transportability criteria including volume, frequency
and security of shipments.
2. Desired locations for transporation and facilities.
3. Planned material availability by quantity, volume and
location.
4. Special transporation and handling procurement requirements.
5. Interactions with the other ten ILS elements, and with
operational design requirements.
In order to properly execute its responsibilities, logistics
support management must: (1) have an appreciation for the mission
system and equipment; (2) recognize and provide support resources
throughout the system's life-cycle; (3) request and schedule funds as
necessary to ensure support; (4) provide for continuing interaction
between the Acquisition Manager, his logistician and all element
managers; and (5) make use of such management concepts and tech-




certain of these concepts and techniques. In military systems, the
development and operation of teamwork among specialists in various
fields, including the logistics disciplines, is required if resources
are to be used in the most efficient manner. As weapon system
Acquisition Managers are forced into more of a cradle-to-grave con-
cern for operation of the system, they will necessarily come to rely
more and more upon the advice of logistical specialists.
Challenge for the Future
From the preceding discussion of circumstances surrounding
the development of ILS, it is apparent that the concept is basically
designed to insure that responsible logistic personnel become involved
early in the development phase of new weapon systems or equipment.
Specifically, Navy directives implementing ILS require that:
1. The concepts involved apply to all acquisitions in the Navy,
even though only major procurements go through the com-
plete, formal life cycle process.
2. The system Acquisition Manager is responsible for
45
Appendix C to NAVMAT Instruction 4000. 20, Integrated
Logistic Support Planning Procedures , for example, is entitled "An
Integrated Logistic Support Planning Procedure for Acquisitions of
Less Extensive Systems or Facilities Requiring a Design and Develop-
ment Contract. " Appendix D is entitled "An Integrated Logistic Sup-
port Planning Procedure for Acquisitions of Off-the-Shelf Military
Standard or Commercial Equipments. " These appendices provide
guidelines for the acquisition of less than major systems.
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implementation of ILS planning.
3. A logistician is assigned to the Acquisition Manager to assist
in the planning.
4. ILS planning is supposed to start at the beginning of the
acquisition process.
5. All logistic element managers are to participate in the
planning process.
In theory this is a highly desirable and challenging concept.
As one report puts it: "Given the goal of maximizing weapon and
equipment readiness at optimum costs, the integration of logistic
support elements into complementary time-phased and mission
oriented actions is a management tool which today challenges all
members of the defense team. . . military, civilian, and contractor
alike. Yet the system is not presently in full and complete oper-
ation. A writer on the subject recently stated that ". . . although
Integrated Logistic Support Directive 4100. 35 was issued more than
3 years ago, it has not been effectively implemented. "
46
Logistics Management Institute, POD Systems and Equip-
ment Integrated Logistics Support Planners Guide (Washington, D. C.
Logistics Management Institute, 1967), p. iii.
47
J. Reed, "The DOD-CODSLA ILS Need/Use Report, "
Proceedings, Integrated Logistic Support Symposium (Washington,
D. C. : Electronic Industries Association, March 7, 1968), p. 49.
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Several problem areas which have delayed the implementation
of ILS are, however, amenable to solution. For example, diffi-
culties have come up in ascertaining the true dollar cost of "logistics
support. " Also, qualified logisticians do not yet exist in adequate
numbers and there is no firmly established organizational framework
within which the system can operate. Differences in interpretation
and implementing action of the objectives of ILS exist at all organi-
zational levels. In addition, the concept has not yet been carried out
through the entire life cycle of a major system, so it has not been
proven that expected benefits will in fact result. A start, however,
has been made. As Giordano puts it: ". . . the Navy assault on the
48ILS learning curve beings. " In theory, ILS unifies previously inde-
pendent logistic efforts.
The purpose of this study is to aid the logistician by in-
creasing his knowledge and skills so that greater benefits may be
realized in the future from Integrated Logistic Support Planning.
48
°Giordano, "Logistical Implications of Weapon System
Design Decisions, " p. 203.

Ill
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN INTEGRATED
LOGISTICS SUPPORT
. . . the services are concerned primarily with the
defense of the United States and not with saving the
taxpayers' money.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that certain
relatively fundamental microeconomic and mathematical concepts and
tools can serve as important aids in helping the logistician to effect
more efficient allocation of resources in the Integrated Logistics
Support environment.
Economic Principles of Resource Allocation
How to get more and how to make the best use of what is
available has been described as "the economic problem, the ever-
lasting problem of every family, every business firm, and of every
government unit. " Implicit in this statement is the fact that resource
Alain Enthoven and Henry Rowen, "Defense Planning and
Organization, " in Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization
,
ed. by James M. Buchanan (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University
Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1 96 1) , p. 381.





limitations have become as much a fact of life in the military as in
private business and this must be recognized by the defense planner
as one of the major constraints he faces.
Economic theory is traditionally divided into two main
groupings -- macroeconomics and microeconomics. The former
deals with aggregates and is concerned with how these aggregates
reach certain levels, and why changes occur. This may be called
the "big picture, " although it is composed of many individual ele-
ments. Microeconomics, also known as price theory, deals on the
other hand with the elements comprising these aggregates. These
two approaches are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
The microeconomic approach, however, is used in this study in that
it provides a more convenient framework for analyzing components
of military economic activity such as ILS. Some have alleged, in
fact, that since the end of World War II the single most important
application of microeconomic analysis has been in the area of
national defense planning.
The problem of sub- optimization. -- Microeconomic analysis
is also particularly appropriate for use by military decision-makers
because in this organizational structure the great majority of manage
Watson, Price Theory and Its Use s, p. 11,
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merit choices are ultimately made at lower levels. At these lower
levels the opportunity frequently presents itself to make use of
quantitative analytical techniques since many of the broad, qualita-
tive issues are centrally decided at higher levels in the government.
Quantitative analysis is thus perhaps even more readily usable at
the level of the IL.S logistician than at comparable levels in the busi-
ness firm. Such analysis, however, often requires the use of the
technique of sub-optimization (see Chapter II in this regard). Under
this procedure, management decisions are made in as near an opti-
mal manner as possible, but at the level of the logistician rather than
at the higher level of over-all national defense planning. Of course,
higher level objectives cannot be overlooked by the logistician. In an
analagous situation in a business enterprise, the marketing depart-
ment, for example, is expected to carry out activities which will help
to maximize profits of the firm as a whole. So it is with the military
logistician and his organization.
The primary danger of sub -optimization at lower levels is
that quantitative criteria selected for choosing among alternatives may
turn out to be inconsistent with those used in making higher level
qualitative decisions. The logistics decision-maker must therefore
4





be on guard that in the process of choosing what appears to be an opti-
mal course of action he does not adopt an overly parochial viewpoint
and thereby compromise higher priority objectives. As an example,
the Navy supply support element manager for ILS might have a deci-
sion to make concerning provision of a particular level of spare parts
in inventory in support of a newly acquired weapon system. He could
make a decision in such a fashion that operation of the Navy supply
system would be "optimized, " but the over-all capability of the total
weapon system would be reduced through provision of too low a re-
serve stock of especially critical spare parts. This matter is given
further consideration in Chapter V where aspects of Navy inventory
control procedures are discussed.
The concept of trade-off. --In Chapter I, economic efficiency
was represented as involving a situation in which maximum possible
benefits are realized from available resources. Since the funds desig-
nated for ILS are assumed given, it is then the task of the logistician
to use these funds in the most efficient manner possible. An efficient
position is one in which additional output of the good or service in
question cannot be achieved except at sacrifice of the output of some
other good or service. Efficiency, however, can also refer to the
achievement of any time-quality result with minimum expenditure of
resources regardless of whether the resullant choice is

- 62 -
optimal. Choosing from among equally efficient combinations is
called optimization. The term efficiency as vised in this study in-
volves consideration of how the choice of a particular alternative is
arrived at and only consequently with how well managed a program
may be. Since quantitative analysis is designed to arrive at an opti-
mal position, it is necessary to be able to measure the value of
physical inputs and outputs. Inputs can theoretically be measured in
terms of units of cost, and output in terms of "military worth. "
Given that such calculations can be made, the object then would be to
maximize the military worth obtainable from a given level of expendi-
ture (or sacrifice). As various feasible efficient choices are made,
resources are shifted to obtain maximum military worth in the face
of existing constraints. This sacrifice in one area to achieve gains
in another is termed a "trade-off. " Optimization of the allocation of
resources to logistics support of a weapon system requires that
trade-offs be made by logistics personnel aimed at maximizing mili-
tary worth, given budgetary limitations and applicable time-quality
constraints.
Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process:
Economic Incentives (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School
of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1964), p. 4.
In the military, resource cost is generally measured by book
value. An alternative, more desirable method involves use of the
concept of opportunity cost discussed infra.
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The concept of trade-off is very important in the ILS process
and some specific examples are discussed below. Assuming for the
moment, however, that the best possible trade-off among logistic
support element inputs has been reached, the economic theory of
marginalism can be brought to bear to demonstrate that the optimum
capability achievable from a weapon system is at the point where mar-
ginal value received from reaching a level of capability is equal to
the marginal cost incurred. This concept of marginalism is of par-
ticular importance in view of the fact that logistic support elements
form such a significant portion of total system costs.
To demonstrate the principle involved, assume that it is de-
sired to maximize the military worth of a particular weapon system.
Assume also that it is possible to estimate the value to the nation of
this weapon system through the combined use of quantitative analytic
techniques and qualitative judgment at appropriate levels in the de-
-7
In actual practice, however, the planned level of weapon
system capability might be set below that obtainable because of bud-
getary or political reasons, or because the additional capability might
not be considered essential in the near future. Managers in the public
sector must bear such limitations in mind. While admittedly not sub-
ject to the profit motive, these managers are subject to other pres-
sures to perform. They seek to obtain and keep positions of responsi-
bility and hence desire to maximize the value of services performed.
It would be difficult to demonstrate that these pressures are less in-
tense than those in the private sector. For a further discussion of




cision hierarchy. Let W then represent military worth, A the capa-
bility "output, " C the total cost of producing the output, and N the
value received from achieving the output. We define W as W = N - C,
and assume that N, C, and hence W are functionally dependent on A.
Using the terminology of differential calculus, it can be stated that
when the first derivative of W with respect to A is zero, W is at a
Q
maximum. ° Thus, differentiating W and setting the derivative to
zero, we arrive at
dW dN dC
dA dA dA




Now the first derivative of N with respect to A, -ii-l , may be called* dA
marginal value, and, in like manner, , may be called marginal
dA
Sufficient to insure that the maximum will be characterized
by the condition dW/dA = is that W be concave and twice differenti-
able over the range of relevant values of A, say ^- A ^ CxD , and that
the maximum occurs at some value A*, such that "^ A*<oo.
Stated simply, this means that as A increases from zero to infinity,




cost. Military worth, W, is thus maximized when marginal value re-
ceived equals marginal cost. The military logistician must attempt
to allocate his resources so as to approach this theoretical ideal.
The foregoing has perhaps conveyed the impression that an
estimate of military worth of particular systems is fairly straight-
forward. It is not. The value of the entire military establishment
in peacetime can perhaps be most accurately measured in terms of
the destruction which, because of its existence, it prevents. Direct
measurement of any one individual system within the total structure
is. however extremely difficult to do with any real precision. Yet.
as some writers have noted, ". . . military value judgments m u s
t
and
indeed are being made, either explicitly or implicitly, by military
planners. The important point, then, is that these calculations be
made as accurately as possible with full realization of subjective
factors inherent in the final judgment. Some of the quantitative
methods used in making these calculations are discussed further in
Chapter VI.
Considering only feasible alternatives and relevant costs . --
In calculating the costs of various alternatives, it is important to
consider only such alternatives as are actually feasible. Thus a
q
Peck and Scherer: The Weapons Acquisition Process: An
Economic Analysis
, p. 273, italics added.
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logistician might initially conclude that it would be more efficient to
use certain technicians to perform a particular task rather than a
very costly, highly sophisticated piece of machinery. Yet these
technicians might not be available for assignment to this task and
hence the choice is not feasible. An important job of the ILS element
managers thus should be to advise IL.S logisticians closely as to
feasible alternatives. As yet, there is relatively little dialogue be-
tween these groups on this important subject.
Then, too, it is important to consider only the relevant costs
of various alternatives. Future costs and values are of importance
for decision-making. Costs that are "sunk, " i. e. , those that have
already been incurred, or those that will be incurred regardless of
the decision made should generally be ignored in making a choice
among alternatives. Thus if a particular piece of equipment is now-
available and has no possibility of alternative use or no scrap value,
then the capital cost of incorporating it into inventory to support a
weapon system is zero. Incremental or marginal cost involved must
be considered as the important concept in a choice.
A businessman in the private sector of the economy operates
under similar circumstances. When faced with the necessity of
making a choice as to whether he should buy a new machine or keep
an old one, he must consider the total purchase price of the new
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machine. Only the salvage or alternate use value, if any, of the old
machine, however, enters into the calculation. The true cost of the
new machine can be considered as being represented by the value of
those alternatives which, because of the purchase, can now no longer
be considered. This is the economic concept of alternative or oppor-
tunity cost. The longer the planning period involved, the higher this
cost should tend to be, since additional feasible opportunities will
probably present themselves over a longer time span.
It is important to note in this connection that all alternatives
which have identical uses should be considered as having the same
alternative or opportunity cost regardless of any difference in their
historical costs. The true cost to the economy of resources used
in logistics support is the product thereby foregone in other public
or private uses. Economics is, in fact, concerned with the problem
of choices that become necessary because a good can be used in alter-
native ways and because these goods are scarce relative to potential
demands for them.
It is true, however, that the determination of realistic costs
on an alternative use basis can be quite difficult. What, however, is
particularly important for the ILS logistician is that gross errors be
10George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (3rd ed. : New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 106.
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avoided, such as treating those resources as "free" which, although
previously paid for, still have valuable alternative uses. Truly rele-
vant costs should not be excluded from any calculation leading to the
making of a choice among alternatives. Ownership costs of a weapon
system must thus be considered as well as acquisition costs. In the
examples presented in this study, it is assumed that alternative cost
measures have been employed.
As one example of the concept of alternative cost in the area
of Integrated Logistics Support, consider a problem involving the
necessity to value the worth of military personnel who will be required
to support a system once it has been acquired. The wage rates of
these personnel are set by Congressional action, but the real cost to
the economy is the value of the product or service they will not be
producing in the private sector. Similarly, material held in inven-
tory for logistic support of a weapon system may also have valuable
alternative uses. Such possibilities should be born in mind by the
logistician.
Discounting of future costs and benefits. -- Also of importance
in any economic calculation is the fact that future costs and benefits
should be discounted to present value. Expected cost streams deter-
mined to be required in support of a particular alternative should be
calculated as closely as possible and then discounted. These dis-
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counted values essentially recognize the fact that a sum of money to
be spent in the future or a benefit to be realized at some later time
has a lower "present value" than the same sum or benefit spent or
realized today. Thus the present value of an asset can be found in
the following manner:
The way to arrive at any asset's present discounted value
is straightforward. Let each dollar stand on its own feet;
evaluate the present worth of each part of a stream of
future receipts, giving due allowance for the discounting
required by its payment date. Then simply add together
all the separate present discounted values. Thus we have
arrived at the asset's capitalized market value, or what
is called its "present discounted value.
Financial institutions serving both the private and public sec-
tors recognize the necessity for discounting at least in part through
the means of receipt and payment of interest. If an expenditure can
be delayed or avoided entirely, then the sum involved is available
for alternative uses. The formula commonly used in computing
present value is of the form:
P. V. = M —
d+i) n
where: P. V. = The present value of a future expenditure or benefit.
M = The face amount of the future expenditure or benefit,
i = The applicable rate of interest to be used.
Samuelson, Economics, p. 587.
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n = The number of years from the present to the time of
expenditure or receipt of benefit
Present value tables have been computed using this formula for
1
2
various values of i and n and are widely available.
Until very recently the Department of Defense has directed
that 4 percent be used as the rate for discounting purposes in prob-
lems of inventory management. This matter is discussed further
in Chapter V. Here it should be noted, however, that a comparison
of undiscounted cost or benefit streams, although the same in total,
can often lead to erroneous conclusions. Table III- 1 illustrates this
point, listing both discounted and undiscounted cost streams of three
alternatives being compared.
Cost Stream C, when discounted at 4 percent, is the preferable
alternative in terms of present value of expenditures. This can be
seen to be due to the $600 expenditure which is not required until
Year five and hence has a relatively low discounted value.
Subtracting the present value of expenditures from the present
value of receipts or benefits for competing alternatives leaves "net
present value" figures which can then be compared. In doing this, of
1 O
For example, see the tables in Pearson Hunt, Charles M.
Williams, and Gordon Donaldson, Basic Business Finance: Text and





COMPARISON OF COST STREAMS UNDISCOUNTED





Year A B c A B C
1 200 600 100 200 600 100
2 200 100 100 192 96 96
3 200 100 100 185 92 92
4 200 100 100 178 89 89
5 200 100 600 171 85 513
Totals 1, 000 1,000 1, 000 926 962 890
course, it must be borne in mind that resources are consumed in
performing such cost analyses. The procedure should not, therefore,
be carried beyond the point of economic advantage.
The Use of Microeconomic Theory
Economic analysis in Integrated Logistics Support can help
in making choices among alternative combinations of resource inputs.
Such an analysis can be broken down into a series of steps. D The
^In this connection, see the discussion in Hitch and McKean,
The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear A ge, pp. 118-120, for a




first step is taken at levels higher than that of the logistician and con-
cerns the determination of which military objectives are to be accom-
plished. This decision is often qualitative and involves matters of
national importance that are decided through political processes and at
high levels in the Department of Defense. The second step involves
consideration of alternative methods of accomplishing the stated ob-
jectives. This step, in turn, has two phases. The first involves the
evaluation of alternate systems for accomplishing the objective. This
decision will also be made at fairly high levels, although the logistics
implications of choosing among various alternatives must be con-
sidered, as has previously been noted. The second phase, which
directly concerns the ILS logistician, involves the determination of
how the various elements of ILS should be used in combination to sup-
port the weapon system which has been decided upon. It is at this
point that the logistician must undertake an economic analysis, valuing
the ILS resources which each alternative method requires.
The logistician may find the use of a model helpful in making
his analysis. 4 A model is basically a method for studying relation-
ships which exist among variables abstracted from the total environ-
Paul H. Rigby, Conceptual Foundations of Business Research
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 196^), pp. 109-127 contains a




ment. These can range from a simple word description to a complex
mathematical formulation. Appropriateness of a model depends upon
the variables selected and the soundness of the theory upon which it is
constructed. Its value lies in how well it is able to predict outcomes,
so that the consequences of any particular choice can be adequately
estimated. The main point here is that the logistician generally will
need some type of framework within which he can manipulate the ab-
stracted variables, contributing to the total cost of the alternatives
which he is evaluating.
The final step in an economic analysis involves making a deci-
sion based on one or more criteria selected for choosing among alter-
natives. In the private sector, the criterion is often stated to be pro-
fit maximization. As has been previously noted, maximization of
"military worth" is a more difficult problem. To the ILS logistician,
however, the problem which presents itself is ultimately one of com-
bining inputs so as to permit attainment of the desired level of avail-
ability at lowest resource cost. In many cases there will be sub-
problems such as non-availability of particular resources, lack of a
clearly defined organizational structure, or failure of the accounting
system to generate useable cost data. In such situations the logistician
may be unable to optimize his position, and can only try to achieve an




Isoquants and the production function in ILS. -- Microeconomics
frequently makes use of indifference curve analysis in demonstrating
geometrically the determination of efficient use of resources. Strictly
speaking, an indifference curve is a locus of points on a graph which
denotes combinations of any two different items selected in such a
fashion that the potential consumer of the items is indifferent as to
which combination he receives. All points on the described curve
provide him with the same degree of satisfaction. The indifference
curve graph thus has a quantity variable on both axes. The shape or
slope of an indifference curve can be considered as indicating the




Fig. Ill- 1 -- Illustration of a partial family of indifference curves,
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The curve is convex to the origin because as more and more units of
A are given up the remaining units become increasingly more valuable
to the consumer and require more units of B in substitution. There
exists an infinitely large number or family of such curves since an
infinite number of combinations are theoretically possible and an indif-
ference curve passes through each point describing a combination.
Figure III- 1 depicts three members of such a family of curves. In
Figure III- 1 , x and y are equivalent combinations of A and B, while
combination z, lying on a higher indifference curve, is preferred to
either x or y. An economic problem is said to exist when (1) only a
subset of all the possible combinations is available, and (2) at least
one of the unavailable combinations is preferred to any of the available
combinations. The consumer is best off when he selects that available
combination of A and B which lies on the highest indifference curve.
The general principles of indifference curve analysis can be
carried over into the study of production or output. Output capable of
being produced is a function of the inputs used. In economic theory,
this relationship between inputs and output is known as a production
function. It can be stated as Q = f(x, , x ? , * * • , xn ) where Q is the
output and there are n possible inputs. The production function is
valid over a particular period of time, and depends upon the current
state of technology. The notion of a production function implies the
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solution of a prior problem of technological efficiency. That is, given
the state of technological knowledge, the production function indicates
the maximum output available from any given combination of inputs.
Thus the production function itself assumes that the problem of tech-
nical efficiency has already been solved. The economist's -- or logis-
tician's problem is to make choices which result in economic efficiency.
In this section, a static analysis with respect to changes in
technology will be carried out so that input- output relationships ex-
isting at one point in time may be more clearly brought into focus. It
is recognized that this procedure limits the analysis to some extent
since changing technology is a factor the logistician does have to deal
with. It is here, however, assumed that the output being sought by
the logistician is some given level of weapon system availability or
reliability and that he varies the input mix so as to attain the output at
lowest possible cost given conditions then existing. All other factors
are assumed to be held constant (ceterus paribus).
Consider now the general static case of obtaining a given out-
put (level of weapon system availability) by varying the quantities of
logistics inputs. The ILS logistician has, supposedly, ten elements
which he can vary in reaching the output level. In order to keep the
example two-dimensional for the present, however, assume that only
two variable inputs are to be used. The productive output that obtains
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from the use of these inputs can be indicated by curves which look
like indifference curves. The curve which connects the various com-
binations of inputs which yield a fixed level of output is called an
15isoquant or isoproduct curve. The production function in this case
can be represented by a family of these isoquants. Quantities of out-
put are the same at all points on an isoquant; i. e. , output is a con-
stant. Figure III-2 shows one typical isoquant. Movement up this
isoquant (i. e. , to the northwest) would mean that increasingly larger
sized increments of A must be applied in production to compensate
for given decrements of B in order to keep the level of output fixed.
And as more and more units of A are used, it becomes increasingly
more difficult, in the sense of the required increase of A, to main-
tain the level of output by giving up units of input B. This is an
economic relationship similar to that of diminishing returns.
As with indifference curves, an infinite family of isoquants is
required, theoretically, to describe the production function fully.
Slopes of these isoquants depend on the technical substitutability of
the inputs and are equal to the negative of the ratio of the marginal
product of the inputs. The curve in Figure III-2 is convex, indicating
1 5Isoquants are not true indifference curves. Watson, how-
ever, in Price Theory and Its Uses, p. 169 notes that they are some-
times called "production indifference curves." The indifference
curve maps a preference relationship whereas the isoquant deals with






Units of Input B
Fig. III-2 -- Illustration of the production function.
less than perfect substitutability. Further, at no point, can two iso-
quants in the same family intersect, since this would imply that a
higher level of output could be attained by reducing the amount of one
of the input quantities without increasing the other.
The problem which faces the ILS logistician in the context of
this theoretical presentation is to determine that combination of inputs
which is economically efficient in achieving a desired output (level of
weapon system availability). Economic efficiency --as opposed to
technical efficiency -- requires a choice in the face of meaningful
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constraints, in this case a budget limitation. At any one point in time
the logistician is limited not only by the combinations that can actually
be used due to the current state of technology, but also by the avail-
ability of financial resources allocated to his particular task. In order
then to decide which of the technically efficient points is optimal, costs
must also be brought into consideration. Each input has an opportunity
cost, or price, which will influence the extent of its use in the face of
the budget constraint.
Figure III- 3 illustrates an example of this budgetary constraint.
Limiting positions can be established on each of the two axes deter-
mined by the cost of each input and the available budget. A line can




Units of Input B
Fig. Ill- 3 -- Illustration of a budget line.
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being called the budget line, or exchange curve. The slope of this
line or curve is determined by the ratio of the marginal costs of the
two inputs. The budget line can also be thought of as an isocost curve.
In Figure III- 3 , this curve is shown as a straight line, indicating a
condition of constant unit cost of the inputs. Other isocost lines may,
of course, be drawn closer to the origin, representing combinations
which would result in expenditure of less than the full budget allocation.
Suppose now that the IL.S logistician has to consider the use of
only two of the elements previously defined as comprising the Inte-
grated Logistic Support System. These elements have a stated cost
per unit, and the logistician faces a budget constraint. Assume that
the two ILS elements are (1) sets of spares and repair parts (Supply
Support), and (2) sets of support and test equipment. The object, as
previously developed, is to combine these inputs in an optimal fashion.
The productive output attainable from these valuable inputs is mea-
sured in this case in terms of inherent availability of the weapon sys-
tem -- availability being defined as previously indicated in Chapter II,
i. e.
,
Availability = MTBF + MTTR
To support some given level of availability, say 95 percent,
these two inputs can be employed in various combinations and are
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therefore to some extent technical substitutes. Figure III-4 shows a
hypothetical locus of points representing discrete combinations of the
two inputs which it has been estimated would provide a desired 95 per-
cent level of availability. This figure indicates that as more spares
and repair parts are provided the system probably can be more easily
maintained although this increase will be subject to diminishing re-
turns.
If the points shown in Figure III-4 are now connected, an iso-
quant would result such that every point on the curve would represent
an input combination capable of yielding 95 percent availability. Simi-
larly, a family of isoquants based on engineering estimates could be
constructed for other levels of availability as indicated in Figure III- 5.
Each point on any one curve represents as technically efficient
a combination of the two inputs as any other on the same curve. A
move can be made to a higher level of availability only by trading off
between the two inputs in such a manner that total output is increased.
The problem in proceeding to successively higher isoquants arises,
of course, from the fact that there is an opportunity cost involved in
procurement of the inputs, and funds are limited to the Acquisition
Manager for logistic support purposes. The logistician must there-
fore bring cost of the inputs into his calculations. Assume now that
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Fig. Ill- 5 -- Illustration of a family of availability isoquants
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objective has been assigned as the minimum objective for logistics
support. If the entire budget were to be spent on spares and repair
part sets, a certain number of these sets could be obtained. Likewise,
the logistics budget could also theoretically be spent entirely on sets
of support and test equipment. Calculations under each of these two
assumptions will provide the limiting positions on the two axes.
Assume now for sake of simplicity that one set of support and
test equipment can be procured at the same cost as two sets of spares
and repair parts and that both items are obtained under conditions of
constant unit cost. A straight isocost line can be drawn between the
respective maximum points on the axes. In theoretical economics,
the optimum position that would now be possible to be reached is that
point where the line representing the available budget is just tangent
to the highest availability isoquant. In general, we may say that
tangency of isoquants and isocost lines indicates minimum cost posi-
tions. However, in the situation that has been described above, the
goal is attainment of 95 percent availability with the minimum expendi-
ture of logistics funds. In this case, the optimum position is the
lowest budget line which is just tangent to the 95 percent availability
curve. This position is indicated by the point E in Figure III-6.
It is, of course, possible that the budget constraint and the
availability criterion are inconsistent; i. e. , that the budget line repre
senting the maximum expenditure allocated to the task in question lies
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Budget line
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Support and Test Equipment (sets)
Fig. Ill- 6 -- Illustration of an optimum position.
everywhere below the 95 percent availability isoquant. In Figure III-6
















The indicated optimum position would thus involve the procure-
ment of twenty sets of spares and repair parts and ten sets of support
and test equipment. Calculation of the figures required in order to
make such a determination will undoubtedly not be easy. Yet if the
logistician goes through these steps, he will be able to obtain most of
the data he needs and at the very least he may thereby be saved from
making gross errors.
It should be mentioned at this point that it is possible in the
situation being discussed to attempt to either (1) maximize availability
(^•A) subject to some fixed budget B, or (2) minimize B (<tB) subject
to A = A. Figure III-6 illustrates the latter type of optimization.
Here there would be only one isoquant but many possible budget lines
to the left of the maximum line to consider. Figure III-7, shown be-
low, illustrates the former situation where the optimum position is
considered to be tangency of the maximum budget line with the highest
availability curve. In this case there are many isoquants to consider,
but only one budget line.
Elements of maximization. -- The principles involved in the
preceding theoretical example of two valuable inputs can be further
extended to apply to a problem such as use of the ten potential ILS
inputs. This can be done, as Hitch and McKean point out, by simply
dropping the requirement for proof through the method of plane
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geometry. * ' Proceeding to this more complex situation then, assume
once again a constant unit cost for any input, designated by c-. *°
Also assume that it is desired to maximize logistic support contribu-
tion to weapon system availability, A, through an optimum combination
of ILS inputs, subject to the constraint of a given budget, B. Let
x,, x.?, • • •
,
Xjq represent the ten variable ILS inputs. The object
then is to maximize the value of the function A(x,, x^, * * •
,
x,.) sub-
ject to the budget constraint, B. As before, only feasible combinations
should be considered. The budgetary constraint will preclude some
combinations as will present non- availability of some inputs. In addi-
tion, some combinations, although feasible in financial terms, may
not be practically possible. '
17Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age
, p. 117.
18For a general discussion of the cases of constant and in-
creasing average unit costs, see ibid .
, pp. 367-369. Development
of these cases involves determination of the marginal cost of inputs.
A maximum position is found to be reached when the marginal product
of each input just equals its marginal cost. For many problems in-
volving military logistics support of sophisticated weapon systems,
however, constant unit cost of the logistic inputs is a valid assumption
since these items are purchased by lot, or are frequently available at
some constant unit cost in inventory.
"
ibid .
, pp. 385-387 considers programming techniques where-
by manpower as well as budget constraints are present. By use of the
general technique described infra , however, combinations can simply
be eliminated if they involve the use of any inputs not available.
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In addition to calculus, by assuming both A and B to be linear,
the problem can be handled by linear programming as well using solu-
tion techniques such as the simplex method. ^ Linearity is often a
reasonable assumption, particularly in the specific area under con-
sideration, and it greatly simplifies the mathematics involved. In
such a situation, the logistician may readily make use of the tech-
nique. Even if A and B are not precisely linear, the use of linear
programming is likely to achieve results of at least a fairly close
approximation.
Often, however, in an ILS problem it may be that the variable
inputs to be manipulated are relatively few in number and discrete,
? 1
with the budget standing as the only constraint. In such a case the
logistician might follow a procedure which essentially involves con-
sideration of relative marginal products of the inputs. The marginal
product of any input, x-, may be identified as the contribution which
one extra unit of x- makes to A. Measured in small enough units,
^It is not the purpose of this study to review the methods of
linear or other types of mathematical programming. However, for a
good discussion of application of the simplex method in management
type problems, see Harold Bierman, Charles J. Bonini, and Warren
H. Hausman, Quantitative Analysis for Business Decisions (3rd ed. ;
Homewood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, Inc. , 1969), pp. 256-296.
21 Of interest in this regard is the discussion of mathematical
determination of maximum and minimum in the discrete case con-
tained in Ragnar Frisch, Maxima and Minima: Theory and Economic
Application s (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 8-14.
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this marginal product is equal to the partial derivative of A with re-
spect to x.. We would normally expect this marginal product Lo be
positive, e. g. , the procurement of one more set of spare parts would
probably contribute in some positive manner to an increase in the
value of A.
Now the budget, B, imposes an input limitation on the logistician
which can be indicated by the inequality
B-V ciXi >0
i-l
where x. is any input and c is its cost.
Having established the basic inequality, a search can then be made of
feasible combinations which would both satisfy the inequality and re-
sult in minimum acceptable availability. One particular combination
can then be found to be the maximizing solution through systematic
comparisons with other possible combinations. The point here is not
to advocate one specific procedure that will be always applicable and
useful. Rather it is to indicate that it may often be possible for the
ILS logistician to make use of rather simple tools which can improve
his ability to make an efficient economic choice in many trade-off
situations. One writer notes in this regard that: ". . . there is a very
real need for the logistics planner to have a rapid, automated proce-
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dure to handle the volumes of logistics predictions, trade-offs, and
22
analyses with the required accuracy.
Applications
The Collins Radio Company produces certain electronic equip-
ment and parts which are used in aircraft production by the military
and also by NASA in the space program. Many of these items are de-
signed to perform somewhat similar functions in various uses. Higher
reliability levels are deemed more essential in some applications,
however, and the parts for these uses are therefore more costly. Re-
liability Level 1 shown in Table III- 2 was designed for equipment which
uses standard military parts and standard production processes and
controls. Level 2 indicates equipment designed for use in the new
F-lll aircraft. Level 3 parts were designed for use in the Gemini
space program and level 4 in Apollo. In each case, a production
quantity of 800 units was assumed in estimating costs. As previously
described, MTBF stands for the reliability concept mean-time-be-
tween failure expressed in hours.
Assume hypothetically now that a logistician has a need to
evaluate the procureinent of sets of weapon system spare parts of the
type indicated in Table III- Z as well as sets of test equipment. These





COST FACTORS VERSUS RELIABILITY LEVELS
(Reliability Expressed in Terms of MTBF Hours)
Reliability Levels
Cost Factors 1 2 3 4
Parts Improvement $ 1, 250
Piece Parts Cost $1, 300 $1,700 $2, 500 4,000
Fabricated Parts Cost 600 600 750 900
Labor and Overhead 1, 350 1, 350 1, 600 2,200
Prime Mfg. Cost 3, 250 3, 650 4, 850 8, 350
Special Charges 350 500 650 850
Total Mfg. Cost 3, 600 4, 150 5, 500 9, 200
G & A and Profit 800 910 1, 200 2,000
Selling Price $4, 400 $5,060 $6, 700 $11,200
MTBF 150 240 560 1,200
Source: Collins Radio Company, Life Cycle Costing (Cedar Rapids,
Iowa: Collins Radio Company, 1966), p. 3-2.
are the only inputs of concern at present. Assume also that Collins
Radio Company is the only possible producer of the spare parts. The
logistician thus has four spare part options to consider in combination
with the other inputs for trade-off purposes. He should observe y of
course, that increases in the selling price of 15, 55 and 250 percent
are associated with MTBF improvements by factors of 60, 370 and 800
percent respectively. It is also implicit that the logistician will in-
sure that contractor charges to overhead are contractually proper so
as not to bias the final decision.

- 91 -
Assume next that the logistician determines ho can procure as
many sets of (es! equipment as may be needed that will meet require-
ments at the constant price of $5, 000 per set. The logistician's con-
cern would now be with the levels of availability and reliability required
23by the equipment design. Assume engineering estimates indicate
500 MTBF hours to be the minimum acceptable level for reliability in
this use and the highest possible level of availability is desired, but
at least 95 percent. The logistician will then decide on the spare parts
with a reliability level of 560 MTBF hours and costing a constant
$6, 700 per set. If the logistician has a maximum budget of $5. 5 mil-
lion which he can allocate between the two material items, he will
want to purchase that quantity of sets of spares and test equipment
which will result in the highest level of system availability (at least 95
percent) possible from his constrained budget. The first step would
be for the logistician to have isoquants calculated by design engineers
for 95 percent and higher levels of availability. As before, the slopes
of the isoquants are given from the marginal rate of technical substi-
tution of the inputs at the indicated point. If we let the level of avail-
23
Recall that inherent availability is defined as being composed
of reliability measured in MTBF, and maintainability, measured in
MTTR. In Table III-2, the levels shown for MTBF assume that nothing




ability be called A, spare parts x , and test equipment x., then we
have a problem of attempting to maximize A(x., x., •••, x ) where
all variables other than x and x_ are being held constant. We then
have dA = A.dx. + A-,dx_ = 0, from which we calculate = - ,




the slope of the isoquant where x, is measured on the y axis and x~ is
, ,, .24measured on the x axis.
To make such calculations, the design engineer would require
estimates which indicated the rate at which sets of spare parts could
be substituted for sets of test equipment. Assume that such data are
obtained and isoquants plotted as indicated in Figure III- 7 . The logis-
tician can now construct his budget line. Since the budget is $5. 5 mil-
lion, a maximum of 1100 sets of test equipment at $5,000 per set or
820 sets of spare parts at $6, 700 per set can be obtained. Under the
given conditions of constant unit cost, a straight budget line is drawn
and tangency with the highest isoquant looked for. This will indicate
the highest level of availability possible within the $5. 5 million budget
constraint. The final calculation with tangency at point E, as indi-
cated in Figure III- 7, is for 597 sets of spare parts and 300 sets of test
24Here Aj is the partial derivative of A with respect to xj. It
thus represents the marginal product to A of an additional small unit
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Fig. Ill- 7 -- Calculation of purchase quantity of two ILS inputs.
equipment, reaching 96 percent availability. "
In any calculation such as that above, certainly the technical
competence of each bidder and the prospect of his being able to
25 See the Appendix to Hitch and McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age for discussion of a method for handling a
problem involving multiple inputs.
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achieve predicted levels of availability and MTBF must be given care-
ful consideration by the logistician. As a part of this kind of evaluation
the potential supplier's quality control program should be closely
studied. This should help to preclude "buying in" by questionable con-
tractors. It should also help stress the point that logistics support
problems must be considered early in the system design stage. It
has often been the case in the past, for instance, that an over-invest-
ment in spare parts came to be considered necessary because support
considerations weren't adequately taken into account in the basic
equipment's initial design. An example of such a situation can be
seen in the case of the airborne digital computer of the fire control
system of the F-lOb aircraft. This system was initially designed in
1956. A few years ago, the system began requiring increasingly large
amounts of logistic support resources. A subsequent redesign of the
system resulted in estimated annual savings of some 200, 000 mainten-
ance man-hours valued at more than $3. 5 million. '
Evaluation of potential contractor performance. -- Another
advantage of the use of economic trade-off studies in ILS is that
weapons system contractors will come to realize that even though the
Worden, "Integrated Logistics Support, " p. 21.
27Morris, keynote address presented at the Electronic
Industries Symposium, March 7, 1968.
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system might actually have little or no competition from direct substi-
tutes, general competition for the logistician' s limited budget resources
must impose restraints on behavior. The Department of Defense does
not at present obtain as much data as are necessary in some cases to
make trade-off analyses in the most effective manner. This is a
separate problem and beyond the scope of this paper. Here it can only
be assumed that information for trade-off analyses is available.
Scherer, however, having studied such information as has in the past
been obtained, inakes the point that it should be possible to award a
large number of weapon system and equipment contracts on the basis
of after-the-fact evaluation of prior contractor performance and that
this procedure would be much preferable to any system involving an
extension of government controls. °
In any case, it should be possible for the logistician to obtain,
in many instances, enough information to make at least preliminary
trade-off analyses through a search of past contractor performance
records and other available procurement data and through requests for
supporting trade-off studies from potential contractors.
A problem related to the above involves the point that much
available subjective information is not being used in any systematic






manner despite the fact that ". . . it is clear that both objective and
subjective considerations must be carefully weighed if sound program
decisions are to be made. " " It is to this problem which we now turn
in Chapter IV.





BAYESIAN STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY APPLIED TO ILS
. . . The time would seem to be at hand when we should
think about Bayesian priors and the applications of
statistical decision theory to defense planning. ...
Relevant Aspects of Statistical Decision Theory
In the discussion thus far we have largely neglected the influ-
ence of uncertainty on the decision-making process. Because the
course of events cannot definitely be known in advance, uncertainty
cannot be avoided and decisions must be made based on predictions
of the future. Statistical decision theory provides a means for
rationalizing the decision-making process under conditions of uncer-
tainty by placing probabilities on the likelihood of certain events
occurring in the future. Decision theory or inductive statistics has
been described as: ". . . the development of methods which will enable
the analyst to calculate and subsequently minimize the gamble which
automatically is assumed in every problem of estimation or predic-
John R. Meyer, "Comments on Institutional Structures and





tion. " Inductive statistics and decision theory thus permit the prac-
titioner to proceed more intelligently by allowing for the determina-
tion and assumption of "calculated risk. "
General statistical decision theory, regardless of the specific
decision-making approach to be followed can be considered to be
essentially composed of the following major elements:
1. The set of all available (alternative) actions.
2. The set of all unknown "states of nature, " or occurrences
which might take place and against which the possible alter-
native actions are planned.
3. A listing of the consequences which will result from taking
a particular action when any state of nature results.
4. The data.
5. A collection of all possible strategies, or mapping of
actions to be taken depending on results which come from
combining the data together with the consequences indi-
cated above across the states of nature.
6. Criteria for deciding on an optimal strategy to attain the
desired objective.
Following an approach which makes use of these elements the
Dick A. Leabo, Basic Statistics (3rd ed. ; Homewood, 111. :
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 110.

- 99 -
decision-maker would be in a position to evaluate the consequences
of taking any particular action when any state of nature subsequently
occurs. In a military situation, however, this may be very diffi-
cult primarily because of the problem involved in valuing conse-
quences in a quantitative sense. Since this problem does exist, it
is, therefore, essential for the military decision-maker to have
clearly established at the outset the objective which is to be ob-
tained, such as the achievement of a particular level of system
availability for the least expenditure of funds, or, alternately,
the achievement of the highest possible level of availability within
a given budget constraint. He can then proceed to use all available
evidence in an attempt to attain the objective in as efficient a man-
ner as possible following as closely as possible the above general
procedure.
Statistical inference makes strong use of the mathemati-
cal concept of probability. Although a rigorous development of
the theory of probability is beyond the scope of this study, it would
be appropriate to discuss how we shall interpret the meaning of the
term.
Classical versus the subjectivist approach . -- In classical
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theory, the term probability is used to mean relative frequency of
occurrence in the long run. Thus if one were to roll a fair die a
large number of times, he could expect that any one of the sides
would appear about one-sixth of the time, reflecting some intrinsic,
uncontrollable variability of results. This approach to probability
is particularly important in scientific uses where it is possible to
obtain a data base from observations of repeated trials performed
under identical conditions. Decision-making under such conditions
is secondary to the process of conducting the experiments and ob-
taining results. If it is known ahead of time, as in the die experi-
ment, that a certain number of equally likely outcomes are possible,
then probabilities can be assigned prior to conducting the experiment.
Relative frequency can thus be conceived of as some under-
lying number, or kind of long-run stability which idealizes reality.
In the classical theory relating to equally likely outcomes, the proba-
bility of an event A occurring, designated P(A), is thus defined as
the number of equally likely outcomes favorable to A divided by the
total number of equally likely possible outcomes.
Reference has been made above to the idea of random vari-
ation of results. The notion of a random variable is used to mean
any rule which assigns a real number to each possible outcome of an
experiment. If X, then, is a random variable with possible values
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X,, X£, •••, xn having related probabilities p(x j ), p(x2 ), •**, pf^O.
then this latter collection of numbers can be called the probability dis-
tribution of the random variable X. Now the sum of the products of
each x. times its related probability is called the "expected value" of
X, or E(X). The expected value of a random variable is interpreted
in terms of long-run, average expectation. This notion of expected
value can be of particular importance in the case of those systems and
support element acquisitions which involve substantial research and
development effort.
It should also be noted at this point that regardless of how
probabilities are assigned to individual events, they must satisfy three
3basic postulates of finite probability theory:
1. Any probability P(A) is a non-negative number: P(A) > 0.
2. The probability of a certain event is equal to unity.
3. If the events A and B are mutually exclusive, we have the
additive rule: P(A + B) = P(A) + P(B).
The classical notion of probability has its widest application,
as stated above, in repetitive^ experiments under controlled conditions.
^Harald Cramer, The Elements of Probability and Some of
Its Applications (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1955), p. 33.
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The strict classicist would not want to estimate the probability of
occurrence of an event such as life on Mars -- life is either there or
it isn't and once the answer is obtained the experiment would not need
to be repeated. (In fact, it could not be repeated. ) The classical
approach can, however, easily be visualized as applying to a situ-
ation where the problem is to estimate the probability of picking a
"good" item from a continuous production run where it is possible to
relate the long-run relative frequency of the number of good items to
total production. In this instance, no judgments based on any sub-
jective feeling or "intuition" of the item selector as to the likelihood
of obtaining a good item are formed prior to selection.
In addition to this type of situation, however, there exists a
class of non-programmed, business type decisions in which it would
appear necessary, or at least advisable, to investigate how manage-
ment or other expert opinion feels about the probability that certain
occurrences will (or will not) take place. Probability in this con-
text can be thought of as a series of weights or degrees-of-belief
attached to possible outcomes. Personal or subjective judgments
are systematically combined with sample data in arriving at "up-
dated" probabilities and ultimately a decision. In considering a
problem such as that of life on Mars, the subjectivist approach would
hold that different degrees-of-belief are possible for different per-
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sons, even when all have examined the same basic evidence.
This subjective approach will hereafter be referred to as
"Bayesian" since it makes use of Bayes 1 theorem in the decision
process. Bayes 1 theorem is a consequence of the statistical defini-




2 i=1 P(A.) P(H/A.)
where there are n distinct events A,, A^, ' ' '
, A comprising the set
and H is another event contained in the set. The use of this theorem
in the ILS setting is discussed below.
The advantage of the general Bayesian approach for purposes
of this study is that it allows for the development and use of a subjec-
In 1763, an essay by the late Rev. Thomas Bayes appeared in
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society . It was entitled "An
Essay toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. " The
proposition which he stated and proved therein has since been further
developed and is today known as Bayes 1 theorem.
See Hymans, Probability Theory
, pp. 262-263 for a derivation
of Bayes' theorem from the definition of conditional probability. Two
events, Aj and A^, are considered statistically independent if and only
if the probability of simultaneous occurrence of these two events is
equal to the product of their individual probabilities. This means that
the fact that Aj has happened (or not) gives no clue as to the proba-
bility of A^ happening (or not). If, however, Ai does influence or have
something to do with the probability of occurrence of A^, then it can
be said that A 2 is "conditional" on Aj. We can thus speak of the proba-
bility of A^ given Aj, or A2/AJ.
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tive prior probability distribution for an unknown parameter. This
distribution can, of course, be constructed through use of the tech-
niques of economic analysis discussed in Chapter III, or by any other
method which suits the preference of the decision-maker. The pro-
cess of Bayesian analysis actually begins, however, only after the
prior probability distribution has been developed.
Two views of probability have thus been discussed -- one, the
notion of long-run relative frequency and the other, the idea of
weights, or degrees-of-belief which can be updated by considering
new evidence. Before demonstrating how Bayesian analysis can be
used to update degrees-of-belief, however, let us first demonstrate
the use of Bayes' theorem considering for the moment only certain
sample evidence. Assume that 100 identical items were tested at
the plants of three contractor-bidders with the following results:
TABLE IV-
1
RESULTS OF TESTS IN THREE CONTRACTOR PLANTS
Contrac tor Items Pa:sse d It'ems Fai led Total
A 97 3 100
B 96 4 100
C 92 8 100
Totals 285 15 300
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Assume further that the logistician is interested m ascer-
taining the probability that a particular random failure occurred in the
plant of Contractor C. To put this information in the notation used
above for Bayes' theorem, let A, = Contractor A, A^ Contractor B,
A3 Contractor C and H the condition fail. From the information pre-
sented and the definition of probability, the following calculations can
be made
:
P(A,) = -^ =
. 33 +
1 300
P(A 2 ) -^ .33
P(A .) = Mo = j33 +
3 30
° r^




































Thus the probability of the random failure having occurred in the
plant of Contractor C is seen to be . 53. Suppose, however, that only
incomplete data had been available and, specifically, none of the
final three probabilities conditional on H were directly known. The
logistician, must then calculate the conditional probability P(A,/H)
from Bayes' theorem. From our previous definition of this theorem
we have








To obtain the denominator, we can calculate
PIAjJPtH/Aj) = (.33)(.03) = .0099
P(A
2
)P(H/A 2 ) = (. 33)(.04) = .0132
P(A
3
)P(H/A^) = (. 33)(.08) = .0264
From the definition of conditional probability we then have
2+-
-i P(Ai )P(H/Ai ) = P(H) = . 0099 + . 0132 + . 0264 = . 0495
Substituting into the equation gives
(. 33)(.08) . 0264
P(A,/H) =i " L = = .53
3
.0495 .0495
Thus once again the probability of the failure having occurred in the
plant of Contractor C is calculated to be . 53 or a 53 percent chance.
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Strategy selection and use. -- Perhaps one of the most impor-
tant distinctions between the classical and subjective approaches to
probability is apparent in the method of selection of strategies and the
procedure which is then followed. For example, a decision-maker
might assume a situation in which he is facing a rational opponent and
that both sides have full and complete information. As a second pos-
sible alternative, he might assume that he is facing unknown "nature"
with incomplete information. Game theory, particularly that of the
two-person, zero- sum type, would fall into the first type of situation.
The second type of situation, however, visualizes the decision-maker
as (1) not having complete knowledge and (2) facing an opponent who
he cannot assume will behave in a rational manner. Hence in this
case definite statements about long-run relative frequency cannot be
made in advance. In such instance the decision-maker must then de-
cide whether or not he wishes to make prior judgments. For one
reason or another, judgments might not be made. Any particular out-
come could then be initially assumed as being equally likely and sam-
pie or test data relied on entirely. In this case, the classical de-
cision theory procedure would be followed, including calculation of
optimum sample sizes and collection of data, and decision processes





such as Minimax followed.
It may be, however, that management does have subjective
judgments which it wishes to make use of together with sample or
test data in arriving at a decision. Bayesian analysis provides a
vehicle for doing this. This analytical tool permits the combining of
sample evidence with the prior probability distribution to calculate
a new, revised distribution based on both of these factors. This new
distribution is known as a posterior probability distribution. Through
the use of this analysis, evaluation is permitted such that the larger
the sample size, i. e. , the richer the objective evidence, the more
the weight placed on it as opposed to the prior subjective judgment.
Calculation of revised probabilities should appeal to the ILS logisti-
cian since it would enable him to put to use that which he has learned
o
"from experience. " The logistician can employ his own internal
Q
techniques to establish a prior probability distribution. Modifications
'See Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age
, pp. 195-197, 201-202 for a general discussion of use
of Minimax and game theory in a military setting.
o
Robert C. Shook and Harold Joseph Highland, Probability
Models with Business Applications , ed. by Ester H. Highland (Home-
wood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
, 1969), p. 80.
"it should be stated at this point that it is still an open question
as to how this can best be done. By their very nature prior proba-
bilities must be viewed as "personalistic" and hence might vary from
individual to individual. Bruce W. Morgan points out in his An Intro-
duction to Bayesian Statistical Processes (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. :
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can then be made as further evidence is obtained across the early
stages of a system's life cycle. Such an approach would enable"
1. ILS personnel to be early contributors to the initial decision-
making process, and active participants throughout the sub-
sequent review process.
2. All available evidence, including expert subjective opinion to
be brought to bear in helping to estimate the crucial
parameter(s).
3. A better final choice to be made through the merging of sub-
jective and objective evidence, or at the very least to provide
a basis for inquiry as to the differences which might exist
between government and contractor estimates.
In addition, the logistician in some cases may face a situation in which
the number of potential contractors are few and/or the number of
items to be tested or samples that can be taken limited. Bayesian
analysis can be a useful procedure in such cases as well.
The binomial distribution. --In many random experiments,
the observer is confronted with an either-or outcome. A looked for
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
, 1968), p. 24 that "One main distinguishing fea-
ture of the Bayesian approach, then, lies in its willingness to make
direct use of these personal, or subjective, probabilities. ..."
Bayesian statistics thus can be looked on as a procedure for making
use of personal judgments, indicating that relevant experience is
important. The subjective information is thus to be considered
intrinsically as valuable as the sample information.
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occurrence cither takes place or it doesn't. Occurrences on one
trial also may have no influence on the outcome of another trial.
For example, consider the random selection of an electron tube for
a performance test. The tube will either meet specifications or it
will not. These tubes do not "wear out" in the same sense as do
certain mechanical devices. Rather they fail in a random manner
and the fact that a tube may be operating at t hours tells us nothing
about what to expect from this same tube at t+1 hours. A proba-
bilistic statement could be made, however, about the life expectancy
of this general type of tube.
Performance of an experiment of this type is often referred
to as a Bernoulli trial. When an experiment consists of deter-
mining the total number of successes out of n independent Bernoulli
trials with the success probability remaining constant at p for
every trial, the experiment is called a binomial experiment and
the parameters of its probability distribution are n and p. Tables
have been constructed which show the results of "expanding the
binomial" and specify the probability that a failure will occur ex-
actly r times in n trials. These tables are, however, somewhat
The notation used in the case of Bernoulli trials is
b(r;n,p), which refers to the probability of achieving exactly r suc-
cesses in n trials in which the probability of success on each trial re-
mains constant at p, and the probability of failure is q=l-p. The re-
sultant binomial probability density function is then derived from
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lengthy. Other distributions are thus sometimes used because they
are easier to manipulate mathematically and provide reasonably close
results. The binomial distribution has been singled out here for dis-
cussion, however, because many of the tests in which the logistician
will be involved have outcomes which fall in this pattern and hence
because of the use made of it in the examples which follow.
Bayesian Analysis in the ILS Environment
Let us now consider the hypothetical development and use of
the prior and revised (posterior) distributions in an ILS context.
Suppose that an ILS logistician is confronted with a decision situation.
He has been asked whether the contractor- submitted support plan of
a newly proposed weapon system appears feasible. Two alternative
actions are available:
1. Action a, -- advise that the support plan is feasible.
2. Action a2 -- advise that the support plan is not feasible.
The unknown states of nature in this case may be considered to be the
levels of availability which the support plan can actually provide. The
(r)P rcl
n " r







sum of the probabilities obtained adds to one in all cases.
*For example, see Frederick Mosteller, Robert E. K. Rourke,
and George B. Thomas, Jr. , Probability With Statistical Applications




logistician and his staff do not ;it this point take actual samples such as
items from the production runs of potential suppliers of supper! equip-
ment. Neither is any other type of test of material conducted. Such
things, however, as prior performance of the support plan contractor
in meeting commitments, the recent record of logistic support of
similar or related systems, and probable availability of support per-
sonnel of the kind needed are considered. As a result of a subjective
evaluation of this and any other pertinent information available, the
staff develops the following probability distribution. ^
Decimal Statement of Levels Probability That the Support Plan







. 99 . 5
1. 00
By this procedure, then, an assignment of probabilities has
been made to the "likely" values of the unknown p as the result of
exercise of expert subjective judgment by the logistician and his staff.
1 2Results obtained through use of Bayesian analysis, as de-
veloped infra , can depend importantly on the values determined for
the prior probability distribution. While the logistician thus will
attempt to arrive initially at the best possible; prior distribution he
may well wish in the final decision to subject the results to a sensi-
tivity analysis based on using slightly different values to see how the
decision is changed as changes are made in i:he priors.
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The distribution, whose probabilities sum to one, may be called the
"prior distribution of p. "
Suppose now that a 95 percent availability level has been es-
tablished by design engineers as the minimum that should be insured.
The logistician then draws up the following decision rules:
1. Action a
}
if E(p) ^ . 95.
2. Action a
2
if E(p) < . 95.
Now it is possible that the logistician might make his decision simply
on the basis of the subjective prior probability distribution which he
and his staff have just developed. If he were to do so in this case, he
would calculate E(p) = .910 and hence would take action a.^, advising
1 3
that the contractor's logistics support plan did not appear feasible.
Probably, however, he would not be satisfied with this. The
system hardware procurement may involve millions of dollars, and
the logistic support elements at least that much. Moreover, the sys-
tem might be considered to have a unique value for national defense
1 3 The calculation of the E(p) is as follows:
_p_ P(p) p- P(p)







whose worth could be very great, but difficult to calculate in precise
monetary terms. The subjective prior probability distribution and its
expected value could be considered by the logistician as a sort of
benchmark, but he might well want to obtain additional, current data,
based on sample evaluation.
In fact, it can be noted that under the ILS implementing direc-
tives numerous opportunities present themselves for obtaining and
making use of additional information. Exhibit IV- 1 portrays a manage-
ment matrix which integrates the elements of logistics support planning
with system design management across the system's life cycle. Re-
ferring to Exhibit IV- 1, for example, consider the sequence of events
shown opposite the ILS element Support Management. In particular,
note the following steps which indicate the ability to update information:
1. SM-8. The contractor's logistic support proposal is evaluated
concurrently with his system proposal. This is considered in
subsequent establishment of a support development plan.
2. SM-13. Demonstrations and validation of support requirements
are carried out leading to updating of the support plan.
3. SM- 17A and SM-18. Validation continues following first article
and service tests.
These steps are but examples. The significant fact is that as the basic
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support plan. It should be noted here that it is possible to perform
tests using models and mock-ups quite early in the system life cycle
and substantially before it is possible to make actual operational tests.
The support plan, therefore, can be updated at these early stages with
a relatively small expenditure of resources.
A situation can thus be seen to exist in which it is possible to
pool previous information and subjective judgment with sample evi-
dence and test information to permit the calculation of an updated or
revised probability distribution which is referred to as the posterior
probability distribution, or, in the context of the hypothetical example
being discussed, the posterior distribution of the unknown p, in view
of which decisions can be made or revised. It should be noted that
values can be continually updated simply by using a posterior distribu-
tion as the prior distribution in the next round of data collection and
For a more detailed discussion of the steps in development
of the logistics support plan during which opportunities exist for up-
dating, see Holsclaw and Carlson, "Integrated Logistic Support: The
Life- Cycle Task of Support Management, " especially pp. 3-7. Of
significance also is the following statement contained in DOD direc-
tive 4 100. 35: "Each system or equipment project shall include a
plan for functional and environmental tests or analyses to assess
periodically whether the logistic support planned will maintain the
system or equipment effectively and efficiently. These tests shall
be combined to the maximum extent practicable with reliability,
maintainability, performance, and complete system tests. When
the need is justified, separate logistic support tests or analyses
also shall be scheduled. "
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evaluation. Decisions previously made can be reversed, at a saving
of resources, if subsequent information shows a disparity between the
subjective evaluation and test results. At the very least, grounds for
further tests and improvements are established.
In the hypothetical case under discussion, assume that, on the
basis of recent performance, the logistician is confident of all logis-
tics elements except for certain critical spare parts, and the overall
system availability can therefore be equated to the reliability of the
spares. According to the system design these spares are to be sup-
plied out of present Navy inventory, and are located in various stock
points throughout the United States. The logistician then learns from
the Supply Support element manager that twenty-five of these spare
parts are available at a nearby location. Assume now that the engi-
neers can devise an appropriate non-destructive test. The twenty-
five items are then tested and only one fails to pass. This now pro-
vides the logistician with two pieces of information which he wishes
to combine.
Assume that a random failure pattern for the item in question
has been established so that use of the binomial distribution is appro-
priate. Remember that he will take action a, if
15Should a non-destructive test prove impossible to devise
then, of course, test samples would have to be much smaller.
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Posterior E(p) ^ . 95.
Now let us proceed to indicate how Bayes' theorem and the bi-
nomial distribution can be used to develop the revised or posterior dis-
tribution once the prior has been developed. Recall that the subjec-
tively estimated attainable availability level expressed as a proportion
p is considered as a random variable with the prior probability dis-











1. 00 . 910 = Prior E(p)
The binomial distribution and Bayes' theorem can now provide the
means for combining this subjective prior probability distribution with
the sample evidence. Our sample was of twenty-five items, of which
twenty-four passed. Denoting the number which passed by T, we have
T = 24 or T/n = 24/25 = . 96 as the proportion passing. Recalling that
a priori considerations had admitted four possible values of the actual
system availability, p, we can calculate the probability of observing
that T = 24, or T/n = . 96 for each of these values of p. Assuming
*"It is important to note that T/n, the proportion passing, is
itself a statistically unbiased and consistent estimator of p. In addi-
tion, this estimator becomes more efficient as n increases. Our
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use of the binomial distributed b(r;n, p) or b(24;25, p), a series of
"Test P 1 values can be calculated such that this "Test P" is actually
the conditional probability P(T-24/p) for each value of p. Thus for
the prior p value of .80 we calculate:
P(T-24/p=. 80) - (^) (. 80) 24 (. 20) 1 = .024
1 7Likewise for the other values of p:
P(T-24/p-.90) - (\\) (.90)
24
(. 10) 1 = . 199
P(T = 24/p=.95) = (||) (.95) 24 (.05) 1 = .365






The use of Bayes 1 theorem is now important in proceeding to develop
the updated or posterior distribution and posterior S(p). From the
theorem we have, for the first value of p:
P(d= 80/T = 24) = P(P = -80)P(T--24/P = .8Q){P(p =
.
80)P(T =24/p = . 80) +P(p = . 90)P(T =24/p = . 90)




(. 20)(.024) + (. 24) (. 199) + (. 50) (. 365) + (. 05) (. 196) . 0048+. 0498+. 1825+. 00S
problem here is that for n equal to only twenty-five, we wish to use
more than just sample evidence. See Hymans, Probability Theory
,
p. 267.
17As previously mentioned, these values can be obtained from
binomial distribution tables. For example, see Mosteller, Rourke
and Thomas, Probability With Statistical Applications
, p. 443, using




Thus we have P(p = . 80/T = 24) = • ° ** = .019. 18 In similar fashion,
. 2469
values can be calculated for the other levels of p and listed for con-













90 . 25 . 199 .0498 . 202
95 . 50 . 365 . 1825
. 739
99 .05 . 196 . 0098 . 040
1.000
P(p/T = 24)
With these results and the prior E(p) previously developed, the logis

































This is directly comparable to the prior value P(p=. 80) = . 20.
Initial, subjective, research had arrived at a 20 percent chance of 80
percent availability. The test results, which indicated T/n = .96 (96
percent availability) serve to reduce the likelihood of only 80 percent
availability so that we now have: Probability of 80 percent system
availability given a particular test result of 96 percent availability
= P(p=. 80/T = 24) = . 019 «= . 20.
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Thus we have a situation where the prior E(p) =
-91, the sample test
= 24/25 = . 96 and the posterior E(p) = . 939. The two pieces of evi-
dence have been weighted and combined. Since the posterior E(p)<c.95,
the logistician recommends course of action a£. Had the posterior
E(p) been such that a favorable decision to proceed resulted, the
posterior distribution could then be maintained and used as a prior
distribution for some subsequent test. This is important because in
the ILS procedure, several tests are provided for prior to actual
hardware procurement. A planned procurement could thus be termi-
nated, if necessary, at any of several research and development test
points prior to letting of the actual fabrication contract.
In the above example the subjective judgment of the logistician
and his staff in effect outweighs favorable test results. Perhaps the
subjective judgment was based on an experience involving support of
a similar system, in which unfavorable results occurred. In any
event, under Bayesian procedure, as the sample size increases the
relative weight given to sample evidence increases. Therefore, if
he desired to be even more positive, the logistician might take steps
to test identical items located at another location and so increase the
sample size. Such tests of reliability could also be carried out by
contractors under government supervision as part of the prime con-
tract, or as a special test and evaluation sub-contract. Certainly it
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would seem that industry in any case would need to make stringent
tests in its own self-interest, and the results could then be made avail-
able to the logistician under appropriate contractual arrangements.
Moore notes in this regard that: "Reliability is a characteristic that
a product has put into it by the factory. And in order to find out if its
19products are reliable, the factory must test its output. " It should
also be emphasized that the type of analysis discussed above could
conceivably be carried out with any of the ILS elements. If carried
out separately, it would be possible to determine which, if any, of
the elements fell short and hence would require upgrading prior to
use.
The role of subjective judgment. -- But why, one might ask,
should we allow subjective judgment to influence the final decision.
The logistician is a professional in management of the military busi-
ness function and as such is in a unique position to add to the decision
process in a positive manner. Classical techniques of statistical de-
cision theory make no provision for this. Judgment based on past
experience can be a very important asset. One writer, in fact, has
stated that it is "perhaps the significant ingredient in most interesting
'Franklin G. Moore, Manufacturing Management (5th ed. :
Homewood, 111. : Richard D. Irwin, Inc. , 1969), p. 328.
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management decisions. " u It is this type of decision which permits
non- quantitative factors to be taken into consideration. Such deci-
sions can, as we have already noted, be very important in defense
applications. What is being discussed here, of course, has nothing
to do with snap judgment or judgment based on limited prior exper-
ience. Rather it is sound judgment based on long experience exer-
cised by intelligent, highly competent logistics managers. This
chapter deals then with how this valuable judgment may be effectively
combined with quantitative, objective evidence in a systematic manner
to provide the basis for sound decision-making at the logistician's
level.
In the hypothetical example developed above, the logistician
would have chosen action a, had he limited himself entirely to sample
evidence. Using the Bayesian approach, however, he chose instead
action a^. Writing about situations of this type, a proponent of
Bayesian analysis states: "The Bayes-type approach is superior to
an approach which limits itself to frequentist- objectivist (classical)
considerations except in situations where it may be taken for granted
that the two approaches lead to results which, for the purpose at hand,
^William T. Morris, Management Science, A Bayesian Intro-




are not worth distinguishing. " Provision for subjectivity is also
important in that it allows choices to be slanted in accordance with the
responsible decision-maker's preference as to various consequences
and his judgment concerning the role of uncertainties involved. Thus
internal consistency is introduced into the decision-making process
regardless of how much subjectivity enters into construction of the
prior probability distribution. Should seniors in the chain of command
not approve of a particular decision-maker's subjective preference
scale, appropriate changes can be made to introduce new preferences.
Applicability of Bayesian Analysis in ILS
We have seen that the necessity for qualitative judgments at
high government levels does to some degree limit the usefulness of
pure quantitative techniques in solving defense problems. Thus mili-
tary planners have in the past often made decisions based almost
entirely on past experience. With the coming of systems analysis to
the DOD, however, such judgments came to be looked on as being of
very little value. Systems analysis groups, however, perhaps pushed
too far in attempting to quantify all factors involved in a problem. As
one observer has noted, the primary result of this was "the mislabeling
2 ] William Fellner, Probability and Profit (Homewood, 111. :
Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
, 1965), p. 59.
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7 7by the civilians oi their own intuitions and judgments as 'analysis'. "
Judgment, of course, should be combined with objective evi-
dence. It is obvious in this regard that the present procedure for ob-
taining sufficient empirical data from contractors needs strengthening,
so that the logistician's decision-making process can be improved.
Of perhaps equal importance, however, is the necessity for the estab-
lishment within the Department of Defense, readily accessible to the
logistician, of a group capable of evaluating the more technical infor-
mation obtained from test samples and historical information and also
capable of rendering other technical assistance. Indicating that such
a need exists, one researcher has observed, for example, that "In
all but three of the twelve programs covered by our case studies,
there existed within the buying agency no group with the technical
competence needed for a thorough independent analysis of contractor
estimates. "^ This is a key point. Assuming evaluations are pro-
vided by such a group (or other means), then Bayesian analysis can
fill a definite need of the logistician. It will enable him, indepen-
dently, to review and, in effect, to adjust contractor estimates to a
22James R. Schlesinger, "Organizational Structures and
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more realistic level. The approach recommended for the cases which
follow assumes this service is available.
Uncertainty in the military setting. -- How one might ask, is it
possible to deal with uncertainty? One obvious way utilized in the past
has been simply to ignore any factors not lending themselves to ready
quantification. The attractiveness of this approach comes from the
fact that the weapons system acquisition process is characterized by
a set of uncertainties different from those found in normal business
activity and particularly difficult to quantify. The main deficiency,
of course, is that potentially critical factors may be purposely left
unevaluated in any manner. At the other extreme is the belief that all
factors are quantifiable if only the problem can be studied long and
hard enough. This is also an unrealistic alternative and one which can
result in deceptively clear conclusions. It is, for example, virtually
impossible to estimate in precise terms the loss that would occur
should a system not maintain 95 percent availability due to failure of
some support element to perform as expected. What is left, then, is
a middle ground, wherein all factors possible are reduced to quantifi-
able terms and subjective judgment is then intermixed.
We have been discussing decision-making primarily during the
early stages of a system's life cycle. It is during this period that
uncertainties are much greater than at some later period in the system
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life cycle. It would be advantageous if mathematical models developed
to deal with these uncertainties could initially be kept as simple and
flexible as possible. More specific and detailed calculations can then
be made later as the weight of empirical evidence begins to supplant
subjective judgment. Then, too, it may turn out that because of un-
certainties, ILS resources could conceivably be combined in more
than one way to achieve a desired output. In such a situation, as
Hitch and McKean point out: "The simultaneous development of two or
more of the possible choices is frequently preferable to developing
only one --no matter how superior it appears to the experts. If
more than one combination is feasible, then, the logistician may well
want to retain the capability to use each until uncertainties are lessened
through subsequent tests and evaluation. Statistical quality control
tests (referred to in Chapter III) in contractor plants can, of course,
provide important objective information which may contribute to a re-
2 5duction of this uncertainty.
ILS Case Examples
A number of procurements have recently been carried out
24
Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age
, p. 265.
For additional information dealing with S. Q. C. procedures,




under a Department of Defense Test Program to assess the practicality
of the concept of life cycle costing. Two of these cases are detailed
below together with an indication of how a Bayesian approach might
have been used by a logistician to provide clearer direction. These
examples involve relatively small procurements , dollar-wise, and
cover only a few of the possible ILS elements, but nevertheless do
demonstrate through the use of actual procurement data the potential
for a subjective Bayesian approach. ° Before proceeding, it should
be noted that the items tested in these cases are assumed to fail due
to random acts of nature rather than because of "wearing out. " In
fact, it has been authoritatively stated, referring to the demand
rates which often follow such failures, that ". . . the demand rates for
many spare parts are virtually independent of part age, at least for
11 27the typical, rapidly-obsolescing weapon systems. The binomial
probability distribution has therefore been considered appropriate in
the Bayesian development which follows.
Example one -- 600 horsepower non-magnetic diesel engines
26
These examples are developed from ILS data presented in
Logistics Management Institute, Life Cycle Costing in Equipment
Procurement: Supplemental Report (Washington, D. C. : Logistics
Management Institute, February, 1967), pp. 89-92.
27 W. H. McGlothlin and Eloise E. Bean, Application of the
Bayes Technique to Spare Parts Demand Prediction (Santa Monica,
Calif. : The RAND Corporation, January, l G 6l), p. 5.
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for mine warship ships. -- This case concerns a multi-year procure-
ment contract let under the procedures of formal advertising. Criteria
for award was established as the lowest cost combination of initial
unit purchase price and cost of repair parts for a ten-year period. A
fuel consumption penalty was devised for the sample tests.
Decision procedure for selection of a contractor was as fol-
lows: Each company competing for the award submitted repair parts
schedules and a fixed price option for repair parts in their bids. The
Invitation for Bids and the subsequent contract detailed specific fuel
consumption tests which were to be performed on 5 percent of the
engines delivered. A contractor was permitted to exceed his bid
average specific fuel consumption (ASFC) by 0.010 pounds per brake
horsepower per hour without a price penalty. A penalty was to be re-
quired for fuel consumption which exceeded bid ASFC by a larger
amount. This penalty took the form of adding on to the total bid price
a relative-inefficiency evaluation calculated as: (Test ASFC - Bid
ASFC - 0. 010) x $100, 000 x Number of Engines Delivered.
Based on this formula, the contract was to be awarded to the
bidder whose total price was lowest. Bids were subsequently received





Purchase Ten Year Fuel Consumption
Company Price Repair Parts Penalty Total
W $19,614 $6,132.87 $ $25,746.87
X 27,200 Not Stated 3,334.67 ?
Y 31,900 3,694.77 ^5, 594. 77
Z 63,374 18,318.41 2,633.33 84,325.74
Because data pertaining to the ten year cost of repair parts was not sub-
mitted, Company X's bid was considered non-responsive. The contract
award was made to Company W on the basis of the data presented.
This procurement was significant from the ILS standpoint in
that it was one of the first in which logistics considerations actually
were made part of the award criteria. Let us assume, then, that in
this case the assigned ILS logistician has been presented with these
data by the design engineer and the procurement agency and has been
asked to comment on the ten-year repair parts estimate prior to award
of the contract. The question thus is how might a Bayesian approach
have been used to sharpen the decision-making process in the interest
of helping to insure the most efficient allocation of resources. In the
first place, it should be noted that there is no evidence the ten year
repair parts cost figures represent discounted values, based on years
in which actual expenditures must be made. This should be accom-
plished in the manner described in Chapter III, vising for the present
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the discount rate recommended by the Department of Defense. In the
analysis which follows, it will be assumed this has been done, re-
28
suiting in the following:
Discounted Ten Year




Since the contract provides for a fixed price option on the repair parts,
this is also expected cost of the parts.
The logistician and his staff now review the contractors' past
records for delivery of reliable equipment and submission of realistic
repair parts schedules; data concerning any similar contractor equip-
ment currently in operation; and other available pertinent procurement
data and expert opinion. Based on evaluation of these data, prior
probability distributions relating to the repair parts schedules are
developed for each of the three actively competing contractors. In
the tables below, p in each case stands for the unknown maximum per-
cent level of engine availability capable of being reached; P(p) stands
for the prior probability that the contractor's repair parts schedule
28The use of a more appropriate discount rate is discussed
at some length in Chapter V, infra .
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can maintain the given level of availability; and p. P(p) gives the prior
probability distribution, its total representing the expected value in
the prior distribution of p.
Company W Company Y Company Z
£ P(p) P- P(P) £ P(p) P- P(P) £ P(P) P- P(P)
.80 .20 . 16 . 80 . 10 .08 . 80
.90 .25 .23 .90 .20 . 18 .90 . 15 . 14
.95 .50 .48 .95 .65 .62 .95 .75 . 71
.99 .05 .05 .99 .05 .05 .99 . 10 . 10
1.00 .92 1.00 .93 1.00 .95
Now assume that the proposed contract states that the engine should
achieve a minimum of 93 percent availability and the logistician sets
as his objective the attainment of this minimum at the lowest possible
cost. Company W's bid now begins to look less favorable, since award
should be to the bidder whose bid is the most advantageous, price and
other factors considered (see Chapter II). By saving $10,000 in the
award, it is possible that design availability may not be met at all,
or only after subsequent costly modifications. Some mine warfare
ships might even be placed out of service. At least there would seem
to be a basis here for concern. There is no evidence, however, that
such considerations actually entered into this contract award.
Let us continue to assume that the award has not yet been made.
The logistician and design engineer confer and determine that there
are six especially critical parts common to all three of the contractor's
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repair parts schedules. Two of these are in sufficient stock in the
Navy Supply System. The other four parts are produced in the con-
tractors' plants, by means of normal production run process. At
this point, then, it is extremely important that there be available an
appropriate group within the Department of Defense which the logis-
tician can turn to for assistance:
1. To review and evaluate general quality control procedures in
the contractors' plants.
2. To devise and conduct appropriate sample tests for the four
critical repair parts to be fabricated in these plants. If the
tests must, of necessity, be destructive, then the government
would have to be prepared to negotiate suitable reimbursement.
Should a contractor have devised tests which are judged to be
suitable, then the results could simply be verified.
3. To devise and conduct sample tests for the two critical repair
parts in Navy inventory, for this particular application.
Indeed the establishment and staffing of such a group with highly
capable personnel is a major recommendation of this study. A
reputable commercial testing agency could possibly be placed under
DOD contract to perform the actual evaluations. I shall hereafter in
this study refer to this recommended organization as the Design
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Evaluation Group. Such an organization could have great potential
value in helping to direct scarce defense resources efficiently.
Assume now that samples are selected and tested at the three
contractors' plants and from Navy inventory. The two items in Navy
inventory experienced no failures. Results from the three contractors'
plants were:




The Design Evaluation Group also notes as a general observation that
Contractor Z's quality control procedures seem to be more stringent
than Y's, and Y's better than W's. With this information and his prior
probability distributions, the logistician now proceeds to develop the
necessary posterior distributions using a binomial distribution table
to obtain Test P figures. (See footnote 17 above. )
Company W
Posterior




80 . 20 . 16 . 137
.
0274 . 141 . 113
90 . 25 . 23 . 285 . 0713 . 368 . 331
95 . 50 .48 . 189 .0945 .487 . 463
99 .05 .05 .016 . 0008 .004 .004






j^ P(p) Prior E(p) Test P P(p)- Test P P(p/T^-19) E(p)
80 . 10 .08 .058 . 0058 . 019 .015
90 . 20 . 18 . 270 . 0540 . 172 . 155
95 .65 . 62 . 377 . 2451 . 783 . 744
99 .05 .05 . 165 . 0082 . 026 . 026





_p_ P{p) Prior E(p) Test P P(p). Test P P(p/T = 20) E(p)
80 . 012
90 . 15 . 14 . 122 . 0183 . 050 . 045
95 . 75 . 71 . 358 . 2685 . 728 . 692
99 . 10 . 10 . 818 . 0818 . 222 . 220
1. 00 .95 . 3686
= P(T=20)
1.000 .957
The logistician then summarizes these results.
Company Total Bid Price Expected Level of Availability
W $25, 314 91. 1
Y 35,400 94
Z 87,874 95.7
On the basis of this analysis, the logistician notifies the procurement
agency that Company W does not appear to be capable of providing the
minimum level of availability specified by the contract and that Com-
pany Y appears to be low bidder "price and other factors considered.
'
Thus the use of Bayesian analysis in this example could have resulted
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in more efficient allocation of resources in the Long run, given the
assumptions made. The question might well be asked at this point what
the logistician would have done if Company Z's bid price were only
slightly greater than that of Company Y, say $37, 874 instead of $87, 874.
Such a situation points up clearly why it was emphasized at the be-
ginning of this chapter that the logistician must have identified his
exact objective in each case. In this case his general objective was
to provide for a minimum of 93 percent availability at the lowest pos-
sible cost recognizing that higher levels of availability would be pre-
ferable if no budget constraint existed. With this decision criterion,
his choice would still be Company Y.
Example two -- tunable master oscillator klystron for the Hawk
missile system. -- This case involved a competitive negotiation, with
the authority to negotiate granted on the basis of Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulation 3-2 10. 2(xiii), which permits negotiation "when
it is impossible to draft. . .adequate specifications or any other ade-
quately detailed description of the required supplies or services. "
The Request for Proposal stated that award would be made to the com-
pany with the lowest cost proposal, based on the following formula:
^~
- T - Nam - Nfm - Fse - F s
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where: P = unit purchase price
S = one tube's share of the cost of special tooling
L = average hours of tube life
T = temperature coefficient
Nam = AM noise
Nfm = FM noise
F ge = spurious emission amplitude
F
g
= frequency stability input voltage
Performance levels were specified for the values T, Nam , Nr F ge ,
and F g . Two potential suppliers returned quotes on this basis. The
government then purchased eighteen tubes from each of these com-
panies for test purposes. Upon completion of tests, the following data
were listed:
Company P S L T Najn Nfm F se F s
X $1,230 $19 546 -.19 -.03 .475
Y 1,239 973 -.19 .01 .469
Applying these data to the referenced formula resulted in the determi-






Award was made to Company Y on this basis, even though its purchase
price, considered alone, was higher.
This case is particularly important for ILS because in it a test
was devised and used for the logistic component under proposed pro-
curement such that performance as well as price was to be considered
in the award. It would be interesting therefore to ascertain if a
Bayesian approach might have been possible. Assume that the logis-
tician once again has access to the Design Evaluation Group, and he
asks (1) what would be the probable highest formula value that could
be interpreted as a favorable result, and (2) what are the probabilities
associated with various proportions (p) of tubes which would achieve
this favorable result?
The Design Evaluation Group then conducts a review of the
proposed action, including appropriate discussions with design engi-
neers and the procurement agency. Estimating the likely range of the
various formula component values based on previous test results as
well as subjective considerations, this Group determines that values
of 1.5 or less achieved through use of the formula could generally be
considered as "favorable. " Using this criterion the following prior
probability distribution for the characteristic p is developed by the
Design Evaluation Group where p represents the proportion of tubes
which would yield a formula valued 1.5:
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p P(p) Prior E(p)
. 70 .40 . 280
. 80 . 25 . 200
.
90 .20 . 180
.95 . 10 .095
.99 .05 . 050
805
Since this distribution covers all tubes produced by all poten-
tial bidders, however, the logistician, based on past records and ex-
perience, develops separate subjective prior probability distributions
for each of the bidders as follows:
Company X
_£. P(P) P:rior E(p)
. 70 . 30 . 210
. 80 . 25 . 200
.90 . 20 . 180
.95 . 15 . 143
.99 . 10 .099
Compar
'Y Y
-E_ P(p) P rior E(p)
.70 . 45 . 315
. 80 . 30 . 240
. 90 . 15 . 135
.
95
. 10 . 095
.99
1. 00 . 832 . 785
We may interpret these results as meaning that of all klystrons that
could be submitted for test on this bid, the Design Evaluation Group
feels that about 80. 5 percent could be expected to achieve a formula
reading on test of about 1. 5 or less. From this universe, then, the
logistician subsequently subjectively estimates that the items from
Company X would have an expected value of about 83. 2 percent of
reaching this result, and Company Y 78. 5 percent. This, of course,
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places a premium on the logistician having ready access to past pro-
curement and reliability data and also on his training and competence
to make such evaluations. (It will be a recommendation of this study
that these conditions be met. )
It has been stated that eighteen tubes from each company were
purchased and tested. Assume that formula results for each test were
obtained, with the following results (x ^=_ 1.5 being considered "favor-
able"):
Favorable Percent
Tests Conducted Test Results Favorable
Company (n) (T) (T/n x 100)
X 18 14 77.8
Y 18 16 88.9
With this objective data, the logistician now completes his calculations
to determine the posterior E(p) for each company.
Company X
Prior Posterior
P(p) E(p) Test P P(p)- Test P P(p/T=14) E(p)
.0504 .421 .295
.0538 .450 .360
. 0140 .117 . 105
.0014 .012 .011
0+ 0+ 0-1
1. 00 . 832 . 1196 1. 000 . 771
= P(T=14)
70 . 30 . 210 . 168
80 . 25 . 200 . 215
90 . 20 . 180 . 070
95 . 15 . 143
. 009










70 .45 . 315 . 046
80 . 30 . 240 . 172
90 . 15 . 135 . 284
95 . 10 .095 . 168
99 .013
. 157 . 110






1. 00 . 785 . 1317 1. 000 . 837
= P(T = 16)
Summarizing these results,
Prior Test Favorable Test Posterior
E(p) Evaluation Results E(p)
Company (Percent) Results (Percent) (Percent)
X 83.2 2.0325 77. 8 77. 1
Y 78.5 0.9844 88.9 83.7
Based on this analysis Company Y would still be awarded the
contract, but now because the expected value of its performance is
higher than that of Company X, and not merely on the basis of abso-
lute formula results with no real way available to make a meaningful
comparison. This example shows, then, how it would be possible
under a Bayesian approach to combine subjective and sample evidence
to make the final result clearer. Prior judgments were in effect re-
versed in this case as a result of combination with strong contrary
sample evidence. In short this case illustrates that Bayesian analysis
can serve as a meaningful tool for efficient resource allocation.
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In order to be useful, of course, sample evidence needs to be
as accurate as possible. This, as has previously been noted, points
up an area of weakness in the present DOD-contractor relationship,
but one that is receiving increasing attention and hopefully will soon
show significant improvement. At present, however, as one DOD
official has stated:
We need better data and better tools for an early assess-
ment of the logistics impact. We can do reasonably well
in estimating operational costs, and to a lesser extent
production costs. However, our ability to estimate oper-
ational and maintenance consequences, including their
?Q
costs is poor. 7
2gFinn J. Larsen, "ILS-Integrated logistic Support: Its




VECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN ILS INVENTORY SUPPORT
. . . the broad outline of a rational inventory policy for
spare parts associated with modern weapons is ob-
vious. If the parts are inexpensive stock them in
depth and at all locations that need them; we cannot
afford to have expensive weapons unavailable for lack
of a low-cost part. If, on the other extreme, the
parts are very expensive, we will have to get along
with a much smaller stock of spares. To prevent ex-
pensive weapons from being unavailable because of
parts shortages, we must create an information sys-
tem which detects changes in consumption rates and
maintains accurate and up-to-date inventory status
records.
Inventory Acquisition and Holding in ILS
In evaluating system alternatives for purposes of making a
military choice, it is necessary to be able to assign costs of acquisi-
tion and ownership to these alternatives as well as to estimate per-
formance. Acquisition and holding of support inventory is a signifi-
cant factor in several of the ten designated ILS elements. How well
the alternatives involving ILS considerations can be evaluated depends






hence the reason for the key position of the logistician. Although accur-
ate determination of the ultimate cost of acquisition has proven to be a
problem in the past, the estimation of ownership costs is perhaps even
more difficult. Specifically, if the book values of goods in inventory
do not reflect adequately their opportunity costs, if procurement pro-
cedures are based on faulty concepts of inventory holding costs, or if
"protection levels" assigned do not adequately reflect customer needs,
then costs assigned to ILS elements might actually be quite misleading
when used as a means of helping the decision-maker choose between
alternatives. Certainly the cost of ILS itself cannot be properly
assessed unless its component elements are properly valued.
The importance of the material acquisition and holding function
becomes even more apparent when the previously discussed concept of
system availability is considered in more depth. Inherent availability
of a system has been defined above as^
MTBFA = MTBF + MTTR
In fact, however, the quantity A merely represents a sort of upper
limit of potentiality and does not take into account the very real problem
of logistics delay. If we can conceive of the idea of a "mean logistics
2 As defined in Chapter II, MTBF refers to mean-time-between-
V
failure of a system, and MTTR stands for mean-time-to-repair.
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dealy" time (MLD), then the true operational availability that can
actually be obtained is
. _ MTBF
° MTBF + MTTR + MLD
The effect of MLD can be seen in the estimate of one company that
new, sophisticated systems are available for operational use in the
field (Up Time) less than 50 percent of the time due to logistics de-
lay. This same company has estimated that inherent system avail-
ability (A) can be divided in the following manner:





The primary system problem, thus, is one of supportability. Fur-
ther, the relation of operational costs to total system cost has also














Raytheon Company, Life Cycle Costing Implementation
(Lexington, Mass. : Raytheon Company, n. d. ), pp. 4-5.
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Hero total operational costs are the sum of pay and allowances and
operation and maintenance expenditures. Logistic support costs, in
turn, comprise a significant portion of these elements.
Maintenance of high operational availability depends on having
the right material when and where needed. This means that decisions
are constantly required as to the appropriate range and distribution
of spare parts and other items of inventory. Decisions as to the ma-
terial to be carried and costs assigned thereto are of considerable
importance to the ILS manager first because the sheer quantity of ma-
terial in inventory has a financial impact, and second because of the
importance of mix considerations. If the physical level of support
inventory is increased, a reduction in MLD and an increase in Up Time
should result. Such action will, however, increase the cost of various
ILS support elements and hence ILS itself unless offsetting reductions
are elsewhere realized. A tradeoff situation is thus presented to the
logistician. The range, or mix, of items carried in inventory is in-
fluenced by the holding costs involved as is the quantity of individual
items carried. Current military and in particular, Naval logistics
concepts and procedures dealing with these issues may at present be
too narrow in scope. This may then result in less than optimal deci-
sions being made and courses of action followed.
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The Function of Inventory Management
Business logistics, as differentiated from military logistics,
is composed of the functions of movement control (traffic and trans-
portation and warehousing and materials handling) and demand-supply
coordination (order processing and information flow, inventory
management and supply scheduling and allocation). ILS, as has been
noted, does not include the same elements. Common to both business
logistics and ILS, however, is the important function of inventory
management. Certain aspects of this important element are therefore
considered at some length below in an effort to indicate how some of
the newer concepts of business logistics as well as established
economic principles might be interjected into ILS procedures as an
aid to decision-making.
The components of cost in inventory. -- One writer has pointed
out that there are essentially two different types of costs associated
with business inventories -- acquisition costs and possession costs --
and that an important aspect of logistics management is to make
economic trade-offs between them. The military logistician is
faced with much the same problem; that is, the necessity to aim for
See Heskett, Ivie, and Glaskowsky, Business Logistics
, p. 22,
-'Dean S. Ammer, Materials Management (Homewood, 111. :
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 239-242.
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an inventory policy which will minimize the total of all support and
acquisition costs consistent with the level of system availability
designated (this level is here assumed to be analogous to the business
concept of customer service level (CSL).
For purposes of this study, total inventory costs may be divided
into the following categories:
1. Unit acquisition cost . This represents the ultimate purchase
price of the logistics support items. Quantity and range of ma-
terial purchased for inventory depends largely on cost, needs of
the customer, and level of system availability required. In the
terminology of Navy inventory management, the inventory "pro-
tection level" selected to provide a certain CSL is thus highly
influential. Economic order quantity (EOQ) formulas are in
use for the selection of order quantities, considering these as
well as other factors. (More will be said below about certain
The derivation and use of "protection levels" in Navy inven-
tory control are discussed in more detail infra .
EOQ refers to that order size which theoretically results in
the lowest cost per unit of inventory, acquisition and ownership factors
considered. One of the oldest recognized EOQ formulas was developed
at Yale and is known as Camp's formula. It can be stated as:
EOQ
-P1KC
where EOQ - the economic order quantity
R = annual rate of usage
S = cost of placing an order (or setup costs if manufactured)
C = standard cost per unit, and




of these EOQ procedures. ) Once an order size is determined
by economic order or other procedures, acquisition cost of in-
ventory items can normally be fairly closely estimated, at
least once the research and development stage has been com-
pleted.
2. Ordering and reordering cost . This measures those relatively
fixed steps involved in placing an order and preparing to receive
it. Some costs in this category may vary with size and frequency
of the order, but these costs are a small portion of the total.
3. Shortage cost . This is a measure of the loss which would occur
if a particular item of Supply Support should not be available
when and where required. It includes the costs of priority
ordering and premium shipping. Theoretically it should also
account for loss of availability of the system requiring support.
4. Holding or carrying cost . This component which includes outlay
as well as opportunity costs of holding inventory has been esti-
mated by a number of business logisticians as amounting to
about 25 percent per year of the average value of inventory
o
carried. The well-known Alford k Bangs allocation of this
o
Heskett, Ivie, and Glaskowsky, Business Logistics
, pp. 13-
14 and 269. See also G. B. Carson, ed. , Production Handbook (2nd
ed. ; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), pp. 4, 56-69, and
Ammer, Materials Management

























This breakdown is one of few such listings published and while
issue might be taken with the exactness of some of the individual item
estimates, at least this work does provide an authoritative frame of
reference based on research into the subject. Certainly, the 25 per-
cent figure seems to be fairly widely accepted. That total inventory
carrying costs are very important in the private economy can be seen
in the fact that they annually comprise as much as 6 percent of the
country's Gross National Product. ^ Surely then these costs must also
be of major concern in military logistics. In the private sector the
size of inventories is of continuing concern because if they are too
q
L. P. Alford and John R. Bangs, eds. , Production Handbook
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), pp. 396-397.




large, the firm's profitability will be reduced. This same sort of
reasoning can also hold in the case of military inventories, the exis-
tence of which represents foregone opportunities to utilize appropri-
ated funds in other ways -- another application of the concept of
opportunity cost. The very minimum opportunity costs of inventory
investment to a private company might be considered to be the
earning potential lost because of non-investment in riskless short-
term government securities. In point of fact such costs should also
not be overlooked or minimized in the military. Secretary of the
Navy Instruction 4000. 20 for example, specifically charges the Chief
of Naval Material with responsibility to:
1. Develop and prescribe procedures for the prediction of logistic
support costs [which should include inventory carrying costs].
2. Develop and prescribe procedures for optimizing logistic sup-
port costs. . . .
In light of the foregoing, then, the remainder of this chapter will
focus in particular on the inventory carrying cost components of in-
ventory, obsolescence and depreciation, and on the system availability
or reliability level, which here can be considered the military equiva-
lent of the business concept of customer service level, as these con-
Of course if inventories prove too small, demand will not
be adequately satisfied. This problem is considered infra in the
discussion of customer service levels.
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siderations concern the material elements of ILS and hence deeision-
1 ?
making involving allocation of resources.
Treatment of Interest Costs Involved in Holding Military Inventory
The rate of interest can be conceived of as serving two separ-
ate and distinct functions in inventory management. In the first place,
in its "pure" form, it provides the means whereby the present value
of costs and benefits can be obtained (see Chapter III for a more de-
tailed discussion of the process of present value discounting as it
effects ILS). As one writer has noted, "The technique of discounting
future costs and benefits in order to obtain their present value is an
accepted method of converting a multi-period problem to a static prob-
1 ~\lem in investment theory. " This value theoretically reflects the
prevailing "cost of capital" and is influenced by the time preference of
the decision-maker. Determination of this rate, however, has some
interesting aspects. For instance, it must be clear as to how the term
1
2
This chapter deals with topics which fall under the general
heading of inventory control. This term is defined in Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for Joint Usage
, pp. 115-116,
as "That phase of military logistics which includes managing, cata-
loging, requirements, determination, procurement, distribution, over-
haul, and disposition of material. " Such is the sense in which the con-
cept is used in this study.
Donald R. Stone, Discounting in Military-Cost-Effectiveness
Studies (unpublished Master's Thesis, United States Naval Postgradu-
ate School, 1965), p. 1.
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cost of capital is being defined. One important study of this problem,
Tor instance, concluded that the pure interest cost applicable to govern-
ment investment should be about 15 percent. ^ The reasoning, simi-
lar to that discussed above, is that government capital investments
which would include military inventory involve opportunity costs.
These costs are said to be best measured by the rate of return obtain-
able before income tax in private industry -- manufacturing, in par-
ticular. For the period 1949-1958, the average annual rate of return
of representative manufacturing corporations before income tax was
found to be 19.6 percent. During the period 1961-1965, the rate was
15.4 percent. The basic principle involved here is followed in this
study. When the government invests in inventory, it prevents the re-
source allocation decision from originating in the private sector.
Such resources, if otherwise freely available would theoretically have
tended to channel themselves toward the then most profitable segment
of the economy. Thus the use of some sort of average or marginal
rate of return, often used as a measure of opportunity cost, might
14
J. A. Stockfish, The Interest Cost of Holding Military Inven-




For more detail see the statement of J. S. Stockfish in U. S.,
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Planning- Programming- Bud-
geting System: Progress and Potentials, Hearings , before the Senate
Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Committee Print
(Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1967).
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actually be biased on the low side. Return before income tax is
accepted as an appropriate measure since it tends to reduce the influ-
ence of certain non-economic factors and hence inore adequately de-
fines the ability of a firm to meet consumer wants and needs. This
reasoning, of course, assumes a condition of relatively full employ-
ment in the economy, a goal likely to be generally desired by both
political parties.
The private sector has historically made earlier and more
frequent use of the technique of discounting than has government in
general and, in particular, the Department of Defense. A research
paper on this subject, in fact, has stated that "While industry has de-
veloped discounted return on investment methods, DOD test procure-
ments have merely added up the costs and awarded on the basis of
lowest total cost. The Government could learn from industry exper-
ience in this particular area even though the objects of profit maximi-
zation and cost minimization are different. DOD has made use of
discounting in its cost-effectiveness studies. (This subject is dis-
cussed further in Chapter VI. ) The procedure, however, remains yet
to be effectively implemented in the area of logistics support.
Logistics Management Institute, Life Cycle Costing in Indus




Allowance for risk. -- Discussion thus far has centered about
the idea of a "pure" interest rate to be used in discounting operations
in relatively risk-free situations. Such, however, is not truly char-
acteristic of military investments in general. Risk is ever-present
in new system investment, including related support functions. In-
deed, it is probably greater than in the private sector of the economy.
17Some reasons which have been suggested for this include:
1. The possibility that war might break out sooner than expected,
before capability is achieved, and hence investment in ef-
fectiveness already made might never be utilized.
2. The possibility that peace might be realized, or arms limita-
tion agreements reached, rendering many military systems
either unnecessary or unuseable. Here again no realization
would be obtained from investment made.
3. The possibility that final performance of new, highly sophis-
ticated systems might not be acceptable, despite the expendi-
ture of large sums of development and procurement funds.
4. The possibility that the general political climate might change
quite rapidly, causing unanticipated changes in deployment,
and hence in required support inventory.
l n
Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age
, pp. 205-218 discusses in more detail the issue of risk and time
considerations in military investment.
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5. The fact that costs of military systems have experienced wide
variations, chiefly upward, from original estimates. In some
cases, this has made necessary the acceptance of a lower level
of capability.
Some additional amount must therefore be added to the pure rate of
interest to allow for the element of risk involved.
The point has thus been made that the use of either an average
or a pure interest rate to reflect the cost of capital (including inven-
tories) may not be sufficient in the military environment. To arrive
at a suitable rate of interest for military decision-making purposes,
therefore, two elements must be evaluated and combined. These are:
1. The "pure" rate of interest reflecting time preference, and
2. An additional allowance for risks unique to the military situation.
With this discussion in mind, then, it would now be appropriate to
inquire into discounting procedures followed by various Federal
agencies and to consider what implications are thereby involved for
ILS.
Discounting practices in Government. --In January, 1968, the
Controller General of the United States submitted a report to the Joint
Economic Committee of the Congress. This report presented the re-
sults of a General Accounting office survey of general discounting
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practices used by some twenty-three Federal agencies. ° A wide
range of practices was revealed, with rates utilized ranging from
3 percent upwards to 15 percent. Thirteen of the twenty-three
agencies reported that they did not use discounting at all. Of the ten
which did, the primary reason for the difference in rates chosen was
the fact that one group of agencies held that the rate should be deter-
mined by and be equal to the rate paid by the Treasury in its borrow-
ing operations. The other group held to the general concept of pri-
vate sector opportunity cost. Within each group, however, signifi-
cant differences were also apparent as to the appropriate rate to be
used. A summary of rates used by the ten agencies together with
supporting rationale is included as Appendix I.
The Department of Defense reply stated that a 10 percent dis-
count rate was used, but only in its military construction program.
This rate was felt "to reflect the amount of time preference for cur-
rent versus future money sacrifices that the public exhibits in non-
governmental transactions. The 10 percent rate is considered to be
the most representative point within a range of plausible rates ob-
1 8U. S.
,
Controller General, Report to the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, Survey of Use By Federal
Agencies of the Discounting Technique in Evaluating Future Programs




tained from considering the public time preference. " " It was fur-
there pointed out that this rate was used for construction projects at
shipyards and other naval establishments. At no point in this docu-
ment is mention made of use of the interest rate for discounting in-
ventory costs.
Choice of an interest rate to discount capital costs and bene-
fits has important implications for resource allocation. When vari-
ous Federal agencies use different rates, it is obviously impossible
to make inter-agency comparisons. If two agencies use different
rates, programs of the agency using the lower rate will tend to show
a more favorable cost-benefit ratio thus leading, potentially at least,
to resource misallocation. (See Chapter VI for a further discussion
of this point. ) There is therefore a need for general guidance in this
area to be supplied by the Congress, especially in view of the adoption
of the Planning- Programming- Budgeting System within the government
(see the discussions concerning PPBS in Chapter II and cost-benefit
analysis in Chapter VI).
But this is a larger problem than can be dealt with in this study.
Rather what is to be evaluated here is the procedure followed specifically
by DOD. The GAO report referred to above pointed out that DOD ap-






Department of Defense Instruction 7041. 3, subsequently issued, con-
firms this policy. The supposed intent is to adopt an interest rate
which "reflects the private sector investment opportunities foregone. " ^
Such rate has been determined by DOD to be 10 percent. Of particu-
lar importance for this study, however, is the fact that the instruc-
tion specifically excludes from economic analysis "proposed acquisi-
tions of principal or secondary items, justified on the basis of an in-
ventory objective in accordance with DOD logistic guidance. " Invest-
ment in inventory is thus not to be considered as a capital cost in the
same way as would be a construction project.
Navy Inventory Policy
The development of DOD and Navy inventory policy is an out-
growth of the annual budget process in which the Secretary of Defense
issues logistics guidance to the Services in the form of a "Draft
Presidential Memorandum. " This document spells out planning ob-
jectives related to: (1) forces to be supported in the event of mobili-
zation; (2) amount of material to be procured to support these forces;
and (3) level of peacetime support for existing forces.
U. S., Department of Defense, Instruction 7041. 3, Economic
Analysis of Proposed Department of Defense Investments (Washington,




Within those broad guidelines, each military service develops
its own interpretations and guidance to lower levels. In the Navy, sup-
ply system responsiveness requirements are specified by the Chief of
Naval Operations and carried out by the Naval Supply Systems Com-
mand (NAVSUP). Under NAVSUP individual inventory managers such
as the Aviation Supply Office, Electronics Supply Office, and Ships
Parts Control Center must then decide how to allocate limited re-
sources over all items in the inventory under their cognizance in
some manner so as to obtain the best possible return from the capi-
tal investment involved and to insure support for items of high essen-
tiality.
These inventory managers, of course, support the Navy's
Material System Commands and Project Managers through the pro-
visioning of new weapons systems and equipment and the maintenance
of inventory. To assist in performing this task efficiently decision
rules have been developed within the Navy whose purpose is to arrive
at an optimal position by balancing acquisition costs, holding costs
and shortage costs. For the present it is assumed that acquisition
costs have been determined. Shortage costs are considered together
with the general topic of customer service levels and are so discussed
below. What remains here to be looked at then is the subject of
holding cost policy and procedure.
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Holding cost policy. --In 1958 the Department of Defense
promulgated an instruction whose purpose was to "establish a policy
for peacetime operating and safety levels of supply on the most
economical basis considering military necessity, item activity and
2 1
other item characteristics and supply operating costs. " This in-
struction put forward the notion of economic order quantity and also
detailed elements of holding cost which, as a minimum, were to be
taken into consideration by inventory managers. These minimum
cost elements were listed as interest on dollar investment (which for
the purposes of the instruction was arbitrarily set at 4 percent);
obsolescence, deterioration and shrinkage, required stock and finan-
cial control, care and preservation of stock, storage, and physical
inventory.
The importance of the above for the present study is that:
1. Navy decision rules still generally use the 4 percent interest
rate figure in inventory matters whereas 10 percent has been
specified for certain other capital investments, as noted above.
2. Holding cost, for purposes of a number of current decision
rule computations pertaining to consumable standard items
2 1
U. S., Department of Defense, Instruction 4140. 11 Peace
time Operating and Safety Levels of Supply (Washington, D. C. :




in inventory, is assumed to be a constant, usually amounting to
15 percent per year per dollar of inventory and normally com-






Provision is made, however, in some cases for varying, within
limits, the rate of obsolescence used. In such cases, a linear dis-
count rate is used for obsolescence, i. e. , an item with an estimated
five year life would have an obsolescence rate of about . 20 signifying
a loss of 20 percent of its value per year.
The holding cost rate selected can, of course, significantly
affect EOQ decisions. DOD Instruction 4140. 11, as noted above,





Q = the economic order quantity in dollars
A = the annual value of demand in dollars
C = the cost to order in dollars, and
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H = the cost to hold expressed as a percentage per year.
A standard commercial formula of the same general type although
not equivalent produces a quantity result expressed in units by intro-
22ducing price per unit (P):
^ / 2AC
Such formulas make a number of simplifying assumptions,
2 3including demand certainty and no restriction on order size. J More
complex formulas have therefore been developed, both in industry
and in the DOD, to deal with these complications. The purpose
6 For the derivation of Camp's formula, see George N.
Collins, "Advanced Techniques in Production and Inventory Control, "
in Readings in Physical Distribution , ed. by Hale C. Bartlett (Dan-
ville, 111. : The Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc. , 1968), p. 73.
23A typical Navy order quantity formula of this type is one




where: D = quarterly demand at end of lifetime
B = quarterly recoveries from repair
A = cost to place an order
i = interest, or time preference rate
s = storage rate
a = obsolescence rate
c = unit price
^For example, see the models developed in Bierman, Bonini,
and Hausman, Quantitative Analysis for Business Decisions
, pp. 1 69-
179. Also, Naval Supply Systems Command, Navy Implementation of
DOD instruction 4140. 11 (Washington, D. C. : Research Analysis
Staff, July 31, 1968), various pages.
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here is not to delve into the derivation of such formulas, but rather
to point out that techniques are readily available for extending EOQ
principles to take into account special circumstances such as minimum
order level and variable demand, and also that the basic EOQ form
discussed above is appropriate to consider since it is presently used
with some variation by Navy inventory managers. The value set for
H, cost to hold expressed as a percentage per year, is obviously
quite important, and interest rate is a significant component of H.
If this rate is set arbitrarily at too low a level, the buy quantity and
total inventory level held will be increased, thus wasting resources."
Similar reasoning holds for other elements of holding cost as well.
2 5
It should be stated at this point that no single, uniform set
of rules exists in the Navy which provides general guidance on stock
levels and order quantity determination for all commodities. In
dealing with the problem of demand variation, however, the statisti-
cal concept of mean absolute deviation (MAD) is often used. Some-
times it is used in calculation of an estimator of the standard devi-
ation of demand for an item whose leadtime demand is distributed
N(jt
, o )• The standard deviation of the i*n item in terms of abso-
lute deviation in items per quarter is then shown as
A / it
6i = V y MADi .




<T= —=r (MAD) jfJL
A'
3
where L = Leadtime (see footnote 37). In still other cases, MAD it-
self is used directly as a measure of variation of demand. Yet MAD
does not have nice statistical properties when dealing in probabilities.
For instance, MADX + MADy i MADx+y . A nicer measure of disper-
sion would be the variance (VAR), where VARX + VARy = VARx+y,
assuming statistical independence. The standard deviation of demand
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Obsolescence, storage rates and depreciation . -- Determina-
tion of a value for rate of obsolescence is also of extreme importance
since it is potentially the largest single component of inventory holding
cost. A value commonly used in the Navy for an obsolescence rate
has been noted as being 10 percent of average inventory value, with
some flexibility for upward adjustment. In theory, the relationship
is obsolescence rate (in percent) =
Estimated Shelf Life in Years
x 100. Thus when an item has become completely obsolete this frac-
tion becomes infinity, H becomes infinite and Q becomes zero. In
practice, however, 10 percent is often adopted as a sort of general
rule of thumb. Inventory obsolescence, including spoilage, can take
26
several forms in private industry, including:
1. Outright physical deterioration over a period of time.
2. Risk that a particular item in inventory will:
a. become technologically unusable, or
b. go out of style.
could then be quickly estimated directly from /VVARX where
E(X -^M) 2 = VARX = EX 2 - (EX) 2 . MAD simply weighs differences
from the mean whereas VAR weighs differences by probability times
the deviation. In any event, the three basic techniques used in de-
mand forecasting are moving average, single exponential smoothing
and double exponential smoothing.
26For more detail, see the discussion in John F. Magee,
"Guides to Inventory Policy, " Harvard Business Review , January-
February, 1956, p. 6.
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In specific reference to inventory supporting modern military sys-
tems, item 2a above must be considered the prime factor in obsoles-
cence. Indeed, one writer has noted that ". . .as we modify our sys-
tems we obsolete a segment of our spare parts inventory. "27 in
this connection a report which discussed inventory holding costs both
in private industry and in the military concluded that ". . . the risk of
obsolescence is, in general, much higher than is the case in private
2 8industry. " ° Certainly this trend has only continued to intensify in
recent years. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, for example, Dr. Herbert York, formerly in charge of DOD
research, stated that the complex, costly and highly sophisticated
Anti- Ballistic Missile system could be rendered obsolete in as few
2Q
as 10 years. 7 Inventory managers have often in the past greatly in-
creased the quantity of spare parts in stock to completely insure that
an equipment would never be idle for lack of a part. A study of
cruisers and destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet, for instance, once
showed that 85 percent of items carried in inventory on the ships were
27 Zwick, Logistics Modernization
, p. 4.
^"Logistics Management Institute, Life Cycle Costing in Equip-
ment Procurement
, p. 38.
'U.S., Congress, Senate, Strategic and Foreign Policy Impli-
cations of ABM Systems, Part III, Hearings , before a subcommittee of




never used from overhaul to overhaul. •*" The high cost and risk of
obsolescence of spare parts associated with modern weapons systems
has made this policy no longer tenable. Obvious also is the fact that
standard consumables simply cannot be treated in like manner for
inventory management purposes if one item specifically supports a
weapon system and another is entirely a common-use end item.
It may be recalled that the Alford and Bangs computation of
holding cost included depreciation at 5 percent of the average value
of inventory per year and storage at . 25 percent. In Navy EOQ
formulas, storage is often included at 1 percent. It would seem
reasonable that this rate should be higher in the case of military in-
ventory since the range and quantity of items carried and facilities
and personnel required in management capacities are much larger
than is the case in private industry. As for depreciation, however,
no charge is generally made separate from the charge for obsoles-
cence. Granted that it is difficult to identify the incremental quanti-
ties of many resource services associated with logistics support in
general and inventory maintenance in general. Yet it seems that
some attempt should be made to consider depreciation separately.
Speaking specifically of certain revolving fund logistics support enter-
prises such as the Defense Supply Agency, one writer notes a weak-
°Worden, "Integrated Logistics Support, " p. 21.
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ness which he considers quite serious is that "The current account
3 1has no entry for depreciation. . . " In the past losses have occurred
in the value of the revolving Navy Stock Fund because prices charged
for issues out of inventory were not high enough to cover material
losses caused by such losses as inventory shortages and deterioration
or depreciation.
The above discussion supports the conclusion that military
inventory holding costs are significantly understated and the ILS
logistician therefore does not have available, in many instances,
figures which represent the true capital costs of the alternatives he
is considering. Consider first the element of interest rate. Origi-
nally, 4 percent was apparently selected because this was approxi-
mately the rate the government actually paid on long-term borrowing.
32
This certainly is not the case today. Supposedly, this rate was
considered to be a measure of the "cost of money" which all Federal
agencies could use. This 4 percent rate is not , however, a valid
measure of cost of money to the government. Nor, in fact, is any
rate which merely reflects the discount on long-term Treasury bonds.
3 1
Bailey, "The Market Mechanism in the Defense Depart-
ment, " p. 178. He states that if all items were included that are ac-
counted for in conventional bookkeeping, revolving fund enterprises
would comprise more than 20 percent of annual DOD resource use.
3 "? For instance, on October 27, 1969, the long-term Treasury
bond rate was listed in The New York Times at 6. 2 percent.
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As previously mentioned, funds tied up in public capital projects
theoretically do add in some fashion to the total productivity of the
economy. The question, then, is are these funds being used in the
most efficient manner in an opportunity sense. Comparison with the
rate of return before taxes in the private sector would seem to be a
more appropriate measure of this efficiency.
Not only is the Treasury long-term bond rate inappropriate as
a measure of the opportunity cost of money, but it has also been
pointed out that the use of an inappropriately low rate may result in
buying quantities that are too high, economically speaking, leading to
overinvestment in inventory. It may be that high weapon system sup-
port inventory levels are justified for reasons of national security.
If so, sufficient funds should be allocated to permit procurement
based on a more realistic approach to the opportunity cost of capital.
That the average rate of return actually realized in the private econo-
my is probably, in fact, a conservative approach is indicated in the
opinion expressed that "When inventory. . .is normally financed in-
ternally (author's italics), a rate of return or imputed interest rate
between 10 and 30 percent is not unreasonable. It has also been
pointed out in this regard that "The cost of borrowing new capital is
John F. Magee and David M. Boodman, Production Planning




apt to be misleading lor estimating the cost oi capital in inventory
unless the firm [or government agency] is actually willing to increase
or decrease its borrowing [or budget request] in response to inven-
tory changes. " In the case of military inventories such a course
might be practically as well as politically impossible. Some invest-
ments are riskier than others, and this must be recognized in the dis-
count rate selected. And certainly "Advanced weapon systems. . .
appear to be among the riskiest enterprises of the modern world. "
This risk should be recognized separately from the pure discount
rate.
Once a risk is somehow evaluated, it can be combined with
the utility function of the decision-maker. This presents an oppor-
tunity for a Bayesian approach to this matter of interest rate selec-
tion. An inventory manager can select a particular rate of interest
based on his knowledge of economic activity and the riskiness of the
investment. This rate could then be updated as more information is
received, thus permitting changes in the range and level of inventory
to be made in a rational manner. The real problem, however, in
34
Charles C. Holt, et al. , Planning Production, Inventories
and Work Force (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, Inc., I960),
p. 71.




soiling a realistic inventory goal is in obtaining the manager's policy
statement. Once this is obtained, arbitrary factors should be re-
placed to as large an extent as possible with decision rules resting
on a sound economic base. This applies to the handling of obsoles-
cence and depreciation as well as the interest rate.
As one final comment on the treatment of holding costs, men-
tion should be briefly made of the method of treating items newly
placed into inventory. Increasingly, these are consumables which
support new systems and hence are highly subject to obsolescence.
The percentage of such items in total Navy inventory stocks seems
certain to increase. The ability should thus exist to permit an esti-
mation of holding costs for new items at various rates. Yet at least
as late as November, 1968, the Navy was using in contracts ranging
up to a billion dollars a predetermined fixed cost per inventory line
item for carrying costs, regardless of commodity, inventory control
point, federal stock class, investment cost, or any other variable.
In view of the preceding discussion, it would seem that such policy
should be reviewed on general economic grounds.
One Navy EOQ formula, for instance, does define order quan-
tity as Q : max , unit pack, one month's supply, min.'Q
-) Shelf life
^Technical life
There is, however, little evidence that obsolescence is realisticallv
taken into account in all cases in the determination of technical life.
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In his role of providing economically efficient operational sup-
port to military systems, the logistician faces a number of internal
and external constraints on his activities. One of the most important
of these occurs in the area of inventory control and centers around
the level of service that has been decided on by inventory managers
as necessary to meet customer requirements. Potential loss which
could be realized as a result of insufficient service is an important
factor in deciding what should constitute an adequate inventory
policy. In private business a firm might establish a particular level
of sales or orders satisfied which it would be prepared to meet with
virtual certainty from existing or nearly-on-hand stock. The firm,
then, would be willing to settle for the loss of sales which might
result should this level be exceeded. In a sense, military logistics
faces a similar problem. Navy inventory managers, for instance,
determine "protection levels" desired for various classes of com-
modities in inventory. A protection level of 95 percent would mean
that there is a 5 percent chance of stock-out during the demand period.
Safety levels of stock are established in order to provide
planned protection levels during procurement lead time periods.
These safety levels are computed by multiplying expected deviation




level established for the items. Generally, an item is placed in a
"sales class" and every item in the class is afforded the same pro-
tection. The procedure is that the protection level desired is first
determined, and then the number of units that would supply that
protection is calculated and planned for. Budgetary limitations may,
of course, force some changes to be subsequently made.
Desired protection levels are in part set as a result of
stratification requirements and the assignment of essentiality codes
to some items in inventory. Stratification is a process prescribed
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense and performed by all Navy in-
ventory control managers whereby inventory requirements are ar-
ranged in order of priority and available assets applied against them.
If assets are less than requirements, then stock fund increases are
requested in the normal budgetary procedure. A number of mea-
sures of effectiveness have been devised to help the inventory man-
ager assess the results of his policy actions. Among these measures
3 'Safety level of stock in the Navy is commonly derived




are statistics relating to number of items short, number of orders
unfilled, and dollar value of items short or orders unfilled. Military
Essentiality Codes are arrived at for various items as a result of in-
formation provided by the responsible Systems Commands and Pro-
o o
ject Managers (See Appendix B).
The protection level process is based on an assumed normal
distribution of demands, and at times seems more designed to pro-
tect the inventory manager than the ultimate consumer. The custo-
mer, a system logistician in this instance, cares very little about
how well the inventory manager is able to make manipulations so as
to remain within prescribed investment and workload constraints.
He is interested rather in whether or not an item is available when
needed to support a critical system. In this context, customer ser-
vice levels in support of a critical military system are similar in
nature to service levels within a business firm, where the firm's
production line is the ultimate customer. Referring to such a situ-
ation, it has been stated that "If the production line is the customer,
The determination of an item's essentiality code, or weight,
is a complex task and involves the utilization of all available expert
maintenance and operational judgment. Among pertinent consider-
ations in the determination are:
1. Criticality of the system's mission.
2. Importance of the part or component to the mission, and




an out-of- stock situation may be intolerable. Cause is often hard to
trace. These reasons make the out-of- stock measurement largely
39
an academic exercise. " There is virtually no cost involved in
physically supplying the needed item which could exceed the cost of
shutting down the production line, or, in the ILS context, rendering
a costly, highly critical system inoperative. When items that sup-
port such systems are assigned to inventory classes for which over-
all protection levels are decided on, in part based on budgetary con-
siderations, then there is a strong possibility that support may not
be supplied when needed most. Items are generally ordered and
stocked based primarily on expected demand, with criticality or
essentiality being only one of a number of other factors considered. ^0
Demand is customarily reviewed quarterly in order to revise order
quantity and reorder levels. Nevertheless, more flexibility is re-
quired by inventory managers to determine protection levels on an
item by item basis in the case of critical system support inventory
of a consumable nature. It is true that procedures do exist to esti-
39 Heskett, Ivie, and Glaskowsky, Business Logistics
, p. 165.
40A general replenishment rule at Navy inventory control ac-
tivities for consumables is: If inventory (on hand and on-order) drops
to some pre-determined reorder level, then order sufficient stock to
bring item inventories up to a "desired" level, which is usually the
sum of the reorder level, the economic order quantity, and any author'
ized set-asides as, for instance, war reserves.
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mate the economically acceptable risk of being out of stock. Figures
used in this computation, however, come as a rule from a "requisi-
tion shortage cost" which is calculated for an entire cognizance sym-
bol covering many items. This shortage cost is often calculated as
the number of units short (i. e. , not in stock) per year times the im-
portance (essentiality) of the unit times the cost of being out of stock
of one item of unit essentiality. This latter cost is considered as
arising from the necessity for premium ordering, expediting, and
transporting. No calculation is made of a shortage "penalty"
which would result from potential down time of the supported system.
The point is that these calculations may be, as noted above, largely
academic exercise in any event, particularly in the case of highly
critical systems, in terms of national defense needs.





where: H = holding cost
C = unit price
Q = basic order quantity
D = average quarterly demand
5 = shortage cost
E = essentiality
Thus in the case of an item whose unit price is $4, holding cost the
typical 15 percent, shortage cost $15, basic order quantity 60, aver-
age annual demand 15, and unit essentiality, we would have
Risk = (.15)(4)(60) = Q4 or 4 ent>
(4)(15)(15)(1)

- 1 I <
Another point concerning the determination of protection
levels for various classes or even items of stock is that this should
be done only on the strength of the results of analysis of the com-
parative costs of possible and feasible logistic supply systems. ^
Costs of the variable components in these systems need to be com-
pared, such as order transmittal mediums, order processing pro-
cedures, material handling and packaging, warehousing, and modes
of shipment. The most economical method of providing a protection
or service level can be properly found only by trading off one type of
cost for another, rather than accepting a particular logistics system
as "set" and deciding on protection levels based on it. These pro-
tection levels should not be set, as is now frequently the case, in-
dependent of a consideration of the elements of logistic cost involved
in providing that standard. The logistician as well as the ILS Supply
Support element inventory manager need to be concerned with more
than simply the cost of the support material. The total support sys-
tem must be evaluated in the interests of efficient resource alloca-
tion. Shortening the requisition cycle, for instance, could be a key
element in reducing overall logistic costs.
42See, for example, Heskett, Ivie and Glaskowsky, Business
Logistics
, pp. 172-175 for an example of a typical procedure for cal-




Policy of Navy inventory managers as concerns systems con-
sumable support should be kept as flexible as possible with provision
for considering critical material on an item by item basis. It has
been noted that "Stockage policy has a pervasive, if implicit control
over the [logistic] systems operating costs: It determines the level
of investment and frequency of shortages, of requisitions, of new
procurements, and of repair actions. "^ a Bayesian process could
conceivably provide a more systematic method of realizing a greater
degree of flexibility based on experience. Thus probabilistic calcu-
lations of expected demand rates could be made and then combined
with subjective probabilistic estimates of the inventory managers.
The resulting posterior distribution could then be updated periodically
based on actual demand experienced during that period. The mechan-
ical process could be similar to that previously discussed in Chapter
IV.
Harrison S. Campbell, "Procurement and Management of
Spares, " in Defense Management , ed. by Enke, p. 187.

VI
THE ROLE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ILS
. . . some significant consequences of public under-
takings must, it seems, always elude the craft of
the quantifier. Nevertheless, the process of
political decision can be sharpened significantly
by removing as many aspects as possible from the
realm of unsupported opinion and emotic rhetoric. *
Definition of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost- benefit analysis as used in this study has been defined
as "... a systematic examination of the benefits and costs of a par-
ticular governmental program, setting out the factors that should
enter into the evaluation of the desirability of the program and fre-
quently analyzing several alternatives for the attainment of the ob-
jective. Elements of the analysis include:
1. A statement of the objective, or goal to be attained.
2. A statement of the alternatives (or "systems") which it is anti-
cipated should be able to achieve the objective or goal.
Robert Dorfman, ed.
,
Measuring Benefits of Government In-
vestment (Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 2.






3. A statement of the costs (if possible in terms of opportunities
foregone) and benefits, direct and indirect, which may be ex-
pected to result from the adoption of each alternative.
4. A model which shows the relationships among the variables
involved.
5. Criteria by which alternatives are ranked and on the basis of
which the most promising is chosen.
Inasmuch as cost- benefit analysis involves the comparison
of a stream of costs and a stream of benefits accruing from each
alternative, both streams discounted back to present value, a simple








^•t=l (l+r) fc (1+r) 1
where B = the stream of benefits
C = the stream of costs
r = the discount rate
n = the life of the project
t = year of occurrence of the cost or benefit
Once having decided on objectives and criteria for determining bene-
fits, that alternative method for accomplishing a particular program
would then be considered "best" which showed the highest positive
value. Given an unlimited budget, all programs would be pursued
which could show at least one acceptable alternative with a computed
value no less than zero. Another way of expressing this would be to
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say that, the benefit to cost ratio should be at least equal to one. Since
unlimited budgets are rarely the case in government, however, the
constrained budget will theoretically be allocated to programs which
appear to promise relatively greater excesses of benefits over costs.
In this context, cost-benefit analysis is similar to capital budgeting
procedures used by businessmen in the private sector. The main
difference is that some sort of social value must be established in
the place of market value.
Significance of the interest rate. -- In economic analysis,
the interest rate selected for discounting is important. Many
projects, for instance, might show a positive net present value at a
discount rate of 4 percent, but not at 10 percent. In the event that
program managers use different discount rates in evaluating alterna-
tives or ranking programs, and do so without strong justification,
then resource misallocation can easily result. Consider a case, for
example, where a program manager faced with budget limitations is
trying to decide which of two programs to include in the budget for
the coming fiscal year. Assume that the analyst evaluating Program
A uses a discount rate of 4. 5 percent while the Program B analyst
does not use discounting at all. Each program is estimated to have
a twenty-five year life cycle. Data is collected and the following




Program A Program B
Initial Investment Costs $12,000,000 $16,000,000
Annual Operating and Support Costs 2,000,000 1,500,000
Present Value of Total Costs 41,656,000 53,500,000
Annual Benefits 3,000,000 2,500,000
Present Value of Benefits 44,484,000 62,500,000
Cost-Benefit Ratio 1.07 1.17
Faced with only this information, the decision-maker would
conclude that Program B seemed the more attractive. Yet if the 4. 5
percent rate of discount had also been used in Program B calculations,
a cost-benefit ratio for that program of 0. 97 would have resulted.
This type of disparity increases as the gap widens between interest
rates used in discounting costs and benefits of alternate programs.
Development of cost-benefit analysis. - - Evaluation by the
government in general and the military in particular of the costs and
benefits involved in programs under consideration has often been per-
formed in an erratic manner. This was especially true prior to the
introduction of program budgeting and PPBS planning (discussed in
Chapter II), the purpose of which was to introduce more scientific
budgeting and planning techniques into government. The initial
3For more detail concerning this problem, see U. S., Con-
troller General, Survey Of Use By Federal Agencies Of The Dis-




thinking pertaining to a formal statement of cost-benefit analysis
seems to have taken place in France during the nineteenth century.
The first attempt to actually apply the theory to public investments,
however, took place in this country in the 1930's. A key influence
was the Flood Control Act of 1936 which required that benefits, to
whomever they might accrue, should be in excess of costs if a pro-
ject were to be undertaken. The technique of cost-benefit analysis
was soon being used to demonstrate that requirements of the law were
being met.
It is, however, ". . .no accident that benefit-cost analysis had
its origin and highest development in the field of water resources.
That is the field in which government operations are most analogous
to private business and in which the highest proportion of outputs --
water and power -- are salable commodities bearing relevant market
prices. J
Over the years government cost-benefit procedures have
gradually become more formalized. It is still true, however, that
there is no one particular reference which details general methods
See Stephen A. Marglin, Public Investment Criteria




Measuring Benefits of Government Invest-
ment




by which cost and benefits are to be valued. Moreover, while in cer-
tain specific areas of government activity such as water resource
management and public health activities the techniques of cost-
benefit analysis have proven of significant value, little progress has
been made in developing this tool so as to make it more useful in
helping to direct development and allocation of the federal budget in
accordance with planned national priorities.
Cost-benefit analysis has as its primary objective the pro-
viding of assistance to managers in attaining desired program objec-
tives. Some types of proposed government expenditures, however,
lend themselves more easily than do others to some sort of direct
measurement of related costs and benefits. In the case of proposed
national defense programs measurement of costs and benefits may be
rendered far more difficult due to unique conditions of uncertainty.
In addition, political and social pressures may have an important im-
pact on the decision process, yet their specific influences may not be
readily quantifiable.
Cost- Benefit Analysis in the Department of Defense
Reference has been made above to the introduction (under the
For instance, see Ibid . , for examples of how cost-benefit
analysis is used in such areas as Research and Development, Out-
door Recreation, Civil Aviation and Urban Renewal.
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leadership of Hitch and Enthoven) of more highly quantitative, ana-
lytical techniques into DOD beginning in the early 196(Vs. Alterna-
tives for the accomplishment of planned objectives were often con-
structed as highly complex systems and hence the genesis of the term
systems analysis.
Systems analysis in essence grew out of World War II oper-
ations analysis, but introduced more higher level judgment and intu-
ition into the decision process. In accordance with these procedures
it became accepted practice to attempt to arrive at decisions con-
cerning major programs through making systematic analyses of pro-
gram alternatives evaluated in terms of estimated military worth and
expected costs. The objective of this procedure was to establish a
more rational framework for decision-making.
As systems analysis techniques became more developed, they
became a means of attempting to predict the future, of deciding on ob-
jectives based on this future expectation, and on the evaluation of
alternatives for achieving these objectives. Military experience, as
such, gradually began to be accorded a lesser role. The expected
performance of human beings, for instance, was often ignored since
it was difficult to define in analytical terms.
Two significant problems developed in the use of these tech-
niques which are to some extent still in existence today. The first of
these had to do with the treatment of uncertainty. Uncertainty in the
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military setting can be classified into two main categories -- uncer-
tainty of a technological, strategic, or political nature and statistical
uncertainty deriving from random chance occurrences. The use of
mathematical methods (such as simulation) to deal with the latter
type of problem may only be expensive window dressing if the former
type of uncertainty is potentially large yet not recognized.
A second problem area concerns the ability to realistically
evaluate appropriate costs and benefits. This is perhaps the heart
of the matter of efficient allocation of resources in a military setting.
In general, military costs were not previously and are not now con-
sidered in an opportunistic sense. Military logisticians have been
trained to think almost exclusively in terms of outlay cost. At the
level of the ILS logistician, it may be that this is inevitable. A
problem arises, however, when inadequate attention is also devoted
to this matter at higher levels. But the real problem enters in
trying to measure the benefits or military worth of one particular
system. How should the ILS logistician calculate the benefits to be
realized from support of this system? The answer would seem to be
that precise measurement or at times even definition of all benefits
may be virtually impossible.
In a normative economic sense, a benefit can be measured by
consumer willingness to pay for a good or service. In the case of
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national defense expenditures, however, it is often difficult to
identify and value output as well as measure public willingness to
purchase it. Speaking to this general problem area, Hitch and McKean
state that
. . . the choice of an appropriate economic criterion is fre-
quently the central problem in designing a systems analy-
sis. In principal the criterion we want is simple enough:
the optimal system is the one which yields the greatest
excess of positive values (objectives) over negative values
(resources used up, or costs). But as we have already
seen, this clear cut solution is seldom a practical pos-
sibility in military problems. Objectives and costs
usually have no common measure. ...
It is also clear that political as well as economic considerations
enter into the type and amount of national defense goods and services
produced. Decisions concerning this production are inherently sub-
ject to value judgments and political pressures. Cost-benefit analy-
sis as a precise mathematical technique is thus somewhat limited in
its applicability to the study of national defense production due to the
many immeasurables which may be encountered. This limited appli-
cability does not, however, mean that the tool is of no use to the ILS
logistician. The importance of cost-benefit type studies flows from
the fact that by their nature they require some manner of comprehen-
sive consideration of all possible relevant factors in a decision situ-
ation.
n





The objective of the IL.S logistician is not, of course, to attempt
to maximize output or benefits based on the primary utilization of any
one single element. Rather he should have as his objective the attain-
ment of the stated support objective through the lowest collective cost
of element inputs. Since benefits in many military situations are
hard to identify and evaluate, however, a method that has been de-
vised to circumvent the problem of benefit measurement is first to
identify through some decision-making process, political or economic,
the objective(s) or goal to be achieved.
Cost-effectiveness technique. -- Having established these ob-
jectives, a "cost-effectiveness" technique can then be used whereby
alternate possibilities for future action are evaluated in terms of
their effectiveness, or ability to achieve the stated objectives. Cost-
effectiveness analysis in this sense has been characterized by one
author as "The quantifiable examination of alternative prospective
systems for the purpose of identifying the preferred system and its
associated equipment, organization, etc. The examination aims at
finding more precise answers to questions and not at justifying a con-
Q
elusion. "°
I. Heymont, Guide for Reviewers of Studies Containing Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Cor-
poration, 1965), p. 57.
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The end result of all military procurement decisions can bo
considered as the allocation of scarce economic resources among
competing uses. Cost-effectiveness in this context may be therefore
throught of as a measure of value received (effectiveness) for re-
sources expended (cost). The Five-Year Defense Program referred
to in Chapter II reflects an attempt to array missions and programs
in an orderly fashion so that the resources required for the imple-
mentation of each can be listed and compared with the benefits ex-
pected as the result of attainment of mission objectives. The advan-
tage of such a procedure lies in its ability to systematically compute
and present data in a format designed to aid the decision-maker in
arriving at his choice.
Cost-effectiveness analysis as here defined has, unfortunately,
come to have the meaning to many people of a mathematical process
which results in the achievement of economy first and effectiveness
last. ' This is not, however, the intended connotation. What is
meant, rather, is that the analytic techniques discussed in this chap-
ter should be considered as tools to aid in the decision-making pro-
cess, but in no sense should they be considered a complete substitute
for sound judgment. The purpose of cost-effectiveness studies is not
9 For a further discussion of this problem see Donald H.
Heaton, "System/Cost Effectiveness in the .System Engineering Pro
cess, " Defense Industry Bulletin
,
July, 1969, pp. 34-37.
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necessarily discovery of the cheapest system. In fact, these studies
are (or should be) neutral as regards system unit cost. The objec-
tive should be to determine which system offers the greatest effective'
ness in terms of attaining a program objective for a given outlay, or,
alternatively, a particular level of effectiveness at least cost, de-
pending on the decision criteria.
The most important task for the ILS logistician in this pro-
cess might well be to help identify more clearly the objectives which
the decision-maker is attempting to achieve. In so doing, he can put
his professional expertise to best use in accordance with his own
assessment of the feasibility of available alternatives. He will, of
course, have to assume that the stated objective has been judged
through the political process as one worth achieving. It is also im-
portant that he should not at this point confuse effectiveness in
achieving the objective with system performance. Small increments
in system performance can have profound influence on effectiveness.
For example, the ability of a Polaris submarine (whose objective let
us assume is to defend the West Coast) to remain submerged for say
10 percent longer may result in a vast increase in its effectiveness.
Thus the ILS logistician, having had the task presented to
him of providing a particular level of support for a planned system,
can then theoretically combine ILS elements so as to attain this ob-
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jective in the most "cost-effective" manner. Such a course of action
is, however, actually only a restatement in different form of the
theoretical approach of economic optimization discussed in Chapter
III. One problem which the logistician faces in implementing this
procedure is that he does not at present have direct control over the
elements he must use, but rather must deal through many adminis-
trative units. This at a minimum delays action and also greatly in-
creases the possibility of parochial decisions at various points in
the operational chain to the detriment of efficient resource allocation.
Another and related problem is that logistics data has in the past
generally been compiled in such a manner that it deals with individual
ILS elements thus rendering it difficult to ascertain total system
costs when elements are combined. These problems are beyond the
scope of this paper. Nevertheless they will have to be resolved by
DOD if the theoretical goal of economic efficiency is to even be ap-
proached.
The fact that judgment has been interjected into the cost-
effectiveness procedure in a random manner has in the past resulted
in cost and/or performance estimates for an individual system alter-
native being over or under- stated depending on whether that alterna-
tive was being advocated by the decision-makers. This point will be
further illustrated below by means of an example dealing with Naval
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nuclear propulsion. From an ILS standpoint, the obvious solution to
such a problem would seem to lie in the systematic training and de-
velopment of a highly motivated, professional corps of logisticians
who would be expected to participate in the determination of system
objectives and the selection of criteria on the basis of which alterna-
tives would be rated. This participation is a necessary step in the
achievement of economic efficiency because in general each military
decision must be weighed on its own merits. There has as yet been
no method devised by which it is possible to directly compare the
true effectiveness of different military programs. For each indivi-
dual program, however, the logistician may well be able to help es-
tablish the over-all goal or objective sought, and then evaluate the
contribution which a particular combination of elements can make
toward reaching that goal or objective within the over-all constraint
of his support budget limitations.
A crucial point in this analysis is that appropriate measures
of both cost and effectiveness be used and that ". . . all costs and pre-
dictable effects of the relevant decision be given their appropriate
weight in the choice. The logistician's role in this is potentially
very important as can be seen from the statement of the Assistant
Armen A. Alchian, "Cost Effectiveness of Cost Effective-
ness, " in Defense Management , ed. by Enke, p. 75.
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Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) that ". . .in preparing
our cost-effectiveness analyses, we must include in the 'cost side' of
the equation the cost of supply, maintenance and down-time; and.
. .we
must include in the 'effectiveness side' of the equation the value of
greater operational up-time and longer mean-times-between-failure. " *
The analysis should thus be so structured that a great deal of time and
effort is not addressed to wrong or irrelevant questions.
Limitations and applications of cost-effectiveness analysis. --
It has been indicated above that cost- benefit analysis often cannot be
directly applied in decision-making problems involving national de-
fense program evaluations. Once objectives are agreed to, however,
a more limited form of analysis -- cost-effectiveness -- can help, if
properly applied, to clarify narrower issues. This process can be
considered valuable if it only succeeds in forcing all concerned to
think about the stated objectives, how they were arrived at, and what
means are available for their realization. Certainly a major task of
the logistician-analyst in such a situation is to help the final decision-
maker become aware of the consequences of taking alternate courses
of action. It must not, however, be forgotten that military decision-
making operates in a highly bureaucratic environment. As one writer
Morris, address presented at the Electronics Industries
Symposium, March 7, 1968.
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has put it ". . .issues cannot be treated wholly in isolation. The quality
of information is very much influenced (and biased) by the structure
of and alliances within the bureaucracy. The methodology chosen for
1 ?
analysis will in itself introduce a specific form of bias. " It is im-
portant, therefore, for the logistician to be aware of the limitations
as well as the possibilities of the cost-effectiveness analytical pro-
cess. Probably one of the most damaging biases apparent in many
DOD analyses is the honest, although often misguided, conviction on
the part of the analyst of the Tightness of his own views, a conviction
which he then proceeds to justify by some quantitative means.
The logistics analyst should also be aware that the political
process, substituting in the sphere of government for market deter-
mination, virtually forces an attempt at foot-in-the-door tactics by
all concerned, leading advocates to overstate benefits and understate
the cost of "their" choices. The reward system at present often
favors those programs or ideas which are politically most acceptable,
and not necessarily those which best utilize resources. The present
budget authorization and appropriation process with its emphasis on
current rather than total future costs also contributes to the problem.
These are matters with which those in authority in government must
12James R. Schlesinger, Systems Analysis and the Political




come to grips if theoretical approaches are to have any chance of
working.
The ILS logistician is, however, even now in position to con-
duct a form of cost-effectiveness analysis as he seeks to obtain the
best combination of elements available to support a given system or
objective. As one example of this, analysis recently performed by
Navy and contractor personnel indicated that manpower requirements
for a particular system could be reduced from thirty-one men to
twenty-four if certain material modifications were made. Based on
the number of systems projected to be deployed, it was estimated
that a total savings of some 1400 man years would result. Using an
average cost of $10, 000 per man year, potential savings were thus
calculated to be $14 million. Assuming that both the original and
modified systems were of approximately equal effectiveness, the
logistician would then be in position to weigh the benefits from man-
power savings against the cost of the indicated modifications.
Thus it is apparent that it is the incremental costs and bene-
fits of each alternative which assume importance. This type of cal-
culation, of course, is not limited to the manpower element. Simi-
lar analysis can and should be carried out for all applicable ILS
elements when a new or modified system is being considered. Re-
sults of these calculations can then be subjected to such tests as
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sensitivity analysis to determine how results change as the indepen-
dent variables are changed. The Vice Chief of Naval Material, in
fact, has estimated that calculations of this general nature have the
potential for reducing the life cycle support costs of major ship pro-
grams by $100 million to $200 million. 13
In carrying out a cost-effectiveness analysis, the logistician
should seek to quantify those factors which logically lend themselves
to such analysis in order to present the results to the decision-
maker in such a manner that judgment can then be used in combining
qualitative factors with quantitative data. Cost-effectiveness analysis
in itself, of course, expends resources and thus should not be con-
ducted merely as an academic exercise, but rather with the objective
of making a definite contribution to the decision-making process. ^
1 ^This opinion was presented in a memorandum of March 17,
1969 from the Vice Chief of Naval Material to the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations.
l^it is interesting to note in this respect that Department of
Defense Instruction 7041. 3 provides a format for systematically iden-
tifying the costs and benefits of proposed DOD investments associ-
ated with alternative methods of achieving a particular objective so
that the alternative can be identified whose total discounted cost is
lowest. The proposed acquisition of new military systems falls with-
in the scope of this instruction, including ". . .the costs of support
services required on an annual basis. ..." Yet no apparent attempt
is made to clearly require the inclusion of the specifically defined
Integrated Logistic Support elements or to make it clear that Acquisi-
tion Managers and designated ILS logisticians should use the format
in their calculations. In fact, no specific guidance is given to the
logistician along these lines.
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It should not, however, take the place of, or be used as a pretext for
overriding expert judgment and supplanting it instead with the precon-
ceived notions of the analyst. Clark cautions against such quantita-
tive overemphasis when he states that ". . . what we find today is a
curious mixture of dollar-money accounting, usually down to the
last penny of 'costs' of weapon systems, these costs to be pitted
against their 'worth' in the overall strategic pattern of the country,
a worth the Department of Defense is not able to express in generally
acceptable numbers. "*-> Some benefits, however, even though they
are intangible and immeasurable do need to be considered in some
objective fashion. Priceless in this context thus should not neces-
sarily be considered the same as worthless. All relevant factors
should be taken into consideration, qualitative as well as quantitative.
Problems in the Use of Cost- Benefit Type Analysis -- A Case Example
A long and stormy controversy has taken place within the
Defense Establishment itself and between DOD and the Congress over
the issue of whether or not to provide for nuclear propulsion in new
major surface warships for the Navy. *" An investigation of some
^Clark, The New Economics of National Defense
, p. 204.
"U.S. , Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program-- 1967-68, Hearings , before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, 90th
Cong.
, 1st and 2nd sess. , March 16, 1967 and February 8, 1968
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parts of this controversy is appropriate for this study because:
1. Much of controversy centers around the manner in which cost-
effectiveness analysis was used in the decision-making process.
2. Many of the points which came into question involve logistics
matters and hence are of direct concern to ILS.
The fiscal year 1963 DOD authorization bill included provision
for the construction of a new aircraft carrier, designated CVA-67 and
subsequently named the John F. Kennedy . At this time, only three
Navy surface ships had been constructed which were designed for
nuclear propulsion. These were the aircraft carrier Enterprise
,
included in the fiscal year 1958 shipbuilding program, the cruiser
Long Beach in the 1957 program, and the frigate Bainbridge in 1959.
In addition, a second frigate, the Truxtun , had been authorized in
1962. In the case of the Truxtun
,
Congress was responsible for
changing one of the seven frigates requested by DOD that year from
oil to nuclear power.
With the large scale adoption of systems analysis and cost-
effectiveness studies by DOD in the 1960's, a growing feeling became
evident among the civilian leadership that the advantages of nuclear
power for surface ships were not worth their higher cost --in
contains unclassified versions of pertinent studies and correspondence,




particular higher initial cost. As evidence of this feeling, a third
nuclear frigate, which had been authorized and funded by Congress
in the 1963 program, was subsequently cancelled by the Secretary
of Defense prior to initiation of construction.
In the light of this record, attention by all concerned became
focused on plans for the CVA-67. The original Navy request was
that this ship be nuclear-powered. Apparently as requested by
DOD, however, the Navy changed its recommendation to a conven-
tionally-powered aircraft carrier before the fiscal year 1963 budget
was formally submitted. It should be instructive to the ILS logisti-
cian to critically evaluate the role played by cost-effectiveness
analysis in this decision, particularly in view of the strong support
voiced in Congress for the construction of a nuclear surface fleet. '
The Navy nuclear-powered submarine fleet, in contrast to
the surface fleet, has been steadily growing since the 1950's. As
of February 21, 1968, in fact, seventy-four nuclear-powered sub-
marines were in operation. As regards nuclear surface ships, how-
ever, the Secretary of Defense stated in a letter to Chairman, Joint
17For example, after executive hearings aboard the Enter-
prise in March and June of 1962, the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy stated: "The United States must prosecute vigorously the
conversion of the Navy to nuclear power in the surface fleet as well
as in the submarine fleet. " The Joint Committee also urged, to no




Committee on Atomic Energy that:
... on a ship-for-ship basis, nuclear power offers defi-
nite advantages. But nuclear power adds a great deal to
the cost of ships. So, no matter how much we spend on
naval forces, we face the choice between a given number
of nuclear ships and the larger number of conventional
ships that we could buy and operate for the same total
cost. In the case of submarines, the added effectiveness
for nuclear power is so great as to far outweigh the
costs. 1°
Although by that time advances in technology had made the building
of nuclear aircraft carriers more attractive from a cost standpoint,
the clear implication was that nuclear submarines had demonstrated
themselves to be "cost-effective" whereas, at least by 1963, nuclear
surface ships had not.
Called before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to ex-
plain this position, the Secretary of Defense stated -- without de-
tailing exactly why -- that he considered the advantages of nuclear
propulsion to be worth only about $25 million to $50 million over the
ship's life cycle -- about .05 percent of the estimated cost of the
ship and aircraft squadrons. "
^Letter, Robert S. McNamara to Hon. John O. Pastore,
May 1, 1967.
'See Clark, The New Economics of National Defense
, pp.
67-70 for one author's view of this controversy. It is difficult to
evaluate the significance of the stated percentage figure. More rele-
vant would have been a comparison of the added benefit with the
added cost over the ship's life cycle.
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In support of this position, the following information was pre-
sented to the Committee:
Proposed nuclear carrier initial investment $371. million
Initial nuclear cores 32.
Additional aircraft squadron 37.4
Total 440.4
Conventional carrier initial investment 277. 2
Difference $163. 2 million
Referring later to this presentation the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Systems Analysis wrote ".
. . CVA-67 will cost about 280
million dollars. Had it been decided to make her nuclear-powered,
she would have cost over 400 million dollars. For roughly 400 mil-
lion dollars one can buy either a nuclear-powered carrier or a con-
ventionally-powered carrier plus four 3, 500 ton escorts. "
It seems evident from this exchange that the only approach
taken by DOD analysts was one of attempting to maximize the effec-
tiveness of a pre-selected system within the constraints of a fixed
over-all budget. There was little, if any, attempt made to first de-
termine which particular system might offer the greatest military
effectiveness, this step to be followed by an evaluation of the effect
on total outlay required, support and logistic factors included. Com-
menting on DOD's analysis, one U.S. Congressman subsequently
stated that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been told that




. . the choice we face is between a given number of conventional ships
and a smaller number of nuclear ships at the same cost. In other
words, to improve a weapons system, we must reduce the number
2 1
of weapons to pay for it. He then went on to emphasize that he did
not share this view.
There seem, therefore, to have been two major sub-problems
involved in this controversy, both of significance to the logistician.
The first involved the determination and specification of the objec-
tive which cost-effectiveness analysis should be attempting to help
achieve. The second problem had to do with determination of the
specific elements of cost and benefits which were to be evaluated by
DOD analysts, and what, if any, effect the method in which this was
handled may have had on the results obtained. The solution to the
second problem depends on resolving the first. As has previously
been noted, cost-effectiveness analysis should theoretically be neu-
tral as regards the unit cost of any particular system. A writer who
has been instrumental in development of the new analytical approach
in DOD has noted in this regard that "The systems analyst. . . can
tell the decision-maker how many more targets would be destroyed
if 200 new bombers were added to the planned force and how much
2 1 Congressman Chet Holifield, remarks at the launching of
U.S. S. Truxtun , DLGN-35, New York Shipbuilding Corp., Camden,
N. J. , Dec. 19, 1964.
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they would cost; ho can rarely demonstrate whether they should or
should not be added. "^ Yet this may well be exactly what the DOD
studies attempted to do in the case of the Navy aircraft carrier.
In support of the position that CVA-67 should have been nuclear-
powered, a number of advantages which would accrue from this type
of propulsion and which would add significantly to the ship's military
effectiveness were claimed by the Navy. These included:
1. The capability to steam at high sustained speed for almost
limitless periods of time. This, in turn, would afford:
a. Increased tactical flexibility and freedom of independent
action.
b. Capability to transit at high speeds to take advantage of
logistic support available in less vulnerable locations.
c. Capability to carry out assigned missions over a greater
perimeter.
2. Reduced ship vulnerability because of:
a. Reduced necessity to receive logistics support in direct
combat areas.
b. Improved capability for sealing the ship due to elimination
of air intakes required by conventionally-powered ships.
Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley,
Calif. : The University of California Press, 1965), p. 76.
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3. Greatly reduced freedom from logistics support, which means:
a. A lower requirement for mobile support forces;
b. A lower requirement for advanced support bases.
4. Greater military effectiveness, due to:
a. Ability to remain on station for a longer period of time.
b. Increased ability to take advantage of weather conditions.
5. Increased capability to generate ships service electrical power
to service advanced electronic equipment.
Whether or not these stated advantages were adequately evalu-
ated in cost-effectiveness studies carried out by DOD is not clear.
It can be instructive for the logistician to consider some of the more
controversial aspects of reports such as the Naval Warfare Analysis
Study conducted for DOD by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) so
that similar problems may be recognized and handled in his own
analytical work. First among these considerations is the fact that
the objective of the analysis was, in fact, never clearly defined. It
was apparently assumed by DOD that the objective should be to max-
imize the cost-effectiveness of a given type of system (in this case,
an aircraft carrier) within the basic constraint of a limited, one-
year ship construction budget. ^ The Navy, and certainly the
23
In support of this, the Secretary of Defense, in a letter of
December 1, 1965 to the Chairman, House of Representatives Armed
Services Committee, wrote: "I think that it is absolutely essential




Congress, however, assumed that maximum military effectiveness
should be the prime objective, provided, of course, that the cost of
the more effective alternative should not be significantly greater than
its competitors. ^ jn this regard, a Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy report on this subject stressed that "The total lifetime cost of
the nuclear carrier with its aircraft is estimated to be only about 3
percent more than the lifetime cost of the conventional carrier with
its aircraft. . . the increased cost of nuclear power is not significant
in relation to its demonstrated advantages. "^ In view of this con-
troversy, it can be seen that it is essential in any output maximiza-
tion or resource minimization problem that the logistician clearly
understand the objective which is to be attained as well as criteria
for judging success in attainment.
A second problem area concerns the fact that disagreement
took place over which relevant considerations were quantified and
which were not. Consider first certain items that were not quantified,
^As an example of this thinking, the Congressional Hearings
referred to in footnote 16 point out on p. 8 that "In Southeast Asia
today the United States is once again faced with the bitter reality that
what counts in war is 'military effectiveness 1 -- not 'cost-effective-
ness'. " See also Ibid .
, p. 76 for the full statement of Admiral
Rickover which sets forth the belief that "Nuclear propulsion should
be judged on its own merits. For ship types where the increased







yot might have been. The Chief of Naval Operations, in his endorse-
ment to the interim report of the CNA study referred to above, re-
flected on this matter when he stated:
Those aspects of tactical superiority that come strongly
into effect in wartime and yet are difficult to quantify
analytically are not in this study. I have in mind the
military value of greater freedom to move far and fast
on demand; in other words, the new order of capability
to meet swiftly changing circumstances that nuclear
power provides and that conventional power cannot match.
We could make a more realistic comparison of nuclear
and conventional carriers if we could find a way to embrace
a full appreciation of these most important assets.
Yet many of these "difficult to quantify analytically" items probably
could have been measured. Of particular interest to the logistician
in this regard is the fact that the most serious limitations of DOD
studies in this area have to do with the failure to treat realistically
and in a quantified way the advantage of relative freedom from the
necessity for external logistics support. Specifically, DOD cost-
effectiveness comparisons were generally based on the somewhat
inappropriate assumptions that:
1. Tankers and oilers needed to supply fuel for oil-fired warships
would always be available and would be able to operate un-
hampered by the enemy.
2. The fuel oil needed to run conventional ships would always be
readily available whenever and wherever needed.
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As a result of these assumptions, related cost factors for potential
losses were not fully developed. If the full impact of such costs
had been included in the cost-effectiveness calculations, the final
result would certainly have been more favorable for nuclear propul-
sion.
Certain other items, however, were quantified and used in the
calculations, but seemingly in a somewhat questionable manner. In
the figures presented to Congress by DOD, for example, it can be
seen that the costs involved in procurement of an additional squadron
of aircraft were charged against the nuclear carrier simply because
the ship, due to its configuration, would be able to accommodate
them. Yet all it would have taken to avoid the incurrence of this cost
would have been a subsequent decision not to procure the aircraft.
In addition to this questionable calculation, the cost of the nuclear
reactor cores, which would have been able to power the ship for at
least seven years, were charged against the nuclear ship alternative
whereas no charge was made against the conventional alternative for
the cost of fuel oil to provide for a similar period of operation. This
action apparently was taken because conventional fuel could be pur-
? ft
This despite the statement of CNO that ". . . the vulnerability
of our overseas logistic supply lines is greater today than at any time




chased gradually out of operating rather than construction funds.
The concept of life cycle costing was thus slighted in this case in
favor of the exigencies of current year ship construction budget
limitations.
In view of the above, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the purpose of DOD cost-effectiveness analysis in this case was
to develop figures to be used to support a pre-formed subjective
opinion. One writer notes in this regard that as a result of having
researched all pertinent testimony of the Secretary of Defense per-
taining to this decision, he concludes that "In his very lengthy testi-
mony, Mr. McNamara came back again and again to the difference
in money costs but, though several Senators pressed him with intel-
ligent and pertinent questions, he never explained why the advantages
of the nuclear carrier were not worth the difference in these costs. "^'
Applicability of Cost-Benefit Type Analysis to IL.S -- Conclusions
Cost- benefit type analysis can provide specific guidance to
decision-makers where objectives have been definitively stated,
criteria for judging alternatives are clear, and both benefits and
costs are quantifiable in a fairly non-controversial sense. In the
2
'Klaus Knorr, "On The Cost-Effectiveness Approach To
Military R & D: A Critique, " paper presented for the 29th national





case of public goods such as national defense, however, costs in an
opportunistic sense as well as a realistic approximation of benefits
are virtually impossible to assess. Yet even in situations such as
this, analysis can be beneficial by seeking to quantify those factors
which lend themselves to such manipulation and pointing out for con-
sideration of the decision-maker those which do not. When analysis
is conducted, it is perhaps inevitable that judgment should enter. It
should therefore be realized that perhaps as much art as science is
involved in use of this technique. The practitioner must avoid leaving
the impression that he can provide a "proof" for nearly anything, a
charge which has been leveled against DOD analysts. ^°
The objective of cost- benefit type analysis should be to help
to minimize the collective costs of inputs in the achievement of some
specified goal, or, alternatively, to maximize the output attainable
within a limited budget. The precise goal or objective, however,
needs first to be clearly defined. In addition, cost analysts need to
have available the benefit of expert engineering knowledge so that the
costs of acquisition, construction, maintenance and so on can be more
accurately estimated. The contribution of the experienced military
Z
°For example, see excerpts from the testimony by Admiral
Rickover before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on July 25,




logistician, however, can also be vitally important. He alone can
provide much of the experience and knowledge that is needed to place
a realistic subjective evaluation on variables which defy precise
measurement. The logistician is thus in an unique position to add to
the effectiveness of analytical studies. But it is important that he
also understand the limitations of such techniques. As one writer
has put it: "As long as too much is not expected of cost-benefit analy-
sis, it can make, and is making, significant contributions toward
governmental decision making. ,ui "





AN INTEGRATING CASE EXAMPLE
. . . the essential logistics requirement for the future
will be the attainment of greater management control
and improved planning. 1
The purpose of this study has been (1) to investigate the back-
ground for and development of the concept of Integrated Logistic
Support Planning in the Department of Defense, and (2) to indicate
how the ILS logistician might utilize certain of the newer tools of
economic analysis and management science to make better decisions.
These tools include indifference curve analysis, Bayesian statistical
analysis, business logistics theory (particularly as it applies to the
problem of inventory holding costs), and cost-effectiveness analysis.
This chapter will now show how these concepts can be brought to-
gether in a typical ILS equipment procurement situation. The ex-
ample presented below makes use of actual cost and performance
data as the basis for development of a hypothetical yet realistic case.
While the focus is on the procurement of one particular piece of






electronic equipment, the principles involved should also be applicable
to many other procurement situations.
Case Assumptions
The logistician in this case is assumed to be faced with a deci-
sion to award a multi-million dollar contract for the procurement of a
type of airborne radio widely used by the military services in a num-
ber of system applications. Certain basic data relating to an existing
radio of the type in question have previously been presented in the lat-
ter part of Chapter III and in Table III-2 (Level 1). In summary,
these data indicated that based on a purchase quantity of 800 units the
radio would originally have cost $4,400 per unit if manufactured to a
design reliability level of 150 MTBF hours. The analysis which fol-
lows assumes a request for quotes based on government contract
specifications which call for (1) the reliability level of this basic type
of radio to be increased for a new system use, (2) a planned life
cycle of ten years, and (3) 1,000 of the new radios to be purchased
both for originally installed equipment and as component parts to be
held as support inventory. It is further assumed that the request for
quotes provides for the contractual right of the government to receive
supporting cost- reliability data from the competing bidders.
The logistician's "budget, " as defined below, is stated to be
$15 million. The contract is to be awarded to the lowest bidder
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demonstrating at least a 93 percent probability of being able to pro-
duce radios at a reliability level to be subsequently negotiated. The
management procedures which follow are to be used as helping to
evaluate differences in the trade-off relationship between reliability
level and total radio life cycle cost presented in competing bids.
Basic concepts and methods discussed in previous chapters will be
referred to as appropriate and made use of in this example.
In recent years defense contracts have generally stressed the
need for higher levels of equipment reliability in order to maintain
effectiveness standards in ever more sophisticated systems. Recall
that the basic components of inherent availability as earlier defined
in this study are reliability and maintainability. It is apparent that
as reliability requirements in terms of MTBF hours are raised, pro-
curement (acquisition) costs per unit will increase. As reliability is
increased, however, maintenance (ownership) costs per unit may well
decrease, at least up to some point. It should thus theoretically be
possible to actually lower total life cycle costs up to this point by
spending additional sums to extend equipment reliability. The logis-
tician, faced with a budget constraint, should be interested in re-
viewing the bidders' proposals as an initial step in helping to deter-
mine the optimum attainable level of reliability.
It should be mentioned at this point that the "budget" referred
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to in this case is considered to be that total dollar amount required to
acquire and support the equipment over its designated life cycle. The
logistician will normally not have budgetary control over all elements
of cost in the life cycle. For the most efficient allocation of resources
to be achieved, however, he should base his actions on all (discounted)
costs that will be involved in the procurement regardless of (1) the
timing of cost incurrence, (2) the funding appropriation, or (3) the
finally affected administrative budget. It is a recommendation of this
study that fiscal procedures be modified in the future as necessary to
permit the ILS logistician to act in this fashion. The example below,
in fact, assumes prior implementation of such a policy.
This case may essentially be considered a form of cost-effec-
tiveness analysis within the scope of which economic theory, Bayesian
statistical decision theory and inventory management considerations
are brought to bear.
Basic Consideration from Economic Theory
In any procurement there are two main classes of data with
which the logistician should be concerned. These relate to the factors
involved in acquisition and ownership. Ownership, in turn, is com-
posed of a number of different elements. In this study, these owner-
ship elements are considered to be those ten which officially comprise
ILS (see Appendix E). The logistician must be interested in seeing
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how the contractor proposes to combine these elements to produce
stated levels of reliability. The contractor's data, therefore, may
be evaluated to this end in the manner indicated in Chapter III. Thus,









Fig. VII- 1 -- Indication of an optimum position considering only two
ownership elements as inputs.
terms of reliability output would be at point E as graphically indicated
in Figure VII- 1 with OB of ownership element B used as one input and
OA of element A the other.
From the logistician's standpoint, however, acquisition as
well as ownership costs must be considered in order that total life
cycle costs may be properly evaluated. With this objective in mind,
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and maintaining the same form of graphical presentation, the two
valuable inputs could be considered as (1) feasible combinations of
ownership elements, and (2) acquisition units. Thus there could be
considered to be a reliability output trade-off relationship existing
between additional units of a particular equipment and the elements of
ownership involved with the equipment. Since each of these component
elements is capable of being individually costed, the budget line con-
cept can once again be introduced and a position of tangency sought as
indicated in Figure VII-2.
Output is here defined in terms of reliability which, in turn,
is dictated by system effectiveness requirements. As before, the















budget line or some reliability isoquant is limiting. That is, it may-
be possible to reach a pre-designated satisfactory level of reliability,
as determined by design engineers, without expending the full budget
and this then becomes the objective. Alternatively, however, the ob-
jective may be to reach the highest level of reliability obtainable from
the full budget available. Figure VII-2 demonstrates the latter case.
It should now be possible, however, to present these impor-
tant basic theoretical considerations in an analytical framework
which would be more directly useful to the logistician in this case.
This could be done by using the cost data developed for the input
quantities shown in Figure VII-2 and rearranging them as shown in
Figure VII- 3. 6 Reliability output would now be arrayed along the
graph's abscissa. Figure VII- 3 thus clearly shows the trade-off re-
lationship between ownership and acquisition as it affects total life
cycle costs while equipment reliability is being extended.
In Figure VII-3, the ten year life cycle cost curve reaches
its minimum at a point which corresponds to a reliability of OB
MTBF hours and total life cycle costs of OA. Assuming that the
elements of ownership are being efficiently combined, then the opti-
mum position is again at point E. If the system design called for a
7
It is assumed that all costs used in the example in this chap-











MTBF Hours (Reliability Output)
Fig. VII- 3 -- Revised framework for determining an optimum
position.
level of reliability higher than OB, the logistician could still purchase
it subject to budget limitations, but he would have full knowledge that
he is on the rising portion of the total cost curve. It should be stated
here that an accurate estimate of the cost of all ownership elements
may be unobtainable from the contractor. Thus the logistician must
of necessity critically examine all aspects of the contractor's bid so




The Use of Cost- Effectiveness Analysis
In evaluating the input elements as indicated above, it may be
noted that certain benefits can result from increased reliability and
mission effectiveness which are important, yet difficult if not impos-
sible to quantify. Such benefits might include the potential saving of
human lives and the resulting over-all contribution to national welfare.
These benefits should be noted and presented to the decision-maker.
Their essentially non- quantifiable nature, however, limits the oppor-
tunity for a complete cost-benefit analysis. Instead, the logistician
could undertake the more limited form of cost-effectiveness analysis
of each bid as defined in Chapter VI, comparing the respective quanti-
fiable cost of obtaining various levels of MTBF reliability, within the
relevant range. * Where differences appear the logistician should be
interested in determining why they occur by specific ILS cost element.
An example of a format that might be used for collection summary
data by contractor-bidder for such analysis is shown in Table VII-
1
below. This basic format could be revised from case to case as the
^In carrying out his analysis, the logistician should, of course,
seek to avoid the problem areas which have been experienced in such
studies in the past. See Chapter VI, supra , for a more detailed dis-
cussion of this. As used in this chapter, the term relevant range re-
fers to that span of reliability output associated with total life cycle
costs <l the logistician's maximum budget.
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Reliability Levels in MTBF Hours
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The summary data for each contractor-bidder could then be transposed
from individual analysis sheets and plotted on a single graph for easier
comparison.
In order for such an analysis to be meaningful, each element
of cost would have to be estimated as closely as possible. The con-
tractor's estimation procedures should, therefore, be thoroughly re-
viewed by the logistician and his staff. As an example of the kind of
approach that the logistician might expect a contractor to use in
making his cost estimates, consider the procedure followed by a com-
pany which manufactures a type of equipment related to that being con-
sidered in this case. In order to collect all relevant data, this com-
pany sent engineers to six operational sites where maintenance infor-
mation for this type of component was obtained as follows:
1. Equipment -- type, quantity, cost and usage rates.
2. Technical maintenance -- number and grade of technical per-
sonnel assigned; their training, pay and utilization; type and
rate of spare parts usage; technical data requirements.
3. Clerical help -- number, grade, training, pay and utilization.
4. Test equipment -- type, quantity, cost and manner of usage.
5. Publications -- types and manner of usage.
6. Buildings -- type of construction, size, cost, location and usage.
7. Vehicles -- type, cost and method of usage.
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The information that was obtained as a result of these activities is
shown in Table VII-2. The equipment in question was priced at
approximately $6,000 per unit. Among the pertinent points brought
out by Table VII-2 are:
1. That ten year maintenance costs per unit are in excess of
$98, 000 or about 16. 3 times the initial purchase price.
2. Technical services and repair parts taken together account for
nearly 90 percent of total maintenance costs.
TABLE VII-2
AVERAGE MAINTENANCE COSTS PER YEAR 4
EQUIPMENT B






























The costs shown in Table VII-2 are average and non-discounted.
In analyses performed by the logistician it would be preferable to show




Having collected the basic data to support the figures listed in this
tabl ^, it would be relatively easy for the contractor to perforin the re-
construction necessary to use the ILS format suggested in Table VII- 1.
It is apparent that because of the higher percentage of total cost which
results from these elements that the logistician will want to be par-
ticularly careful when reviewing the contractor's estimates dealing
with technical services and repair parts (including inventory control).
Customer Service Level and Inventory Holding Cost Considerations
As a result of having obtained the summary and back-up data
required to prepare Table VII- 1, the logistician will be in position to
have constructed, for each contractor-bidder, curves of the type shown
in Figure VII- 3. This will merely indicate, however, the optimum
level of reliability in terms of total life cycle costs. It will provide
no information as to just how this optimum level relates to design re-
quirements of the equipment in question. Hence the importance of the
concept of customer service level and the reason for the stress placed
earlier in this study on the necessity for the logistician to participate
in design criteria decisions from the very beginning.
Engineering interpolations between discrete reliability esti-
mate points will, of course, be necessary. As will subsequently be
seen, this can form the basis for later negotiation between the govern-
ment and the contractor as to the reliability level finally decided on.
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Assume, for instance, that the logistician is faced with a situ-
ation in which the desired level of reliability is positioned to the right
of OB in Figure VII- 3. This means that for each increase in MTBF
hours beyond OB, a higher level of total life cycle costs would re-
sult. Perhaps the cost involved might exceed the budget allocated
for this component. If so, then having been a part of the original
design decision the logistician would at least have some idea as to
whether he might ask the designers to consider relaxing the reli-
ability requirements, or, alternately, to consider whether it might
be possible to obtain additional funds. According to IL.S implemen-
ting instructions the logistician is expected to take part in design
decisions. In fact, however, he rarely does to any significant de-
gree. It is, therefore, a strong recommendation of this study that
procedures be devised by the Chief of Naval Material together with
the operating Systems Commands to insure that this step is taken.
The business logistic concept of customer service level can
thus be seen as being very important in an analogous sense to the
military logistician. This is true as concerns design matters as re-
ferred to above, but also with reference to inventory items held as
back-up. In Chapter V it has been noted how understatement of the
costs of holding military inventory can result in misallocation of re-
sources. Consider now the specific costs shown for Equipment B in
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Table VII-2. It is a definite possibility that inventory holding costs
may be understated, particularly if the practices followed at military
operational sites are used as a basis for making calculations. To the
extent that the logistician's investigation of the bidders' proposals
finds that this situation exists, then these costs must be recalculated
and ownership and total life cycle costs adjusted accordingly. As
pointed out in Chapter V, the logistician should not simply accept
rules of thumb in current use by military inventory managers which
tend to understate the true costs of holding material. A more realis-
tic valuing of this element may, of course, result in raising the total
cost curve or even changing its shape as inventory holding cost charges
affect one section of the curve relatively more than others. Yet such
calculations cannot be avoided if the true life cycle cost involved in
obtaining a particular level of reliability is to be shown.
The logistician, therefore, must investigate closely the con-
tractor estimates involving inventory holding costs. If they are in-
adequate, he must increase them. If they are omitted, he may re-
quire a re-submission of the proposal. In general, however, the 15
percent figure widely used by inventory managers will probably not be
sufficient. Particular attention should be given to an evaluation of the
contractor's assumptions in calculating the holding cost components




Bayesian Analysis and the Procurement Decision
Assume now that the ILS logistician following the general
procedure and bearing in mind the considerations referred to above
has requested and received proposals from three qualified bidders.
He must now make a decision involving the letting of a contract for
procurement of 1,000 airborne radios. Bid quotes are to show the
costs of producing these radios with design reliability of 150, 240,
560 and 1200 MTBF hours respectively. Upon receipt of the propo-
sals, the logistician begins with an analysis of Company C. Based
on cost-reliability data submitted with the proposals, the cost-effec'
tiveness form is completed as previously described. This is illus-
trated in Table VII- 3. 6
From the data presented in Table VII- 3 it can be noted that
as higher levels of reliability are built into the radio, acquisition
The acquisition and total ownership cost figures shown in
Table VII- 3 are actual for the indicated levels of reliability. The
breakdown by ILS cost element is hypothetical, but generally based
on the percentage distribution of costs estimated by the same com-
pany for related equipment in Table VII-2. It can be seen from
Table VII- 3 data that each element of cost will tend to follow its own
trend as reliability levels are increased. For example, as MTBF
hours are doubled technical costs should not be expected to be halved
since the more highly sophisticated equipment will require increased
engineering competence. Also, as reliability is increased, fewer
personnel may be needed, however, specialized technical personnel
will not be able to be reduced beyond some minimum number and thus
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Reliability Levels in MTBF Hours
150 240 560 1200
$5.0 5. 75 7. 5 12. 5
25. 15. 6. 2 3. 1
12. 8 6.6 1.9 .4
1. 1 . 7 .2 . 1
5. 3 2. 2 .6 . 1
. 8 . 7 . 3 . 2
. 5 . 7 .8 .9
1. 2 1. 1 .4 . 2
1. 1 1. 2 1. 2 .9
. 7 . 5 . 3 . 1
1. 5 1. 3 . 5 .2
$30.0 20. 75 13. 7 15. 6
costs will rise and ownership costs will fall. Putting this basic data
n
It is, of course, possibly true that beyond some point the
quest for increased reliability will require such a technical effort that
technical service costs could force the entire ownership cost curve
into a rising trend. Such is not the experience, however, within the
reliability range indicated in this case.
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into the format of Figure VII- 3, the following graph is obtained with
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Reliability (in MTBF Hours)
1,000 17^00
Fig. VII-4 -- Relationship between life cycle costs and MTBF hours




From this graph, the logistician can estimate that Company C should
be able to supply radios of about 740 MTBF hours at lowest total life
cycle cost even though no specific experimental model was tested in
this range. This graph also demonstrates that it may often be possible
to achieve cost savings while at the same time improving equipment
reliability. In his evaluation of the cost-reliability trade-off pre-
sented above, the logistician must be careful to review the basis for
costing of all ILS elements listed in Table VII- 3. In particular, he
should pay attention to those items involving inventory carrying costs.
Assume for the moment that Company C finally won the award and
that 1,000 radios were purchased at $9,000, 100 of them being desig-
nated for inventory. Assume further that the 100 radios (as component
parts) were sent into inventory immediately and were used up or be-
came valueless at the end of the ten year life cycle, the decline taking
place on a straight line basis. There would thus be an average value
equivalent to fifty radios in inventory each year during the life cycle.
This would mean a total inventory value over the cycle of $9000 x 50
x 10 = $4, 500, 000. At 25 percent per year, total inventory carrying
costs over the ten year life cycle would be 250 percent of this or
$11,250,000. At 15 percent per year, however, total inventory
carrying costs would be 150 percent, or $6, 750, 000, a difference of
$4, 500, 000. There is no evidence that this large potential difference
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in calculated total life cycle costs was considered in subsequent con-
tract awards. Under the procedure recommended in this study, how-
ever, it would have been.
The decision process . -- Having evaluated the bid of Company
C, the logistician would then proceed to follow the same sort of analy-
sis with the two remaining bids. Having derived three total cost
curves as accurately as possible, these curves could then be trans-
ferred to a separate form for comparison as indicated in Figure VII-5.
Now the logistician in this case is interested in obtaining as
high a level of reliability as possible subject to cost considerations
and dependent on the designated customer service level. Figure
VII-5 helps the logistician to visualize which contractor, based on
initial proposal data, appears to offer the most advantageous contrac-
ts
tual arrangement. It can be seen now that Company A offers the
lowest total cost of all three bidders at a reliability level of about 500
MTBF hours. Having been a part of the initial system design decision
process, however, the logistician knows that the preferred customer
service level is 800 MTBF hours but that the 740 MTBF hour optimum
position of Company C would be acceptable. The logistician also notes
It should be stated that the curve for Company C is based on













Reliability (in MTBF Hours)
Fig. VII-5 -- Comparison of optimum positions of Companies A, B,
and C based on evaluation of bid information.
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that at no point does the cost curve of Company B offer a position
superior to that of the other bidders.
Based on these considerations the logistician negotiates with
the three bidders based on their proposals for 1, 000 ten year life
cycle radios at a reliability level of 740 MTBF hours with the fol-
lowing summary results:
Company Life Cycle Cost Estimate
A $13,300,000
B $13, 500, 000
C $12,500,000
With this basic data in hand, the logistician is now in position to make
use of Bayesian statistical decision theory in awarding the contract.
In order to proceed, however, it is necessary for him to develop a
subjective prior probability distribution. He can then combine this
with sample evidence to develop a posterior distribution, the ex-
pected value of which would represent the probability of the particu-
lar company being able to produce radios of at least 740 MTBF hour
reliability. The technical competence of each contractor-bidder is a
matter of extreme importance in a case such as this. The Bayesian
procedure offers an opportunity for expert judgment to be inserted
into the decision process.
On the basis of past experience with the operation of each
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contractor's equipment, the operation of related equipment now in the
field, the examination of all pertinent performance records, and the
evaluation of supporting detail submitted by these contractors, the
logistician and his staff now proceed to arrive at a subjective prior
probability distribution. This is done after weighing all evidence in
the following manner. First, the logistician will designate levels of
attainment, which he designates by the heading p. This p actually
stands for the maximum decimal level of 740 MTBF hours capable of
being achieved by the bidder. The estimated probability of ability to
achieve these respective levels, P(p), is then estimated as follows:
Company A Oampany B C«Dmpany C
p P(P) P(P) P(P)
. 80 . 10 . 10 .05
.90 .20 .25 . 15
.95 .68 .60 .70
.99 .02 .05 . 10
The interpretation of these figures is quite straight forward.
In the case of Company A, for instance, the logistician and his staff
have estimated, after reviewing all available evidence, that there is
a probability of only . 10 (or one chance in ten) that the company can
produce radios of at least 740 MTBF hours reliability a maximum of
80 percent of the time. Similarly there is estimated to be a proba-
bility of . 20 that the designated reliability level can be attained a
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maximum of 90 percent of the time. Similar interpretations can be
made at the . 95 and . 99 levels of p for Company A. These meanings
also hold for the figures indicated for Companies B and C. The lo-
gistician should finally review the distributions to be certain that
whatever differences may exist among the companies at each level
of p are intended.
The next step for the logistician is then to obtain relevant
sample data. Assume now that the logistician is able to consult the
Design Evaluation Group and an appropriate test program is devised. '
It may be possible to consider the current test as being similar to
that previously conducted on related equipment. If so, the logisti-
cian may be able to feel even more confident about his probability
distributions. Based on the test plan, twenty-five critical compo-
nents representative of the company's ability to produce the radio in
question at a reliability level of 740 MTBF hours are selected at
each plant and tested with the following results:







'See Chapter IV, supra , for a discussion of the need for such
a body, readily accessible to the logistician.
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The logistician now has a life cycle cost estimate, represen-
tative sample data and a prior probability distribution for each bidder.
Making use of the binomial distribution as described in Chapter IV the
logistician can then calculate expected values of the prior probability












P(p /T = 24)
.007
10 E(p)
. 80 . 006
.90 .20 . 18 . 199 . 0358 . 128 . 115
.95 .68 .65 . 365 . 2373 . 851 . 808
.99 .02 .02 . 196 . 0039 . 014 .014















.90 .25 . 23 . 266 . 0612 . 306 . 275
.95 .60 . 57 . 231 . 1317 .659 .626
.99 .05 .05 .024 . 0012 . 006 .006














. 80 . 002
.90 . 15 . 14 . 199 .0279 .095 .086
.95 .70 .67 . 365 . 2446 . 835 . 793
.99 . 10 . 10 . 196 .0196 .067 .066
1.00 .95 . 2931 1.000 .947
10As before, this is read "The probability of p given that
twenty-four items out of twenty-five passed. "
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These results may then be summarized:
Expected Value of Ability to
Manufacture Radios at




All companies meet the established criterion of an expected
level of manufacturing ability at 740 MTBF hours of at least 93 per-
cent. Therefore the logistician would recommend that Company C be
awarded the contract. In this particular case, the award company
also had the highest expected manufacturing ability. Should this not
have been the case, the logistician, in general, would have chosen
that company whose expected manufacturing ability value at least
equalled the established minimum, and whose indicated total life
cycle cost was lowest. As previously mentioned in Chapter IV, the
logistician may wish to conduct a sensitivity analysis to see how re-
sults change as slight adjustments are made in prior probability dis-
tributions.
It is also important to note that the Bayesian procedure fol-
lowed above need not be considered ended once the contract is awarded.
A continuing test program, as required by ILS procedures, would pro-
vide opportunities to further update the posterior distribution deter-
mined above. Should the indicated level of manufacturing ability ever
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fall below 93 percent, the government would have strong reason to
consider default of the contract and to take appropriate action. It is
thus quite clear that the contractor's quality control procedures must
be evaluated continually during the development and manufacturing
phases.
Impli cations . -- Something in excess of $40 billion of the De-
partment of Defense's budget each year goes for procurement. Any
benefit realized from the adoption of a procedure such as that indi-
cated above could have a significant pay-off. At the very least, the
decision-maker would have a better basis for contract award than a
simple comparison of contract bid prices. In order to carry out the
procedures indicated in this chapter, however, proposals received
from contractors should be required to show:
1. All cost elements included in the calculations, and the methods
used and assumptions made in their calculation.
2. The methods used in predicting reliability.
3. Any supporting data from prior performance records.
4. The recommended test program by which the bidder would in-
tend to demonstrate his manufacturing ability. The Design
Evaluation Group may then choose to accept this or require
additional procedures.
Military contractors have recently been initiating programs of
life cycle costing in order to make design decisions and to make
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competitive contract bids. This case example has shown how the
ILS logistician can make better use of this data to allocate resources




These attributes of weapons acquisition preclude re-
liance on anything like a conventional market system
for the procurement of advanced weapons, evoking
instead what is best described as a nonmarket, quasi-
administrative buyer- seller relationship. In this non-
market environment the automatic guides and restraints
provided by the market's "invisible hand" are absent.
To replace them the government must deliberately
structure its relations with contractors in such a way
as to assure successful weapons program execution. *
As has been noted many times within this study the Department
of Defense in allocating scarce economic resources is not subject to
the same forces as influence firms in the private sector of the
economy. The free market mechanism does not operate to provide a
clear competitive signal to the military decision-maker to guide him
in the acquisition of productive inputs nor does it evaluate the worth of
the system output. Yet allocation decisions must and, in fact, are
being made. Because national defense is a public good which must be
provided by government if it is to be supplied at all, efficient allocation






of resources by DOD must therefore be determined by appropriate
nonmarket means whenever possible.
The purpose of this study has been to examine certain the-
oretical concepts from economics, statistics and management science
which have been found to have application in the private sector of the
economy. The main thesis of this study has been that several of
these concepts can contribute to an improvement in the military
resource allocation decision-making process. There is, of course,
full recognition of the fact that not all of the practices used by busi-
ness decision-makers can be transferred from the private sector
with equal effectiveness. Evidence has been presented, however,
that certain concepts and procedures such as indifference curve and
marginal analyses from economic theory, Bayesian statistical de-
cision theory, inventory theory and cost-effectiveness analysis can
be useful to the military logistician.
This study has taken as its setting the Integrated Logistic
Support management concept which has been formally established
by DOD directive. ILS is considered herein to be composed of ten
"elements" required to insure the most economic yet effective sup-
port of a particular system or equipment throughout its life cycle.
DOD implementing directives also provide for recognition of the
responsibility of designated Acquisition Managers and logistician
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assistants to direct the actual operation of ILS.
The specific elements of IL.S are not new. They have, in fact,
existed in some form as long as military operations have required
logistic support. But because modern weapon systems have become
so complex and costly many of the procedures and concepts of the re-
cent past are no longer adequate.
Contributions From Economic Analysis
Because an economic problem exists whenever a resource allo-
cation choice is required from among available alternatives (none of
which would be as preferred as some unavailable alternative),
economic theory can aid the logistician in making his allocation deci-
sions more effectively. In the coming era of increasingly more strin-
gent defense budget constraints, in fact, it will certainly be necessary
for those in charge of military procurement and development programs
to be able to demonstrate to appropriate authority that decisions are
being made on a more economically efficient basis.
Relevant economic considerations discussed in this study in-
clude the important concepts of opportunity cost, discounting to present
value, and marginal and indifference curve analysis. Concerning the
idea of opportunity cost, the military logistician must recognize that
the true cost of resources used in an ILS application is represented by
the value of the product which is sacrificed because these resources
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cannot be used in alternative applications. The strict use of outlay
cost as a guide to decision-making may therefore be misleading.
In evaluating system alternatives which involve streams of life
cycle costs and benefits occurring in different years, it is necessary
that these costs and benefits be discounted to present value in order
for meaningful comparisons to be made. There is at present no one
discount rate used by all Federal agencies nor, indeed, is there even
a uniform requirement that one be used at all. The year of occurrence
of a cost or benefit is, however, important and should be formally
recognized. Present value tables are widely available and should be
made use of by the logistician.
The concept of marginalism can be as important in the public
sector as in the private, although perhaps more difficult to apply.
Thus it can be shown through the process of differential calculus that
the economically optimum level of capability of a weapon system is to
be found at the point where the marginal value received from moving
to that level of capability is just equal to the marginal cost thereby in-
curred. Military worth is obviously difficult to quantify. Yet the
logistician must bear in mind this theoretical ideal in making resource
allocation decisions in order to avoid gross errors.
Indifference curve analysis and general microeconomic
theory can be used to demonstrate how two valuable ILS inputs can
be combined so as to obtain the highest possible output. Such
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analysis requires that the logistician bear in mind the production func-
tion which, given the existing state of technology, indicates the maxi-
mum output technically possible from input combinations. Constant
output quantities can be represented graphically as a family of isoquant
curves. Inputs are then shown on both axes. The slope of the isoquant
curve is determined by technical substitutability of the inputs. In order
for an economic choice to be made, however, meaningful constraints
may be represented by input cost and a limited budget. To the above
graphical analysis, then, a budget line may be added, its slope deter-
mined by the ratio of the marginal costs of the two inputs.
Determination of an optimum economic position involves
choosing from among equally efficient positions as represented by the
isoquant curves. The optimum position for the logistician could be
represented by that point at which the maximum available budget line
becomes just tangent to the highest availability isoquant, or, alter-
nately, where the lowest acceptable isoquant becomes tangent to the
lowest possible budget line. The principles involved in this type of
analysis can be extended to a problem involving inany inputs by simply
moving from plane geometric analysis to the use of calculus. In Chap-
ter VII it was demonstrated how this basic analytic framework could be
revised to be more immediately useable by the logistician while still
retaining its essential properties for evaluation.
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In view of these considerations, then, it can be seen that a
new look at military logistic practices is in order --a look in which
it is essential that management, from the outset, should "think
economics. " In the past, as one writer has noted, ". . .the overriding
consideration in the prognosis for any given system acquisition inten-
tion is the degree of predisposition for or against it in [the Office of
the Secretary of Defense]. " While this may still be true in the fu-
ture, it is nevertheless likely that this predisposition will tend more
than ever to be based on economic considerations, once basic objec-
tives have been established through the political process.
Bayesian Statistical Decision Theory
Because of past training, experience and access to relevant
cost and performance data, the military logistician possesses a
valuable reservoir from which the ingredients to form a valid sub-
jective opinion can be drawn. This opinion, although admittedly
subjective, can be intrinsically as valuable as any strictly objective
evidence which the logistician can obtain. A basic systematic pro-
cedure has, however, been lacking in the past for combining subjec-
tive and objective information by the logistician. If a mechanism for
introducing subjective evaluation earlier in the decision process
2 M. Eckhart, Jr. , "Another Kind of Strategy, " United States
Naval Institute Proceedings
,
September, 1969, p. 29.

- 245 -
could be developed, centralization of management decision-making at
the higher levels of DOD might be considered less necessary. The ad-
vantage of pushing the decision-making process down the channels of
command is that only in this manner can the particular expertise and
experience of the logistician be fully utilized. For example, procure-
ment awards are customarily made at present on the basis of bid price
at times backed up by certain test results. Valuable subjective opin-
ion available at lower levels has generally not been brought to bear in
this process in any meaningful fashion.
Bayesian statistical decision theory, which views probability as
a series of subjective weights or degrees-of-belief, can be extremely
useful to the ILS logistician by providing a means for bringing all avail-
able and relevant information to bear in the economic solution of a
problem of resource allocation. Of course, unless the logistician can
make a meaningful contribution to the decision-making process not
much benefit will be realized from his use of this analytic tool.
Calling on his reservoir of data, the logistician can proceed to
logically develop a subjective prior probability distribution based on
his own degrees-of-belief concerning the problem at hand. In many
cases, this subjective prior distribution can be based on information
obtained from past tests on similar or related equipment, often pro-
duced by the same contractor-bidders now under evaluation. This
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should certainly tend to enhance the accuracy of the prior distribu-
tion as well as to help insure compatibility with current test results.
Due to the random manner in which much of the equipment
with which the logistician is concerned fails, the binomial distribu-
tion can be logically used in combining the subjective and objective
data. This process can be facilitated by recourse to standard pub-
lished binomial distribution tables. Once both types of information
have been combined (a procedure illustrated in Chapters IV and
VII), the expected value in the revised or posterior distribution can
be used to assist in evaluating more efficiently each bidder's pro-
posal. The method of combination and the expected value approach
used in this study is, of course, only one of several possible. Due
to its ease in understanding and use, however, and because of the
random failure pattern of many support items, it would appear to be
highly appropriate for use in the ILS environment.
Inventory Control and the Influence of the Customer Service Level
Inherent in the concept of logistic support is the realization
that inventories of reserve material must be maintained. It has
long been recognized in private business logistics that one of the
most significant costs involved in inventory is that of holding or
carrying it. Indeed, it has been widely estimated in business that
these costs seldom run less than 25 percent per year of average
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inventory value. The chief components of this holding cost are in-
terest, obsolescence and depreciation. In terms of how these par-
ticular components are valued, military holding costs appear to be
understated. The outcome of this is that support inventories may
be larger than are economically desirable with detrimental effects
on efficient resource allocation. The interest rate widely used by
Navy inventory managers for example is 4 percent. Such a figure
is highly unrealistic in today's economy. A more realistic attempt
should therefore be made by DOD to assess the current "cost of
capital. " This should include a consideration of both the "pure" in-
terest rate and an additional additive factor appropriate for the
unique risks involved with highly sophisticated military systems.
Another frequently understated element of military inven-
tory holding cost is obsolescence. Due to the rapid advance of tech-
nology many systems are obsolete within a relatively short time
after delivery to operating units. This fact is frequently not ade-
quately reflected in holding cost and economic lot formulas used by
inventory managers. A straight line decline in value due to obsoles
cence is often used on the basis of an arbitrary "shelf life" calcu-
lation. This calculation may not take into account the fact that a
perfectly useable itein can be on the shelf for several years after
it becomes obsolete. As for depreciation, it generally is not
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recognized in holding cost formulas as an entity separate from obsoles-
cence. Considering the large capital investment involved in many
modern inventory components, it would appear that depreciation should
be recognized as a significant and distinct component of holding cost.
In view of the above, the frequently used inventory holding cost
rate of 15 percent per year of average inventory value would seem to
be quite inadequate. If anything, due to the higher risks and uncer-
tainties involved, the cost of holding military inventory should be con-
siderably higher than the 25 percent per year minimum figure com-
monly accepted in private industry.
Provision of service to the customer is, of course, the prime
mission of the military logistician. In order to more fully appreciate
the needs of the system- user customer, it is doubly important that he
participate in initial design decisions. In addition, he must have clear
channels of communication to the inventory managers through cognizant
element managers so that he may be able to provide guidance concerning
"protection levels" established by the inventory managers on items of
direct interest. Customer service levels (levels of system or equip-
ment availability or reliability -- whatever the logistician is trying to
insure) will certainly suffer if the inventory manager places too low a
protection level criterion on reserve stock. If the inventory manager
feels that such steps are unavoidable due to budgetary constraints, the
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system logistician should be immediately notified so that any higher
level action deemed appropriate might be initiated. The situation
should not be allowed to develop, as is now possible, wherein the
fact that an inadequate level of protection has been assigned to an
item becomes apparent to all concerned only after the item in ques-
tion is urgently required.
In short, then, military logistics management can profitably
learn from business logistics practices. The somewhat narrow
concept now being followed should be broadened to include relevant
procedures that are available from the private sector.
ILS and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analyses have been successfully used in a num-
ber of governmental applications. In general, however, these appli-
cations involve situations in which both benefits and costs are rela-
tively easy to isolate and value. Unfortunately, such a situation
does not generally prevail with national defense programs, the
choice of which is often subject to a degree of political influence.
Full-blown cost-benefit studies are thus often rendered virtually
impossible due to the immeasurables involved. By accepting the
politically-decided goals or objectives as the benefits to be attained,
however, the logistician can effectively employ the more limited
technique of cost-effectiveness analysis. The objective of such
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analysis should be to indicate how best to either (1) maximize system
effectiveness given a relatively fixed budget, or (2) reach a particular
level of effectiveness with the least expenditure of resources as mea-
sured by associated costs. In the past, such analyses have at times
been performed largely to support pre-determined preferences. To
be correctly used, however, all relevant factors must be objectively
considered. As many of these factors should be logically quantified as
possible. Those that cannot be quantified should be presented to the
decision-maker for subjective evaluation indicating trade-offs avail-
able. Cost-benefit type studies can thus be considered of importance
to ILS in large measure because they help to focus attention on factors
that might otherwise be overlooked.
Many of the decision problems which the logistician faces can
be considered as involving a general type of cost-effectiveness analysis,
His first responsibility should be to participate in design decision so
that he will be in position to clearly understand the objectives or goals
(benefits) to be achieved and the level of customer service required.
He may then proceed to identify as appropriate those officially desig-
nated elements of ILS which may be involved, and then to value them,
considering trade-offs possible. Having completed this analysis, he
would then be in position to recommend the most cost-effective and
economically efficient position possible based on objective information
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then available. One example of how this might be approached has been
developed in Chapter VII.
Recommendations
Based on the analysis described in this study the following
recommendations have been offered to aid the logistician to fulfill
his role as envisioned by DOD with greater effectiveness:
1. Potential ILS logisticians should, in the course of general
management training activities, receive greater exposure to
basic concepts in economic and statistical theory. This
could be accomplished by including appropriate courses and
training activities in the curriculum of the several logistics
and management training schools now in existence. Topics
to be covered would include:
a. Basic microeconomic theory with applications to military
resource allocation problems.
b. Elements of statistical decision theory including the use of
probability.
c. Inventory theory.
d. Cost-benefit analysis (including cost-effectiveness evalu-
ation).
2. The logistician should, in fact as well as in theory, be
accorded a role in the initial design decision process. Only
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through such participation will he be able to present timely-
advice concerning support cost- reliability trade-offs as well
as gain insights into the levels of customer service that may be
required. The Chief of Naval Material should have responsi-
bility for insuring that such action is taken.
3. Clear and rapid lines of communication need to be established
between ILS logisticians and element managers. Contacts now
being made are frequently untimely and sporadic in nature.
Here again the Chief of Naval Material should have the responsi-
bility for drafting appropriate directives.
4. A "Design Evaluation Group" should be established as an inte-
gral part of the Naval Systems Commands, readily accessible
to the logistician, so that technical problems relating to such
matters as test programs and procedures recommended by con-
tractors can be evaluated and appropriate tests of design reli-
ability and effectiveness devised. The establishment of such a
group should be proposed by the Chief of Naval Material as a
joint venture with the Systems Commands.
5. The "budget" of the logistician should be conceived of as en-
compassing all elements of cost regardless of funding appropri-
ation, year of cost incurrence, or office of final accounting
responsibility. It has been noted, for instance, that "Lower
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level managers are 'charged' with only a small proportion
(20-30 percent) of the resources they actually consumed.
Consequently, there is a tendency to over- consume other
seemingly free goods (70-80 percent). "* Appropriate changes
should be made by DOD to its Planning- Programming- Bud-
geting System so that budget justifications can be structured
in such manner for presentation to Congress.
6. Uniform accounting standards should be developed and made
mandatory for defense contractor use so that alternatives can
be more meaningfully compared, the true cost of defense con-
tracts ascertained, foot-in-the door bidding opportunities re-
duced, and duplication of charges eliminated. One company
official has stated regarding this problem as it affects logis-
tics that
The major parameter of logistics is cost. At the
moment there are insufficient data available in
standard references to assure that all competing
contractors will use the same basic cost references.
The only solution to offer at this moment is to pro-
ceed post-haste to develop such a common source
to permit reasonable comparison of cost-of-owner-
ship.
Jack W. Carlson, "Comments on Institutional Structures and
Defense Spending, " in Issues in Defense Economics , ed. by McKean,
pp. 256-257.
^John E. Losee, "Logistics Development During the Concep-
tual and Contract Definition Phases for USAF Programs, " presenta-
tion to the 1967 SAE/AIAA/AFME Reliability and Maintainability
Conference, Cocoa Beach, Florida, July 17-19, 1967.

- 254 -
The General Accounting Office should make an appropriate re-
port to the Congress in this regard so that DOD may then be
able to understand the will of Congress on this important sub-
ject.
7. All requests for quotes issued by DOD activities to potential
bidders on systems or major items of equipment should require
the submission of cost- reliability trade-off data which backs up
their proposals. This would serve as an important means of
proposal evaluation by the Design Evaluation Group and the
logistician. The Chief of Naval Material should institute action
to see that such data is required in Navy contracts.
8. More formal recognition should be made of the fact that the
demonstration of high reliability by a contractor during the re-
search and development stage of system procurement is impor-
tant, but this must also be carried over into the subsequent
manufacturing phase as well. The Chief of Naval Material
should, therefore, insure that contracts require strict moni-
toring of the contractor's quality control program as production
proceeds. Operational commands must then, upon delivery, be
especially careful to insure that high maintenance standards are
maintained in accordance with original contract specifications.
The Chief of Naval Operations should issue appropriate instruc-
tions to this effect.
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9. Finally, the fact must be recognized and made use of that the
logistician has professional expertise which can make his
subjective judgment potentially valuable and useful. Following
the approach recommended in this study would permit this
judgment to be put to use in a systematic manner.
Assuming the above courses of action are taken, the logistician
will be able to allocate scarce economic resources in a more efficient
manner. This increase in efficiency should be achieved by evaluating
potential cost trade-offs so as to optimize output within over-all bud-
get constraints, deciding on the best possible combination of inputs
by examining the effects of different combinations on total system
performance.
Concluding Comment
The IL.S logistician as a manager of valuable resources must
be interested in the most economically efficient allocation of these
resources possible. The overall objective of ILS, in fact, should be
to attain an optimal mix of system effectiveness and related support
costs. The concepts and procedures developed in this study should
significantly aid in the attainment of this objective. In particular,
logistic support contract proposals should be evaluated more effec-
tively "price and other factors " considered. Integrated Logistics
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Support is in effect a philosophy established as an operational concept
of resource management. What remains now is for the ILS logistician
".
. . to devise the techniques necessary for exploiting the full potential
and promise of the concept of Integrated Logistics Support. "-' This
study has been carried out as a contribution toward realizing that goal.
^Giordano, "Logistical Implications of Weapon System Design
Decisions, " p. 207.

APPENDIX A
DEFENSE AS A PUBLIC GOOD
A public good may be defined as any good or service for whose
supply the political process is required because "the pricing system of
the market cannot deal with all the tasks that must be met in order to
operate a sound economy and a healthy society. "* In the supply of some
kinds of goods and services, then, reliance on the competitive market
could result in undersupply, or no supply at all. The basic problem is
that these goods and services are such that they must be provided col-
lectively to the community or nation. They do not lend themselves to
being divided up into units to be sold separately to individual consumers.
The consumption of the good or service by one individual in no way
lessens the amount available for consumption by another and the mar-
ginal cost of supplying an additional consumer is zero or nearly zero.
It is difficult to exclude anyone from the benefits of consumption, at
Richard A. Musgrave, "Principles of Budget Determination, "
in Public Finance & Fiscal Policy , ed. by Joseph Scherer and James




least in any manner tolerable in our society, and in fact attempts at
exclusion might even raise the total costs of providing the good or
service. There is, therefore, no reason for anyone to reveal his
true preferences since he will be able to consume the good or ser-
vice whether he voluntarily pays for it or not.
Consider the example of an interstate highway. This is not
a "pure" public good, since exclusion would be possible. The ex-
ample can be used, however, because "externalities, " or benefits
for which the producer cannot charge, are present. Attempts to
supply the service entirely through the market mechanism would
result in undersupply assuming net benefits to be positive. To be
useful, the highway must generally extend over areas many people
wish to travel. If the cost of building the highway were to be obtained
entirely from these users, it would be necessary to make the high-
way a toll road or to devise some other type of user-fee system such
as electronic sensing since in no other way could persons be barred
who did not wish to contribute more than the amount represented by
gasoline tax. In this example, the cost of collecting tolls or instal-
ling the user-fee system could also raise the total cost of providing
the service. Some economists have, in fact, pointed out that when
external economies are present, the market mechanism may not only
provide less of the good or service than is optimal, but will also make
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society pay more for the suboptimal quantity than if it were supplied
by the government. ^
Figure A-l illustrates how an undersupply of a public good or
service can occur. Assume that the demand curves of two individuals
for a particular public good are represented by the lines AB and A'B 1 .
If a certain level such as OE, is produced, each and every person re-
ceives this same level of output. Therefore, in the case of a public
good, any potential output is available to anyone and thus the appropriate
construction is to set the qua,ntity and then see what can be extracted





Fig. A-l -- Illustration of the possibility of undersupply of a public
good or service through reliance on the market mechanism.
Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "Collective Goods,
Comparative Advantage and Alliance Efficiency, in Issues in Defense
Economics, ed. by McKean, p. 37.
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of the demand curves indicate that marginal worth decreases as quan-
tity supplied increases. Now let CC represent the good's average
cost curve, its zero slope indicating a marginal cost equal to average
cost. Since, according to the principles of welfare economics, price
should equal marginal cost, OC represents the price to be charged. 4
Production would thus theoretically take place at OF since the intersec-
tion of marginal cost (and price) with total marginal worth as measured
by demand is at R. Now the two individuals might collectively desire
this quantity of the public good or service but find individually that
its marginal worth to them is below marginal cost, and hence not
wish to purchase it at price OC. In the above example, in fact, FL
represents what one person is willing to pay for the Quantity OF and
FM what the other is willing to pay. Demand at the price OC, where
price = marginal cost = marginal worth to at least one individual is,
however, at OE. At OE, one of the individuals would not be willing to
pay the market price yet could not be excluded from benefiting since mar-
kets do not exist to extract different prices. One individual would thus
pay the market price and the other would pay nothing. Hence the quan-
tity EF would not be produced by the market even though it is theoretically
3See Watson, Price Theory and Its Uses , pp. 62-63 for a dis






National defense, as noted in Chapter I, is perhaps the best
example of a public good. As Due puts it:
. . . benefits in the form of protection from foreign invasion,
seizure of foreign territory or prevention of invasion of
friendly countries accrue indivisibly to the entire com-
munity, and no one can be prevented from benefiting. Pri-
vate production is therefore impossible. ->
Since the market mechanism cannot provide the desired supply of
national defense, a political process is necessary. Preferences can
then be revealed either through direct voting for various programs, or
the election of representatives pledged to certain courses of action.
In such a manner, society is able to translate individual preferences
into provision of public goods and services. The role of the economist
in this is to contribute to the judgment and perception of public offi-
cials at all levels of the decision-making process.
-> Due , Government Finance: Economics of the Public Sector ,
p. 9.
"See the discussion of the basic logic of voting in Anthony
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper &
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PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
ILS CONCEPTS TRAINING COURSE
Purposes :
1. To provide an effective and meaningful understanding of key con-
cepts underlying Navy Integrated Logistic Support (ILS).
2. To indicate the manner in which the Secretary of the Navy requires
the utilization and application of these concepts to the acquisition
process.
Objectives :
1. To provide relevant course material which will have significant
residual value beyond the course.
2. To document the essential concepts of ILS and their application
throughout the life cycle of modern Navy systems.
3. To illustrate the principal parts of the weapon system acquisition
process, their inter -relationships, and the importance of know-
ledgeable personnel in the direction of logistic support programs.




implementing directives within the Department of the Navy.
5. To emphasize the application of ILS concepts, not only to major
systems that undergo Concept Formulation/Concept Definition
phases, but also to those systems and equipment representing the
majority of Navy acquisitions, which do not undergo this process.
6. To stress the importance of considering ILS as an everyday func-
tion of extreme importance to the success of the military system
decision-making process.
7. To actually apply concepts related to the use of ILS techniques.
8. To encourage the idea that uniform ILS practices should be used
throughout the Navy wherever appropriate.
9. To transmit a reference bibliography.
10. To help improve manpower utilization by supporting the idea of
career development in the field of ILS.

APPENDIX D
PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
1. Requirements for integrated logistic support shall be included in
systems or equipment development studies, plans, specifications,
requests for proposals and contracts.
2. Preparation of integrated logistic support plans shall be accom-
plished concurrently with development of plans for development,
test and evaluation, and procurement.
3. Integrated logistic support shall be based upon a documented engi-
neering analysis of maintenance and operational requirements in-
herent in the equipment design and the plan for use.
4. Requirements for integrated logistic support shall be "tailored" to
fit the system or equipment to which applied.
5. Systems and cost analysis organizations and programs shall support
and apply the policies and principles of this Instruction.
6. Integrated logistic support programs shall include maintainability
requirements and utilize reliability program inputs.
7. Test and evaluation programs shall concurrently test and evaluate




integrated logistic support resources provided to support the sys-
tems or equipment under test.
8. The integrated logistic support program shall produce basic com-
puter library file inputs and information products in support of
management information systems, i.e., configuration accounting,
readiness reporting, inventory management, maintenance data
collection, performance analysis and cost accounting.
9. Management information systems shall provide data to monitor
the performance of the integrated logistic support system and pro-
vide data to generate refinements and improvements.
10. Responsibility for integrating the logistic support of each system
or equipment shall be assigned to a specifically designated indi-
vidual.
Source: SECNAV Instruction 4000.29, Development of Integrated
Logistic Support for Systems and Equipment , Enclosure (2).

APPENDIX E
DEFINITIONS OF ILS ELEMENTS
(Excerpts)
Maintainability and Reliability :
Maintainability is an expression of the probability of equip-
ment being restored to operating status within allowable time limits
using available test equipment, facilities, personnel, spare parts
and procedures. Reliability is the probability that an equipment will
continue to function correctly for a specified period of time without
failure under a prescribed condition of use.
Both maintainability and reliability are included as main-
tenance preventive characteristics in equipment design and support
resources requirements. Maintainability and reliability goals must
be integrated into the equipment and support system design through
requirement and contract specifications. The specification require-
ments inust be stated early in the concept formulation phase.
Surveillance over changes in both design and support is re-
quired to prevent degradation of maintainability and reliability.




requirements are met. The demonstration results are analyzed and
tradeoffs conducted to improve system design and support. These
early tradeoffs result in a continual narrowing down of configuration
ideas until a firm production baseline is established. Because paper
and prototype changes are relatively inexpensive, maximum emphasis
must be placed on maintainability and reliability prior to establishing
this baseline.
Maintenance Planning :
Maintenance planning establishes concepts and requirements for
each level of equipment maintenance to be performed during its useful
life. As such, maintenance planning defines the actions and supporting
requirements necessary to maintain the designed system and equip-
ment in its prescribed state of operations. Maintenance functions in-
clude checkout, servicing, crew augmentation, status monitoring, in-
spection, fault isolation, replacement, modification and overhaul. The
degree to which these various functions are to be performed by organi-
zational, intermediate, or depot level maintenance must be spelled out.
The use of contract maintenance should be considered. The mainten-
ance plan responds first to readiness requirements and next to econo-
mies in the commitment of supporting resources.
Specific maintenance actions to be performed at various levels
of maintenance and the resource requirements needed to support those
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actions, are identified by systematic and detailed maintenance engi-
neering analysis. This analysis is conducted concurrently with hard-
ware design and is updated as design changes. Maintenance engineer-
ing analysis documentation provides:
The identification and description of tools and test equipment,
facilities, personnel, spares and repair parts and technical data,
Quantification of most maintenance support needs by time and
place,
Personnel requirements analysis by skill, type and number, and
Facilities loading to establish adequacy and utilization.
Support and Test Equipment :
The purpose of the support and test equipment program is to
assure that the required support and test equipment is available to the
operating forces and supporting maintenance activities in a timely man-
ner. The ability to perform the required unscheduled and a scheduled
maintenance depends on the adequacy of the support and test equipment
identified or developed concurrently with the prime system and equip-
ment. Support and test equipment consists of tools, metrology and
calibration equipment, monitoring and checkout equipment, mainten-
ance stands and handling devices which are categorized into special
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(peculiar to the system under development) and common (commercially
available or currently in the defense inventory). The support and test
equipment program encompasses all life cycle phases.
Supply Support :
Maintaining operational readiness under diverse conditions of
military use depends directly on the availability of the right supplies
at the time and place they are needed. Supply support is an essen-
tial element of the logistics integration effort and is responsible for
the timely provisioning, distribution and inventory replenishment of
spares, repair parts, and special supplies.
Supply planning for spares and repair parts must be based
upon technical inputs from maintenance planners and engineers (e. g.
,
system/equipment utilization rate, operating hours, failure rates,
required field repair rates, locations, and selected maintenance
items critical to safety and mission accomplishment). This process
requires support management attention through all phases of the
equipment life cycle. Inventory management control depends upon
current and complete knowledge of item status by configuration and





Transportation and Handling :
The transportation and handling element includes the character-
istics, actions and requirements necessary to insure the capability to
transport, preserve, package and handle all equipment and support
items. The functional requirements and actions are developed from
operations and maintenance analyses, equipment design drawings,
specifications and other documentation defining transportability cri-
teria, handling equipment and procedures, and packaging and preser-
vation needs. Requirements to be considered include:
Transportability and packaging criteria such as time, locations,
duration, frequency, volume, safety, security and fragility;
Desired locations for transportation equipment and facilities;
Planned availability of existing system capabilities by quantity,
volume and location;
Additional or special transportation and handling procurement
requirements; and
Interfaces with other system design and support management
functions.
These considerations require support management attention




The purpose of the technical data program is to provide for
the timely development and distribution of technical data necessary
to conduct operations, training maintenance, supply, modification,
repair and overhaul of the systems and equipment. Technical data
provides the link between personnel and equipment. It includes
drawings; operating, maintenance and modification instructions
;
provisioning and facilities information; specifications; inspection,
test and calibration procedures; instruction cards and equipment pla-
cards; special purpose computer programs and other forms of audio/
visual presentation required to guide people performing operations
and support tasks.
Technical data planning must be based upon information from
equipment operations and maintenance planners (e. g. , system/
equipment use, design characteristics, operations and maintenance
methods and personnel tasks, frequency and time to repair, supply
provisioning and inventory items and procedures, etc. ). Technical
data considerations are involved in design and support trade-offs,
tests, demonstrations, production, operations and maintenance.
Facilities :
The purpose of the facilities program is to assure that all
required facilities are available to the operating forces and sup-
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porting activities in a timely manner. The ability to perform the
mission could depend on the adequacy of facilities provided concur-
rently with the prime system or equipment. Facilities planning is
based on operations and maintenance analyses, equipment design
drawings, specifications and other documentation necessary for de-
fining types of facilities, locations, space needs, environment, dur-
ation and frequency of use, personnel interfaces, installation activi-
ties, training requirements, test functions and existing facility appli-
cations. Facilities planning requires support management attention
through all phases of the life cycle to provide positive coordination
with other program elements, particularly with regard to dates of
need and construction program lead times.
Personnel and Training :
The personnel and training program defines the requirements
for trained operations and maintenance personnel and training de-
vices needed to support the program through all life cycle phases.
A realistic estimate of current manning capabilities, in terms of
both numbers and skills, must be made against the probable quanti-
tative and qualitative manning demands of the system or equipment
concepts under study. As hardware concepts are developed, design
and support decisions must be made with due consideration for their
impact on manpower and training requirements.
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Personnel and training planners must progressively identify
manning requirements for test and demonstration, operations and
maintenance in the use environment. They must consider task cate-
gories and resulting optimum skill mixes needed to achieve or exceed
readiness performance goals. Personnel requirements for operations
and maintenance must be balanced against manpower availability.
Funding :
Successful ILS planning during all phases of the equipment life
cycle requires management attention to the interface between the sup-
port element needs and defense budgeting and financing procedures.
Because of their importance to implementing logistics support, budget-
ing and financing activities are included as a prime element of support
management. Budgeting and financing activities should include the:
Early determination of logistics support funding requirements,
which, together with experience factors from similar equipment
programs, allow accurate forecasting of life cycle costs,
Accurate updating of forecasts for timely fiscal planning and
apportionment of required research and development, investment
and operating funds,
Allocation of available program funds to each logistics support
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element based upon its justified need, with emphasis given to
program schedule and task priorities, and
Accurate accounting of funds expenditures using work break-
down structure and measurement criteria to insure proper funds
utilization and redistribution.
Management Data:
Defense activities use and support many information systems
to meet separate technical management needs of organizations with
differing development, support and operational missions.
Information and control systems interfacing with support
management include: maintenance engineering and analysis control
documentation; engineering test and demonstration records; program
schedule and cost controls, such as pert or critical path; maintenance
management and failure data; miscellaneous requirements forecasts,
e.g., personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities; configuration
management; operational readiness support status, and supply
management effectiveness reporting systems.
Early in the development phase of the acquisition life cycle,
Support Management selectively identifies the extent to which the
above information systems will be required during the item's life
cycle, when they will be required and how and by whom the require-
4
ments will be met.
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Data become useful information only when they are assembled
into manageable aggregates for purposeful evaluation. When this can
be easily done manually, time and costs can be reduced. When sam-
pling /summary techniques can provide needed information on a one-
time or periodic basis, redundant report processing is eliminated.
At the other extreme, the acquisition and operation of new and
complex equipment may justify electronic data processing support.
Here, standardization of data codes, use of available software, and
new generation computer capabilities combine to make data- bank con-
cepts attractive. This approach satisfies all the information require-
ments of the formal systems and also permits selective reporting of
current data to functional support managers on an as- required basis.
Source: Department of Defense Publication 4100. 35-G, Integrated
Logistics Support Planning Guide for POD Systems and
Equipment
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WEAPON SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE PHASE
SUPPORT PLANNING ACTIVITIES
Concept Formulation phase support planning activities begin with the
definition of top level functions needed to satisfy operational capa-
bility, e.g., new mission, weapon system, or equipment. Trade-off
studies are performed to find different means of satisfying those re-
quirements which cannot effectively be satisfied by existing support
capabilities. The best of these support programs are selected and in-
cluded in the 5 -Year Defense Program along with the prime equipment
selection.
Contract Definition phase support planning activities are based on the
logistics requirements in the system development plan. The technical
requirements are grouped together with management planning criteria
for inclusion in the request for proposal to contractors. Contractor
proposals should be evaluated for: (1) the degree to which they meet
or exceed minimum readiness requirements and other support specifi-
cations, (2) comparative credibility of life cycle cost estimates, and




selected contractor support plan and detailed technical and management
criteria for development phase planning are combined in a logistics
support plan for inclusion in development phase contracts. Anticipated
requirements for maintenance actions, equipment, personnel, training,
spares, and data are identified. Development contracts must define
equipment readiness (in terms of maintainability and reliability re-
quirements) as well as other support requirements and constraints,
schedules and controls, and subsystem and system demonstrations to
be conducted for validation of all specification requirements.
Development phase support planning activities begin with the definition
of more detailed logistics support concepts and resource requirements
as the system /equipment design progresses. Logistics support per-
sonnel participate in design reviews and hardware tests and demon-
strations. All resulting changes are evaluated by support element
specialists for their impact on support requirements and functions.
Design/support trade-offs are conducted. Program management
approval based on these trade-offs results in establishment of a pro-
posed product baseline configuration and release of initial production
contracts.
Production phase support planning activities start with the completion
and release of detailed procurement specifications for hardware and
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supporting items. Limited quantities of these resources are procxired
for test. A first article inspection is conducted. Service tests are
conducted in a preplanned operational environment to verify user
suitability and the achievement of support requirements. Deficiencies,
found during test, are corrected by engineering change. The changes
are evaluated for their impact on support planning prior to their
incorporation into follow- on production items.
Operational phase support activities begin prior to delivery of ini-
tial production units to the first operating organization for suitability
testing. All deficiencies are identified and evaluated by design/sup-
port trade-offs prior to making modification decisions. Equipment
modernization or phase-out for technical reasons is dependent on
advancements in the state-of-the-art, revised mission requirements
and evaluations of the cost-effectiveness of maintaining existing in-
ventories compared to replacement with better equipment.
Source: Department of Defense Publication 4100. 35-G, Integrated
Logistics Support Planning Guide for POD Systems and
Equipment






Source: Department of Defense Directive 4100. 35-G, Integrated












4. 5 to 5. 5 Treasury borrowing cost,
except for Power Supply










4. 5 Estimated productivity of
capital.
4.875 to 5.0 Treasury borrowing cost.
3.0 to 5.0 Estimated rate of return on
a safe investment and a
slightly higher rate.





Department of Defense 10.
Sometimes Treasury bor-
rowing cost used, sometimes
rate used by private utilities,
sometimes "rate used in in-
dustry. "




8.0 to 12.0 Opportunity cost, in U.S.,
and in foreign countries in-
volved.
Department of Interior 3. 1 to 12. Rate indicated in Senate
Document 97 to average





Department of Health, to 10.0 Various factors, depending
Education, and on the circumstances.
Welfare
Source: General Accounting Office Report, Survey of Use By Fed-
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